How the Nations Waged War. J. M. Kennedy
William.
The Tsar to the Kaiser.
Peterhof Palace,
July 29th, 1.0 p.m.
I rejoice that you are back in Germany. I beg you earnestly to help me at this grave moment. A shameful war has been declared on a weak country, and there is immense indignation in Russia, which I fully share. I foresee that I shall very soon be unable to hold out longer against the pressure exercised upon me, and shall be compelled to adopt measures which will lead to war. To obviate such a misfortune as a European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.
(Signed) Nicholas.
The Kaiser to the Tsar.
July 29th, 6.30 p.m.
I have received your telegram, and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. But I cannot, as I said in my first telegram to you, regard Austria-Hungary's action as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises are wholly unreliable if merely written on paper. In my view Austria-Hungary's action is to be regarded as an attempt to secure guarantees that Servia's promises shall be really translated into action. I am strengthened in this view by the declaration of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary aims at no territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense. I think, therefore, that it is entirely possible for Russia to maintain the rôle of a spectator of the Austro-Servian war without dragging Europe into the most awful war it has ever experienced. I believe that a direct understanding between your government and Vienna is possible and desirable, and, as I already telegraphed to you, my government has done all in its power to further such an understanding. Military measures on Russia's part, which Austria-Hungary could view as a threat, would naturally hasten a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would undermine the position of mediator which I have readily assumed in response to your appeal to my friendship and help.
(Signed) William.
The Kaiser to the Tsar.
July 30th, 1.0 a.m.
My Ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation: I said the same to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has only mobilised against Servia, and only a part of its army. If, as appears from your communication and that of your government, Russia is mobilising against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which you entrusted to me in friendly wise, and which I accepted at your express request, is jeopardised, if not rendered impossible. The whole burden of decision now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for war or peace.
(Signed) William.
The Tsar to the Kaiser,
Peterhof,
July 30th, 1.20 p.m.
From my heart I thank you for your speedy reply. I am this evening sending Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago for reasons of defence against Austria's preparations. Most heartily do I trust that these measures will in no way influence your position as mediator, which I value highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria to secure an understanding with us.
(Signed) Nicholas.
The two final telegrams have been given on pp. 148–150 of "How the War Began."
On July 28th, a confidential communication was sent by the Imperial Chancellor to the Governments of the various Federal States of Germany. After recapitulating the story of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, it proceeds as follows:
There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. The Novoye Vremya actually thinks that the responsibility for the European conflagration that would result from such action on the part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian Press is looking at things upside down. It was not Austria-Hungary which started the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which, by its unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Servian aspirations, even within Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy, and created a condition of things which finally found expression in the atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in the conflict on behalf of Servia, its right is no doubt good, so far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial acquisition at Servia's expense, or any tampering with the continued existence of the Servian kingdom—merely a desire for peace from the Servian machinations which imperil its existence.
The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against Austria-Hungary is, by breaking down the Danube Monarchy, to burst or weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German Empire completely. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as may be possible, from universal war, likewise directs us to support the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (Eingreifen) of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the sword, but if we do, it will be with the calm consciousness that we are guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of Europe.
This "calm consciousness" does not seem to have been disturbed by the reflection that in the spring of 1913, when Europe appeared to be settling down to a period of peace and prosperity after the Tripoli and Balkan wars, the German Government suddenly startled the whole world by imposing a special war levy of £50,000,000, and by increasing the peace strength of the German army to 870,000 men. Under the Quinquennial Army Law of 1905, the peace footing of the German army was largely increased and reached a total of 505,839 men in 1911. A new Quinquennial Law was voted by the Reichstag in 1911, and if it had been carried into effect the army would have had the strength of 515,221 in 1915–6. This, one would have thought, was surely a sufficient peace establishment; but in 1912 a still further Army Law provided for new units and also for increases in the peace effective. Hardly were the provisions of this law being applied when the special measure of 1913 was passed. The German army, in other words, rose from a peace strength of 505,000 men (excluding the one-year volunteers) in 1911 to a peace strength of about 512,000 in 1912, and a peace strength of 870,000 in the spring of 1914. There were no corresponding increases in any European army to call for this drastic strengthening of the German forces. Indeed, the French army had rather become reduced in numbers in consequence of the two years' service; and the Balkan States were exhausted. The Servia which had advanced against Turkey in the autumn of 1912 was a very much more powerful country than the Servia with which Austria picked a quarrel in 1914.
We were never told why this great increase in the German army was rendered necessary; nor did we learn why, at almost the same time, the Austrian Government voted huge sums for enlarging its land and sea forces. There was a vague reference in the Reichstag to the balance of military power. But, if the Balkan war had altered the military power of Europe, it had altered that power to the advantage of the Triple Alliance. The Balkan States, the perpetual menace of the Danube Monarchy, if we are to credit the statements made at Vienna, were exhausted after their campaigns, first against Turkey and then against one another. Austria herself had had her way with regard to Albania, and Russia had given up her project of securing an outlet on the Adriatic for Servia. Italy, the third partner in the Triplice, was beginning to recover from the effects of the Tripoli war; and France and England wished for nothing better than to be let alone.
If