The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Ali Ahmad Jalali
the convoy.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen conducted ambushes for harassment or for spoils. Often, harassing ambushes were small-scale ambushes which would only fire a few rounds into the convoy to destroy or damage some vehicles. Then the ambushers would withdraw without attempting to loot the column before the convoy commander could react Ambushes conducted for spoils (weapons, ammunition, food, clothing and other military supplies) were normally conducted by larger forces who could maintain their positions for up to an hour. Still, the ambush was a short-term action designed to capitalize on surprise and terrain. Roadblocks, discussed in a later chapter, were designed to fight the enemy to a standstill and prevent his passage for an extended period of time.
Ambushes for spoils were essential to maintaining the Mujahideen in the field. Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers. Most of them had family responsibilities. Normally all captured heavy weapons and ⅕th of the spoils went to the commander. The other ⅘ths was divided among the Mujahideen combatants. Many Mujahideen would take their captured Kalashnikovs and other trophies to Pakistan where they would sell them and then give the money to their families to live on.
Although the popular concept of the Mujahideen combatant is a hardened warrior clutching a Kalashnikov assault rifle, the most important Mujahideen weapon in the conflict was the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher. This Soviet-manufactured, short-range weapon allowed the Mujahideen to knock out tanks, trucks and, occasionally, helicopters. The RPG was a great equalizer and a great weapon in an ambush. Although the Mujahideen were light infantry, heavier crew-served weapons gave them more range and staying power in a fight. Mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns were essential to the force that intended to hold its ground for a time against mechanized Soviet and DRA forces.
The standard Soviet/DRA convoy had a group of armored vehicles at the front of the convoy, more armored vehicles spaced evenly through-out the convoy and another group of armored vehicles constituting a rear guard. The convoy might have a helicopter or ground advance guard or patrol sweep the route prior to movement. Sometimes a mine-detection/clearing force would precede the convoy, although mine-clearing was usually the responsibility of the unit guarding the road and the convoy would not start until the unit had given the "all clear." Sometimes a convoy would have artillery groups move within the column and leap-frog to provide rapid, on-call fire support.
When hit, the convoy's standard reaction was to leave armored vehicles inside the kill zone to return fire while the trucks drove out of the kill zone. If the armored vehicles chased the ambushers away, the convoy would continue. If the armored vehicles could not deal with the ambush, helicopter gunships could usually drive the ambushers from their positions. The convoy commander tried to maintain the movement of his convoy and would not usually turn forces around to deal with ambushes. Sometimes this meant that an ambush would split a convoy. The Soviets and DRA seldom dismounted infantry to pursue their ambushers since convoy movement had priority, and they seldom had enough infantry accompanying the convoy to pursue the Mujahideen into their neighborhood and overpower them.
The Mujahideen seldom hit the head of a column unless terrain allowed them to bottle-up the column by doing so. The Mujahideen preferred to hit the middle of the convoy where there were fewer armored vehicles. If possible, they tried to seal off the section of convoy they were attacking if they meant to loot it. Mujahideen usually prepared fighting positions at the ambush site which enabled them to withstand fire from enemy armored vehicles and, sometimes, helicopter gunships. The most successful Mujahideen ambushes organized the ambush into a heavy weapons support group, flank security groups, an assault group, and a logistics support/spoils removal group. The best ambushes had a well-understood chain of command and radio communications between the groups. Following the ambush, the flank security groups (with an air defense element), covered the withdrawal of the other groups over a secured withdrawal route.
1 ↑ Mulla Latif was killed in fighting later in the war.
2 ↑ The green zone is an irrigated area thick with trees, crops, irrigation ditches and tangled vegetation. Green zones usually run parallel to rivers and are usually practically impassable for vehicles.
3 ↑ The Mujahideen acquired a lot of Afghan Army and DRA material. The Afghan infantry battalion had nine Goryunov 7.62mm machine guns and nine 82mm mortars by TO&E.
4 ↑ Author Ali Jalali has conducted tactical classes on this very terrain while teaching Afghan Army officers at the Higher Education School. It truly is an excellent ambush site.
5 ↑ N. I. Pikov, "Vidy spetspropagandistskoy deyatel'nosti Armii Respubliki Afganistan"[Methods of Special Propaganda Activity of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan], Opytprimeneniya Sovetskikh voysk v Respublike Afganistan [Experience applied by SovietForces in the Republic of Afghanistan], Moscow: Institute of Military History, 1990, 151–184 provides a good view of the composition and employment of these teams.
6 ↑ The Mujahideen called the 60mm mortar the "guerrilla mortar" (cheriki hawan) due to its light weight and transportability.
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