The Philippines - Past and Present (Vol. 1&2). Dean C. Worcester
commander in the field—a thing impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces are not empowered to recognize governments; that function is reserved to the President of the United States; and in this case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19, copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent to the Philippines ‘for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.’ These instructions contemplated the establishment of a military government in the archipelago by military officials of the United States.
“it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them on August 28, three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they were in accordance with the practice of the United States Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo were guided by it.
“It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received the impression at this time from their conversation with American officers that the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, as all American officers serving there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and was never given except under pressure. It is true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers that any government but that of the United States, any colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan as dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise the Government of the United States could not make. Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.
“No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American commander, and no American commander ever rendered such returns to him. At the time of General Merritt’s arrival, and until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and United States troops were united solely by the fact that they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to themselves, had to maintain such relations with the Americans as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet was at his disposal,111 and also such apparent harmony and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced to believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.
“General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able to pass through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal from Aguinaldo.
“In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.
“ ‘This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations with the insurgents. … As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that “the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,” I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and the military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops at my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.’ ”112
All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no coöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit further evidence of this fact.
1 P. 39.
2 For J. M. Basa.
3 P.I.R., 507–7.
4 P.I.R., 477. 1.
5 “Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After having secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then liquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wish to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur, do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters are in a very delicate state at the present time.”—P.I.R., 398. 3.
In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:—
“America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must be patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress are definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there would still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. I would not object at present to them taking up their residence there and acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placing our trust for the future in Providence which will never abandon the Philippines.”—P.I.R.
6 Blount, p. 283.