The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Ali Ahmad Jalali
lack of adequate reconnaissance cost them dearly. Moving a convoy of supply vehicles in close terrain, without effective security arrangements, often resulted in major tactical setbacks. They further failed to cover the convoy movement with helicopter reconnaissance and helicopter gunships. The Mujahideen had calculated the reaction time for helicopter gunships from Kandahar air base. Timely action by helicopter gunships could have saved the day for the Soviet convoy, but they were apparently not planned for and not on call.
Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zonewould drive out of it. The security detail followed this SOP. Instead of aggressive efforts to use their armored strength and fire power to outflank the ambush groups and cut off their withdrawal, the Sovietsecurity vehicles passively remained with the embattled column and fired on suspected Mujahideen positions. They had little effect.
Later on, as the Soviet forces established stationary security posts in the key areas along the highway, they failed to support and sustain them in the face of constant Mujahideen attacks. This later led them to construct a bypass road further to the north away from the dangerous green zone. The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerilla war, the loss of initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of tactical combat.
What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to the ambush site. Simultaneous attack on the enemy column along its entire depth was perhaps the most decisive element in this ambush. In this case, the Mujahideen had approximately 40 combatants to a kilometer of ambush. This was much denser than usual Mujahideen ambushes andreflected that they were fighting from a green zone which could accomodate more combatants.
However, the Mujahideen failed to exploit the initiative they achieved through surprise by moving to the road to complete the destruction of a demoralized and panicked enemy. Instead, they pulled out immediately after their success. This failure to fully exploit an ambush became a hallmark of Mujahideen hit and run tactics throughout the war.
Later fighting confirms the importance of field fortifications and terrain to increase battlefield survivability and sustain combat despit eenemy air and artillery superiority. This was a lesson once learned bythe Mujahideen that was effectively implemented throughout the war. The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted effort to find and destroy these positions. The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection ofthe place and time of tactical actions against the enemy. In areas where the local population remained in their homes and had not emigrated, local resistance units preferred to reserve for themselves the choice of time, place and method of action against the enemy and not let outside Mujahideen groups risk their security and plans by conducting combat in their area without their consent. The decentralized nature of the resistance, factionalism and lack of unified command were both a Mujahideen strength and weakness.
VIGNETTE 12: AMBUSH AT QALA-E HAIDAR
by Asil Khan
(Asil Khan is a famous urban guerrilla who operated in and around Kabul. He belonged to the NIFA faction. Other notes and the DRA security plan consulted for this vignette. )
As early as 1980, Mujahideen began attacking Soviet columns along the major southwest highway connecting the Afghan capital ofKabul to Ghazni and Kandahar. This 480-kilometer stretch was vulnerable in many areas. The road between Cheltan and Maidan, just outside of Kabul, was continuously attacked by Mujahideen operating out of bases in the suburbs of Kabul, Paghman, Kurugh, Arghandehand Maidan. Initially, Soviet/ DRA forces would establish security out-posts at key points along the road every time they moved a column on the highway. According to the DRA security plan, different military units were responsible for sections of road and for manning the security outposts while Soviet or DRA convoys were moving through theirarea. Later on, as military traffic along the highway increased, units would routinely post security details at the outposts in the morning and pull them out at dusk. One of the outposts was located at the old fort of Qala-e Haidar, some 15 kilometers west of Kabul. This outpost was vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who would sneak up on the outpost from neighboring villages which were not under government control (Map 13 - Haidar).
In the beginning of October 1984, the DRA tired of the repeated Mujahideen attacks and did not man the outpost for many days. Asil Khan decided to conduct an ambush at Qala-e Haidar, although he knew that he could not hold the site for more than a few minutes after the ambush, since the DRA could quickly reach the outpost from adjacent outposts. On the night of 18 October 1984, Asil Khan led a 15-man team to Qala-e Haidar. There had been some road repair by the outpost and the road had been scraped down and graded. Asil Khan had his men bury three powerful remote-controlled mines in the road immediately in front of the outpost. They also buried or disguised the wires leading away from the mines to the ambush site. They spent two nights mining the highway and preparing fighting positions in the orchards and in a ditch in front of Qala-e Haider. Lookouts watched the road for approaching columns.
On the morning of 20 October, there were an unusual number of helicopters flying in the area. Asil Khan felt that this indicated that a convoy was leaving Kabul and so he moved his men into the ambush site and waited for the column to arrive. Around 1000 hours, a large supply column, escorted by tanks and APCs, approached the Mujahideen position. Helicopters were flying overhead. As the leading tanks and APCs reached the kill zone, the Mujahideen detonated the mines One tank blew up and the column came to a sudden halt. The Mujahideen opened fire on the column. But the Mujahideen were so concerned about making a fast getaway, that their fire was not too effective against the vulnerable column. They destroyed just one truck with their RPGs before they broke contact and fled unscathed to friendly territory in the west.
COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen achieved surprise but failed to exploitit fully once the column stopped. The commander's desire to safeguard his force prevented their further damaging the column. Still, a tank and a truck is a good days work for a 15-man ambush. Proper selection of the ambush site is key and this area was very open and offered little protection to the force. Some 12 kilometers further south is the Kotal-e Takht (the Takht pass) which is far more suitable for an ambush. The terrain there also allows surprise and provides better protection and concealed exit routes for the ambushing force. An ambushing force could fight much longer in this area and inflict more damage on a column. However, there are certain limitations in selecting an ambush site in the area. First of all, Mujahideen groups generally operated on their home turf. Acting outside their home turf could have unfavorable political, and support ramifications. Secondly, the Mujahideen wanted to harass their enemy as close to the capital as possible for political and propaganda reasons. Attacks at the gates of Kabul were more significant than attacks further out. Finally, since the area is very open, an ambush here had a good chance at surprise since it is not an obvious ambush site.
VIGNETTE 13: AMBUSH AT THE SADRE AZAM HILL
by Doctor Mohammad Wakil
(Doctor Mohammad Wakil is from Shakardara District north of Kabul. He graduated from high school before the war. He joined the resistance and received medical training in Pakistan.)
It was August 1984. We had information that a Soviet supply column would come to Kabul from the north. There