Talmud. Various Authors
requiring a sin-offering (while he is not the scriptural man "that acteth through ignorance"), still he is culpable of a transgression requiring a sin-offering? It is Munbaz mentioned above.
R. Huna said: One who has been travelling in a desert and does not know what day is Sabbath, must count six days from the day (on which he realizes) that he has missed the Sabbath, and observe the seventh. Hyya b. Rabh said: He must observe that very day and then continue his counting from that day. And what is the point of their differing? The former holds that one must act in accordance with the creation (which commenced six days before the Sabbath), while the latter holds that one must be guided by Adam's creation (on the eve of Sabbath). An objection was made: "If a man while travelling in a desert forgot when the Sabbath arrives, he must count 'one day to six' and then observe the seventh. Does this not mean he must count six days and then observe the seventh?" Nay; it may be said that it means that very day, and continue his counting from that day. If this be the case, why are we taught "he must count one to six"? It should be taught (plainly) he must observe a day and continue counting from that day. Moreover, we were taught in a Boraitha: "If one while travelling in the desert forgot when the Sabbath arrives, he must count six days and observe the seventh." The objection to R. Hyya b. Rabh is sustained.
Rabha said (referring to the traveller who forgot the Sabbath): "On every day, except the one on which he realizes that he has missed the Sabbath, he may perform enough labor to sustain himself." But one that should do nothing and die (of hunger)? Nay; only in case he provided himself with his necessaries on the preceding day. Perhaps the preceding day was Sabbath. Therefore read: he may labor even on that day to sustain himself. In what respects is that day, then, to be distinguished from other days? By means of Kiddush and Habhdalah. 1
Said Rabha again: "If he only recollects the number of days he has been travelling, he may labor all day on the eighth day of his journey, in any event" (for he surely did not start on his journey on a Sabbath). Is this not self-evident? Lest one say that one would not only not start out on the Sabbath, but also not on the day before Sabbath; hence, if he went out on the fifth day of the week, he is permitted to work on both the eighth and ninth days of his journey. Therefore he comes to teach us that only on the eighth day of his journey would he be permitted to work, for frequently one comes upon a caravan on Friday and starts out even on that day. "One who has entirely forgotten," etc. Whence is this deduced? Said R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba b. Abuhu: "There are two verses in the Scripture, viz. [Exod. xxxi. 16]: 'And the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath,' and [Lev. xix. 3]: 'And my Sabbaths shall ye keep.' How is this to be explained?" The first means the observance of the commandment of Sabbath generally, and the second means one observance of the commandment for each Sabbath.
"One who knew (the principle of) Sabbath." What is the reason of a difference between the former and the latter part of the Mishna? Said R. Na'hman: For what transgression does the Scripture make one liable for a sin-offering? For what is done through ignorance? In the former part of the Mishna the case of one who was not aware that it was Sabbath is dealt with, and hence only one sin-offering is imposed, while in the latter the case dealt with is of one who was aware that it was Sabbath, but ignorant as to the acts of labor, hence a sin-offering for each act is prescribed.
"Liable for a sin-offering," etc. Whence do we deduce the distinction between acts of labor? Said Samuel: It is written [Exod. xxxi. 14]: "Every one that defileth it shall be surely put to death." We see, then, that the Scripture has provided many deaths 1 for defiling the Sabbath. But does not the verse refer to one who violates the Sabbath wantonly? As it cannot be applied to an intentional violator, for it is already written [Exod. xxxv. 2]: Whosoever doeth work thereon shall be put to death"; therefore apply it to an unintentional sinner. How, then, will you explain the words "put to death"? That is only the pecuniary equivalent (of being put to death) (viz., he shall bring a sin-offering which costs money). Why not advance the distinction between the acts of labor, as R. Nathan (does elsewhere)? Samuel is not of the opinion of R. Nathan, but of R. Jossi, who says that the additional commandment not to kindle a fire on the Sabbath was taught additionally for the special purpose of conveying to us that one who does kindle a fire is not to be punished either with Karath or stoning; for we have learned in a Boraitha: The additional commandment not to kindle a fire on the Sabbath was taught additionally for the special purpose of conveying to us that one who kindles a fire on the Sabbath is not to be punished either with Karath or stoning. Such is the opinion of R. Jossi. R. Nathan says it is written for the sake of separation (from other acts). Let then the separation of acts of labor be adduced whence R. Jossi adduces them--in the following Boraitha: It is written [Lev. iv. 2]: "And do (of) any (one) of them," as follows: Sometimes one is only bound to bring one sin-offering for all transgressions, and sometimes one is bound to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression separately.
Said R. Jossi b. Hanina: "Why does R. Jossi explain that passage thus? The verse should read 'one of them' (Achath mehenoh), but in reality it reads 'of one of them' (Meachath mehenoh), or it should read 'of one them' (Meachath henoh), but it reads 'of one of them.' Therefore he explains that 'sometimes one is equal to many and sometimes many equal one.'" 1
Rabha questioned R. Na'hman: "How is it if one is ignorant of both (of the day being Sabbath and the prohibition of the acts of labor on that day)? Answered R. Na'hman: "Take one instance at a time. You say he was ignorant of the day being Sabbath; then he is bound to bring a sin-offering. How would it be if, on the contrary, I had said that he was ignorant of the prohibition of the acts of labor first? Would you say that he becomes liable to a sin-offering for each and every act performed?" Said R. Ashi: "Let us see from the man's actions. How would it be if one came to him and reminded him of its being Sabbath (without calling his attention to the fact that he was working)? If the man immediately stopped his work, it is clear that he had actually forgotten that it was Sabbath. If, however, the man was reminded by a third party that he was working (without having his attention called to the fact that it was Sabbath), and he immediately quit his work, it is evident that he was not cognizant of the prohibition of the acts of labor; hence he would become liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every act performed. Said Rabbina to R. Ashi: "What difference does it make? If one is reminded that it is Sabbath and he quits work, he becomes aware that it is Sabbath, and if he is reminded of his working he also becomes aware that the day is Sabbath; hence it makes no difference."
Rabha said (supposing the following case happened: "One reaped and ground the equivalent (in size) of a fig on a Sabbath, without knowing that it was Sabbath, and on another Sabbath did the same thing, knowing it was Sabbath, but not knowing that such acts of labor were prohibited; then remembered that he had committed a transgression on the Sabbath through ignorance of the day being Sabbath, and took a sheep and set it aside for a sin-offering. Suddenly he recollected that he had also committed a transgression on the other Sabbath, through his ignorance of the prohibition of the acts of labor. What would the law be in such a case? I can say that the sheep set aside for a sin-offering for the first transgression suffices also for the second, although in reality two sin-offerings were required to atone for the second transgression. The one sin-offering would suffice, because it is in truth not brought for forgetting the Sabbath, but for reaping and grinding; the reaping in the first instance carries with it the reaping in the second, as also the grinding in the first instance carries with it the grinding in the second, and one sin-offering atones for all.
Assuming, however, that in the second instance (when he forgot about the prohibition of the acts of labor) he (at some later time) recollected only having reaped (but forgot that he also ground), and having set aside the sin-offering he became liable for on account of his transgression in the first instance (when he forgot about the Sabbath), he atones for the reaping and grinding on the first Sabbath and for the reaping on the second Sabbath, but not for the grinding on the second Sabbath; hence (after also recollecting that he had ground) he must bring an additional sin-offering. Abayi, however, says: The one sin-offering atones for all, because the grinding, which he atones for in the first instance, also carries with it the grinding in the second instance. Why so? For the reason that in both instances the