The Great Debate That Made the U.S. Constitution. Madison James
States would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century, When the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however that the different proportions of importance in the Union, of the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil & Military of that nation will find I believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.
But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger to have one with another 6 members; and that upon a question, two members of each smaller State should be in the affirmative and one in the Negative, they would make
Affirmatives 14 Negatives 7
And that all the larger States should be unanimously in the Negative, they would make Negatives 36
— -
In all 43
It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 43, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.
The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different Constitution, some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries were contested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present when such differences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of a State is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Small States are more easily well & happily governed than large ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some States, and their fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for the consideration of the Committee another mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature.
Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union.
Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion.
The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress.
The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of Delegates from each State.
And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members voting.
If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful States for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper.
This mode is not new. It was formerly practised with success by the British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just to accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united, they gave us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions appeared to require them for the common good of the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions that we refused & resisted. Those contributions however were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which the Representation shall be equal.
My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already mentioned that the present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally by Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It is of September 6. 1774. The words are
"Resolved that in determining questions in this Congress each Colony or province shall have one vote: The Congress not being possessed of or at present able to procure materials for ascertaining the importance of each Colony."
On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and Mr. Wilson's motion it passed in the affirmative.
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland divd. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was then moved by Mr. Rutlidge, seconded by Mr. Butler to add to the words "equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just agreed to, the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On motion of Mr. Wilson seconded by Mr. Pinkney, this was postponed; in order to add, after the words "equitable ratio of representation" the words following: "in proportion to the whole number of white & other free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes, in each State," this being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5, 7, or 10 years.
Mr. Gerry thought property not the rule of representation. Why then should the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of representation more than the Cattle & horses of the North.2
On the question, — Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryland Virginia N. C. S. C. & Geo: were in the affirmative: N. J. & Del: in the negative.
Mr. Sherman moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have one vote in the 2d branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than an equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr. Elsworth3 seconded the motion.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2d branch,
Massachusetts no. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania no. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2d branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1st branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2d as in the 1st branch it passed in the affirmative;
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland no. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Government & territory to each State, being considered — the words "or partition," were, on motion of Mr. Madison added, after the words "voluntary junction;"
Mas. N. Y. P. Virginia N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J. Del: Maryland no.
Mr. Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea of distinct States which would be a perpetual source of discord. There can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether