The Philippines - Past and Present (Vol. 1&2). Dean C. Worcester
in advance of projected American attacks.
They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.
After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.
They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings and a share in “the war booty.” They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they would be driven out.
I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.
The following is the programme of “coöperation” outlined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:—
“I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manila and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor with full powers to establish a provisional government.
Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior towns with their troops or any other act which might be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.
“After having written these lines, I had another conference with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding the question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a violation of international law. They are no longer fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well aware of the false position said General would find himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and even therein care should be observed … You must not permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees.”36
When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an “ally” might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General Anderson:—
“Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony.”37
And they went in that way.
On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his coöperation in the following words:—
“For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces.”38
On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the
“amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in the Great North American nation,”39
Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort
Up to the time of Governor-general Smith, no governor-general had ever penetrated the land of the Luzon head-hunters. He crossed Bontoc and Ifugao, in company with the author, in 1907. This photograph shows him on the crewst of the Polis range, at the boundary line between these two sub-provinces, sixty-four hundred feet above the sea.
and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in military operations.
On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:—
“I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I would like to have Your Excellency’s advice and coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country.”40
To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:—
“When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to coöperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government.”41
Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—
“We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.
“General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.”
Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement