Talmud. Various Authors
atoned for are analogous. (When a sin-offering was brought, a confession was made. In citing the sin committed in the first instance grinding was mentioned and applies also to the grinding in the second instance. Therefore no additional sin-offering is necessary.)
It was taught: If one has eaten tallow (which is prohibited) on two different occasions, and at both times the tallow was the equivalent (in size) of an olive (or larger); and afterward he was reminded of the first occasion, and later on of the second occasion also, what is the law in his case? R. Johanan says: He must bring two sin-offerings. Why so? Because he recollected the transgressions at different times. Resh Lakish, however, says: He need bring only one sin-offering. What is R. Johanan's reason? Because it is written [Lev. iv. 28]: "For his sin, which he hath committed," and he adduces therefrom that for every sin committed one must bring a separate sin-offering, and Resh Lakish holds according to the passage [ibid. 26], "Concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven him," and claims that it being one and the same sin, only one sin-offering is sufficient. But what will Resh Lakish do with the verse, "For his sin which he hath committed"? That refers to the sin-offering which had already been brought, and therefore could not apply to a later sin. And what about R. Johanan and the passage, "Concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven"? R. Johanan explains this as follows: If a man ate tallow equivalent (in size) to an olive and a half, and later ate another piece the size of half an olive. Afterward he recollected having eaten tallow, but thought that it was the size of one olive, might some not say that the remaining piece eaten in the first instance should be added to the piece eaten in the second instance, and thus constitute another piece the equivalent (in size) to an olive, and make him liable for another sin-offering? Therefore the passage which means: After once having obtained forgiveness for the transgression on the first occasion the second cannot be counted in with the first.
It was taught: If one intended to pick up a thing detached (for instance, a knife that had fallen in a row of vegetables), and while doing so (accidentally) cut off one of the growing vegetables, he is free. 1 If, however, he intended to cut something lying on (but not attached to) the ground, and instead cut off something growing out of (attached to) the ground, Rabha declares him free, because no intention to cut off the growing object existed in the mind of the man; but Abayi declares him culpable for the reason that, while the man did not intend to cut off what he really did, still the intention to cut was prevalent in the man's mind, and he really did cut; hence he is that the Scriptures refer to as "one who acteth unintentionally."
It was also taught: One who intended to throw (from private ground into public) only for a distance of two ells, but threw four, is freed by Rabha, for the reason that the original intention was to throw within a permissible distance (throwing for a distance of two ells only was permitted); but Abayi held him culpable, for the reason that the act originally intended was accomplished. If one threw in public ground mistaking it for private, Rabh holds him free (for the same reason as before), and Abayi holds him culpable (also for the same reason as he gave in the previous case). Both instances though analogous are necessary. In the first instance (of cutting), where Rabh holds the offender not culpable, the intention to cut off what was prohibited did not exist, but in the second instance (throwing four ells), it could not be accomplished without (carrying out the intention of) throwing for two ells, and passing the two ells (the object landing at a distance of four). Now, lest one might say that Rabha coincides with the opinion of Abayi, and from the latter instance it might be assumed that the offender intended to throw two, but threw four ells, hence Rabha holds him not culpable, for the intention to throw four ells did not exist; but if one threw four ells in what he thought was private ground, and which turned out to be public ground, the intention was carried out, for the object thrown reached its desired destination, and therefore lest one say that in this case Rabha coincides with Abayi, the two instances are illustrated, and we are informed that not even in this case does Rabha agree with Abayi.
MISHNA II.: The principal acts of labor (prohibited on the Sabbath) are forty less one--viz.: Sowing, ploughing, reaping, binding into sheaves, threshing, winnowing, fruit-cleaning, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, wool-shearing, bleaching, combing, dyeing, spinning, warping, making two spindle-trees, weaving two threads, separating two threads (in the warp), tying a knot, untying a knot, sewing on with two stitches, tearing in order to sew together with two stitches, hunting deer, slaughtering the same, skinning them, salting them, preparing the hide, scraping the hair off, cutting it, writing two (single) letters (characters), erasing in order to write two letters, building, demolishing (in order to rebuild), kindling, extinguishing (fire), hammering, transferring from one place into another. These are the principal acts of labor--forty less one.
GEMARA: For what purpose is the number (so distinctly) given? (They are enumerated.) Said R. Johanan: If one labored through total ignorance of the (laws governing the) Sabbath, he must bring a sin-offering for every act of labor performed.
"Sowing, ploughing." Let us see: Ploughing being always done before sowing, let it be taught first, The Tana (who taught as in the Mishna) is a Palestinian, and in his country they sow first and then plough. Some one taught that sowing, pruning, planting, transplanting, and grafting are all one and the same kind of labor. What would he inform us thereby? That if one performs many acts of labor, all of the same class, he is liable for but one sin-offering.
Said R. Aha in the name of R. Hyya b. Ashi, quoting R. Ami: "One who prunes is guilty of planting, and one who plants, transplants, or grafts is guilty of sowing." Of sowing and not of planting? I mean to say of sowing also.
Said R. Kahana: One who prunes and uses the branches for fuel is liable for two sin-offerings, one for reaping and one for planting. Said R. Joseph: One who mows alfalfa (hay) is guilty of mowing and planting both. Said Abayi: One who mows clover hay (which sheds its seed when mowed) is liable (for a sin-offering) for mowing and sowing.
"Ploughing." There is a Boraitha: Ploughing, digging, furrowing, are one and the same kind of labor. R. Shesheth said: One who removes a knoll of earth in a house becomes liable for building, and if in a field he is liable for ploughing. Rabha said: Filling up a hole in the house makes one liable for building, and in the field for ploughing. R. Aba said: Digging (the same hole) on Sabbath for the purpose of making use of the earth alone is free even according to R. Jehudah, who said that the performance of an unnecessary act of labor makes one culpable. He refers to labor that improves an object and not to that which spoils it.
"Mowing." There is a Boraitha: Reaping, vintaging, selecting dates, olives, and figs are all one and the same kind of labor. "Binding into sheaves." Rabha said: One who gathers salt from salt works is guilty of the act of binding into sheaves. Abayi, however, said that binding into sheaves applies only to produce of the soil.
"Threshing." There is a Boraitha: Threshing, carding, and hackling belong to one and the same class of labor.
"Threshing, winnowing, fruit-cleaning," etc. Is not winnowing, fruit-cleaning, and sifting one and the same class of labor? Abayi and Rabha both said: "Acts of labor executed during the construction of the tabernacle are enumerated separately, though they are of an analogous nature." Let pounding then also be enumerated (as labor, inasmuch as the spices for incense had to be pounded). Said Abayi: (It is true! This is also one of the acts of labor performed at the construction of the tabernacle.) But as the poor people do not pound their grain, generally using it in its natural state, it is not included in the principal acts of labor. Rabha, however, said: "The Mishna should be understood in the sense Rabbi expounded it: The principal acts of labor are forty less one. Should pounding be included, there would be forty even." Let then one of the principal acts (enumerated in the Mishna) be stricken out and substituted by pounding. Hence it is best to accept Abayi's reason.
The rabbis taught: If there are several kinds of food before a man on the Sabbath, he may select such as he desires and even set it aside, but he must not separate the good from the spoilt. If he does this, he is liable for a sin-offering. How is this to be understood? R. Hamnuna explained it thus: "One may select the good from the spoilt for immediate or later consumption, but he must not pick out the spoilt, leaving the good for later consumption. If he does this, he is liable." Abayi opposed: "Is there anything mentioned (in the Mishna) about separating the good