The Philippines - Past and Present (Vol. 1&2). Dean C. Worcester
she has in Cuba.”15 Apacible thought that the best thing was independence under an American protectorate.
On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should “not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence.”16
Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:—
“The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for the independence of ‘the Philippines’ as far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible.”17
On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary.18 He was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had.19
Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.
On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:—
“I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizenship if they wished it.”20
We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain American,21 and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo’s name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos,22 but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.
There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong.23 Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.
Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:—
“In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano24 addressed to Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letter written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna, in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said: ‘Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.’ Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo’s government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano and Pardo25 still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: ‘that if Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese Government would help.’ Aguinaldo believed Sandico’s story (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba.”26
But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.
As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation.27
Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.
Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to “show their teeth,” and see “who was deceiving whom,” resorting to “force of arms” if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.
Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.
The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking the American troops.
And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:—
Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.
Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.
Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by the Insurgents.
Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.
Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.
It lay at the mercy of Dewey’s guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.
Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo’s help? Let us consider his testimony on the subject:—
“Senator