The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Ali Ahmad Jalali
can only hopethat peace will finally come to Afghanistan so that they can start thelong, difficult job of rebuilding their shattered country. Our special thanks for the generous hospitality and supportextended to us by Nancy Dupree of the Agency Coordinating Body forAfghan Relief, Pir Gailani, Mr. Kamaluddin of the Afghan MediaResource Center, Abdul Ahad Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, GeneralCounsel Haji Abdul Khaleq, Vice Counsel Muhammad Wali Naeemiand Abdul Ghani Wardak.
A special thanks to our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, who wentinto areas of Afghanistan to conduct interviews where we could not go. We contacted several major Mujahideen commanders such as Ismail Khan, Masood, Abdul Haq, and Jalaluddin Haqani for interviews and material, but we were unable to meet with them before the book dead-line. Our thanks in advance for the privilege of returning at a future time to conduct those interviews and to include them in a follow-on book.
Our special thanks to Colonel David O. Smith, Lieutenant ColonelTerry Cook, Captain Bob Hehl and TSGT Barry Cuthbertson of theUnited States Defense Attache Office in Islamabad and PrincipalOfficer of the United States Consulate in Peshawar, Brad Hanson.
The United States Marine Corps funded the research, writing andpublication of this book. Charlie Cutshaw, Karen Dolan and Dick Voltzof the USMC Studies and Analysis Division at Quantico, Virginiaprovided funding for printing The Bear Went Over The Mountain:Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and agreed to underwrite theproduction of this counterpart volume on Mujahideen tactics. ColonelCharles Johnston, the former Director of the U.S. Army ForeignMilitary Studies Office (FMSO) enthusiastically supported theresearch and production as did FMSO Director Dr. Graham Turbiville,and FMSO analysts Dr. Jacob Kipp, Tim Thomas and Major RayFinch. Robert Love helped with translation support and Linda Prideand Al Lindman provided computer assistance. The Combined ArmsResearch Library and Command and General Staff College MapLibrary at Fort Leavenworth provided invaluable assistance. AliceMink of FMSO kept the whole production on time and under budget.
A "band of brothers," skilled in tactics, read and provided commen-tary on the manuscript. Our special thanks to Colonel (Ret) David M.Glantz of Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Colonel (Ret.) Charles E. Johnston,former Director of FMSO; Colonel (Ret) William M. Mendel of FMSO;Allen E. Curtis, Director of Intelligence and Security at the NationalTraining Center; former Marine Captain (Ret) Tim Leaf of Quantico,Virginia; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of CENTCOM; LieutenantColonel Karl Prinslow of FMSO; and Major Darr Reimers of the 1stCavalry Division. Mary Ann Glantz graciously edited the manuscript. JonathanPierce was the book editor/designer, Rhonda Gross created the initialmap graphics, and Emily Pierce did a superb job of finishing the mapsand designing the cover.
Homaira Jalali and Gina Grau showed remarkably good humorand supported the efforts of their husbands as they gathered the mate-rial and worked on the book. We thank all of you for your help. Any mistakes are the authors.
PREFACE
Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in southwest Asia, is home todiverse social communities that share common experience throughinteraction with dominant states, empires, invading armies, tradeand cultural movements that traversed the land during their thou-sands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modernAfghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speakingHazaras, Balochis, etc.) straddle the boundries of the state. However,their national identity is mostly defined by their differences withtheir ethnic kinsmen across the borders rather than their nationalcommonalities. About 99% of Afghanistan's over 17 million popula-tion are Muslim, of which 85% are followers of the Sunni sect whilethe rest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans live in rural communities ina land dominated by mountains and deserts. Modern travel isprimarily restricted to a highway ring connecting the various cities.There is no railroad network. Afghanistan has mostly been a loose collection of tribes and nation-alities over which central governments had varying degrees of influ-ence and control at different times. The country has been historicallyknown for its remarkable Islamic and ethnic tolerence. However trib-al rivalries and blood feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, and tribaldefiance of pervasive interference by the central government have keptthe different parts of the land at war at different times. In such casesthe kinship-based identity has been the major means of the communi-ty's political and military mobilization. Such identity places fargreater importance on kinship and extended family than ideology.
Afghanistan stands at a geographic crossroads that has seen thepassage of many warring peoples. Each of these has left their imprinton the ancient land and involved the people of Afghanistan in conflictOften this conflict got in the way of economic development. What hasdeveloped is a country composed of somewhat autonomous "villagestates" spread across the entire country.1 Afghans identify themselvesby Qawm—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residenceand sometimes occupation. Western people may refer to this as "tribe",but this instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic 1 Ali A. Jalali, "Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan", paper given at the Instituteof World Politics, Washington, D.C., July 1995, page 4. XIII subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups and groups united byinterests.2 The Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic unit of socialcommunity and, outside the family, the most important focus on indi-vidual loyalty. Afghanistan has, at times, been characterized as adisunited land riven by blood feuds. The feuds center on family andQawm. Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm have resolved feuds andheld the land together. Village elders can put feuds on hold for adecade or longer and then let them resume once the agreed-on time hasexpired and the matter is still unresolved. Afghanistan's ancient rootsand strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but alsothe means to cope when central authority has collapsed. Historically,the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruc-tion of its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of thenation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized polit-ical, economic and military potential, have always taken over theresistance against the invaders.3 This was the case during two wars with Great Britain in the 19th Century (1839–1842, 1878–1880). This happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War.
The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley tovalley and tribe to tribe. No more than 15 percent of the guerrillacommanders were military professionals. However, Afghanistan hada conscript army and virtually every 22-year-old male served his twoyear obligation. This provided a basic military education which easedcooperation between the various Mujahideen groups. The Mujahi-deen were true volunteers—unpaid warriors who fought to protecttheir faith and community first and their nation next. As true vol-unteers, fighting for their Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen lookeddown on the professional soldier (asker) as a simple mercenary whowas either the victim of a press gang or too stupid to ply any othertrade.4 This disdain did not attach to the professional officer, whoenjoyed a great deal of prestige.
Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war ala Mao Tse Tung or VoNguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force a new ideolo-gy and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend theirQawm and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value 2 ibid,3. 3 ibid,4. 4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994,page 158–159. xiv system, an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. Itwas a spontaneous defense of community values and a traditional wayof life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or inter-national political organizations.5 The Great Game 6 Russian expansionism and empire building in Central Asia beganin 1734 and Moscow's interest in Afghanistan was apparent by the late1830s. The Great Game described the British and Russian struggle forinfluence along the unsettled northern frontier of British India and inthe entire region between Russia and India. Afghanistan lay directlyin this contested area between two empires. Russia described hermotives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and toestablish order and control along her southern border. The British,however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus,Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feelthreatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near Indiaand ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated thatRussian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to awarm-water port. Britain claimed that her own actions were to protectthe frontiers of