The Philippines - Past and Present (Vol. 1&2). Dean C. Worcester

      An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila

      The condition of the streets formerly made it impossible to remove night-soil and garbage from this district, and cholera was rampant there when this photograph was taken.

      This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:—

      “On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated—something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters—he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:—

      “ ‘Office U. S. Military Governor in the

      “ ‘Philippine Islands,

      “ ‘Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.

      “ ‘The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces:

      “ ‘Sir: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

      “ ‘It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

      “ ‘May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

      “ ‘Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

      “ ‘I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

      (Signed) “ ‘E. S. Otis,

      “ ‘Major-General, U. S. V.,

      “ ‘United States Military Governor in the Philippines.’

      “In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:—

      “ ‘Malolos, Bulacan, September 16, 1898.

      “ ‘The Commanding General of the American Forces:

      “ ‘My Dear Sir: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

      “ ‘I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

      “ ‘A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.

      “ ‘Your very respectful servant,

      (Signed) “ ‘Emilio Aguinaldo.’

“On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command109 would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.”110

      I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it, should be fully set forth.

      On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification to Aguinaldo that unless the latter’s troops were withdrawn beyond the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which might ensue.

      Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.

      Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation with the American forces up to this time.

      Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:—

      “Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports of casualties; but although he had failed to secure the surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison occupied and within their works. The American force on land was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far the relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the designs which he had by this time frankly declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations, and had not answered them, nor was it possible to answer them. The American forces were there under the instructions of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in his civil capacity, to have dealt with him in his civil capacity, would have