Talmud. Various Authors
them culpable, (and it is known which of them held to the former opinion and which to the latter). Said R. Ashi: "We have also learned in a Boraitha: 'Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both culpable.' Why so? Was not double the prescribed quantity necessary in order to make both culpable? Hence we must assume that the Boraitha holds one prescribed quantity to be sufficient." Said R. Aha, the son of Rabba, to R. Ashi: "What proof do you derive from this Boraitha? Perhaps it refers to a reed that was of sufficient size to cook an egg for one and another for the other?" R. Ashi answered: If such were the case, the Boraitha would say merely a "reed" and not a "reed used by a weaver." Said R. Aha again: "Perhaps the Boraitha refers to a reed of sufficient size to weave a napkin each for both of them? Therefore it were better to say that from this Boraitha we can derive no support either for one opinion or the other."
A certain scholar taught in the presence of R. Na'hman: "Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both not culpable." R. Simeon, however, declares them culpable. How can this be? (Is this not contrary to R. Simeon's usage?), Read then (on the contrary), the scholars said they are culpable and R. Simeon said they are not.
MISHNA VI.: If one carry victuals of less than the prescribed quantity in a vessel (out into the street) he is not culpable even of (carrying) the vessel, for the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals. If he carried a person on a litter he is not culpable even of (carrying) the litter, because the litter is of no consequence to the person. If he carried a corpse on a cot he is culpable. The same is the case if (he carries) a part of the corpse of the size of an olive or of a carcass the size of an olive and of a reptile the size of a lentil. R. Simeon declares all of them free.
GEMARA: The rabbis taught: "If a man carry out victuals of the prescribed quantity in a vessel, he is culpable of carrying the victuals, but not of (carrying) the vessel, because the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals; but if the victuals are such that they cannot be carried otherwise than in a vessel, he is culpable of (carrying) the vessel also." Shall we assume from this teaching that if one ate two pieces of tallow each the size of an olive at different times through forgetfulness (and was not reminded of his sin between both times of eating), he is bound to bring two sin offerings? Said R. Ashi: In the case of the man who is culpable of (carrying) both the victuals and the vessel, it must be assumed that he carried them through forgetfulness and was subsequently reminded of having carried only one of them (but forgot about the other); later he was reminded of having carried the other also, and according to the opinion of the teacher of this Boraitha, he is culpable and bound to bring two sin-offerings, one for each time he was reminded. The same difference of opinion exists here as we have seen existed between R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish (in the chapter concerning the general rule of Sabbath).
"If he carried a person in a litter," etc. Shall we assume that the Mishna is in accordance with R. Nathan and not with the rabbis of the following Boraitha? "If one carried out an animal or a bird (into the street), whether alive or slaughtered, he is liable." R. Nathan, however, says: "For (carrying out) a slaughtered (animal or bird) he is culpable, but not for one that is alive, because a live creature carries itself." Said Rabha: "It may be said the Mishna is in accordance with the rabbis of the Boraitha cited, as they differ with R. Nathan only concerning animals or birds, which usually struggle to get loose and thus become a burden; but concerning a person, who is carried and agrees to being carried, and virtually carries himself, the rabbis yield to R. Nathan."
Said R. Ada b. Ahba to Rabha: How will, in your opinion, the statement in our Mishna be made plain: "Ben Bathyra permits the selling of a horse to a Gentile, and a Boraitha, in addition to this, states that the reason that Ben Bathyra permits this is because the Gentile will not perform any work with the horse on a Sabbath that would involve the liability of a sin-offering (for a horse is used for riding only, and when a person rides a horse the person virtually carries himself, and hence is no burden to the horse), and R. Johanan says that Ben Bathyra and R. Nathan said (practically) the same thing." Now, if in your opinion the rabbis differ with R. Nathan only in the matter of animals and birds, because when carried they struggle for freedom, but agree with him in the matter of a person, why does R. Johanan say that only Ben Bathyra and R. Nathan say the same thing? Did not the rabbis also admit this? (The answer was:) R. Johanan said that Ben Bathyra in permitting a horse to be sold to a Gentile referred to one which was used only for carrying falcons. Are there then such horses? Yea; they are to be found at the Zaidons'. 1
R. Johanan said: Even R. Nathan holds a man culpable if he carries a person, animal, or bird that is bound.
"If he carried a corpse," etc. Said Rabba b. b. Hana in the name of R. Johanan, and the same was said by R. Joseph in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish: R. Simeon frees one, even if he carries out a corpse for burial. Said Rabha: "Even R. Simeon concedes that if one carry out a spade to dig a grave with, or a scroll to read from, he is culpable." Is this not self-evident? Should we then assume that according to R. Simeon's opinion even this kind of labor is not labor for its own sake, how can we find any labor for its own sake which in the opinion of R. Simeon would involve the liability of a sin-offering? Lest one say that R. Simeon does not hold a man culpable for carrying a thing unless the work done with the thing is both for the man's sake and also for the sake of the thing itself--for instance, if the spade was needed for digging and also had to be sharpened, or the scroll had to be examined and used for reading--hence he informs us that such is not the case.
There was a corpse in Drokra 2 and R. Na'hman b. Itz'hak permitted it to be carried out into unclaimed ground. Said R. Johanan, the brother of Mar, son of Rabhina, to R. Na'hman b. Itz'hak: "According to which Tana's opinion do you act? According to R. Simeon? Did R. Simeon allow this? He only stated that the act does not involve the liability of a sin-offering, but he did not permit it to start with?" R. Na'hman answered: By the Lord! You yourself, and even R. Jehudah, would allow this to be done the same as I did; did I say that it was to be carried into public ground? I said unclaimed ground! Do not forget that this was also for the sake of the honor due a human being, of which it is said: "Precious is the honor of man, and for its sake even a direct commandment of the Scripture may be circumvened!"
MISHNA VII.: One who pares his finger-nails, either by means of his nails or by means of his teeth; also one who plucks hair from his head, beard, or lip,; also a woman who braids her hair, or paints her eyebrows, or parts her hair, is, according to R. Eliezer, culpable. The sages, however, declare this to be (prohibited only by rabbinical law) as a precautionary measure.
GEMARA: Said R. Elazar: "The difference of opinion exists only in the case of paring the finger-nails by means of the nails, but if taken off with an instrument (all agree) that he is culpable." Is this not self-evident? Is it not plainly written in the Mishna, if he pares his finger-nails, one by means of the others? One might think that the difference of opinion is also concerning an instrument, and the reason the Mishna does not mention an instrument is only to show the firmness of R. Eliezer in prohibiting the paring of finger-nails even with one's own nails. He informs us that the difference of opinion is concerning the nails only. R. Elazar said furthermore: "The difference of opinion is only concerning a man's paring his own finger-nails, but if he pared another's all agree that he is not culpable. (The reason for this is because when paring one's own finger-nails a man can make them look as if trimmed with an instrument, but when trimming another's this is not possible.)" Is this not self-evident? Did not the Mishna say plainly: "His own finger-nails"? Nay. One might think that according to the opinion of R. Eliezer the trimming of another's finger-nails also makes one culpable, but the Mishna, stating plainly "his own finger-nails," intends only to show the firmness of the rabbis in making not culpable even those who pare their own nails; therefore he informs that such is not the case.
"Also one who plucks hair from his head," etc. There is a Boraitha: "One who cuts off a scissorsful of hair from his bead on the Sabbath is culpable." How much is a scissorsful supposed to be? Two hairs. R. Eliezer says: "One." The rabbis agree with R. Eliezer that in case one gray hair is plucked from a number of black hairs a man is culpable even for one, and not only on Sabbath but even on week days it is also prohibited, as it is written [Deut. xxii. 5]: "And a man shall