Elements of Morals. Paul Janet
Division of social duties.—According to the foregoing distinctions, we will first divide duties into duties of justice and duties of charity.
Let us begin by expounding the duties of justice.
These duties may be summed up in a general manner in the respect for the person of others, and for all that is necessary for the preservation and development of that person. Hence four kinds of duties:
1. Towards the life of other men.
2. Towards their liberty.
3. Towards their honor.
4. Towards their property.
Besides these duties, purely negative, which consist only in doing others no harm, there are also the duties of justice, which may be called positive; and which consist not only in not injuring others, but also in granting each what he has a right to. This is called distributive or remunerative justice, and is the duty of all those who have others under them, and who are commissioned to distribute rewards, titles, or functions.
24. Duties towards the life of men.—We have seen above that self-preservation is the duty of every one, and that one should not attempt one’s own life, nor mutilate one’s self, nor injure one’s health. Now, all these obligations which we have towards ourselves, we have equally towards others; for that which each owes to himself, he owes it to his quality, as man, to his quality as a free and reasonable being, a moral person. It is, as Kant says, humanity itself that each one must respect in his own person; and it is also humanity which each must respect in others. We should not do to others what we do not wish that they should do to us, or what we should not wish to do to ourselves. Now, no one wishes others to attempt his life; no one should wish to attempt it himself. For the same reason he should not wish to attempt the life of others.
These are such self-evident considerations that it is useless to insist on them. Let us add that this duty rests, besides, on one of the most powerful instincts of humanity, the instinct of sympathy for other men, the horror of their sufferings, the horror of spilt blood. Those who are wanting in this sentiment are like monsters in the midst of humanity.
One of the corollaries of this principle is to avoid the blows and wounds which might, through imprudence and unexpectedly, cause death, and which, besides, are in themselves to be condemned, inasmuch as they contribute, if not towards destroying, at least towards mutilating, the person and rendering it unfitted to fulfil its duties and functions. In a word, to avoid scuffles, bodily quarrels, which are unworthy, moreover, from their very brutality, of a reasonable being; all this is comprised in the duty of avoiding homicide. All may be summed up in these words of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not kill.”
Pascal, in his letter on homicide (xiv. Provinciale), expressed most eloquently the duty concerning the respect for human life:
“Everybody knows, my fathers, that individuals are never permitted to seek the death of any person, and that, even if a man should have ruined us, maimed us, burnt our houses, killed our parents, and was preparing to murder us, to rob us of our honor, that our seeking his death would not be listened to in a court of justice. So that it was necessary to establish public functionaries who seek it in the name of the king, or rather in the name of God. Suppose, then, these public functionaries should seek the death of him who has committed all these crimes, how would they proceed? Would they plunge the dagger in his breast at once? No; the life of man is too important; they would proceed with more consideration; the law has not left it subject to the decision of all sorts of people; but only to that of the judges, whose integrity and sufficiency have been ascertained. And think you that one alone is enough to condemn a man to death? No; there are at least seven required; and among these seven there must not be any one whom the criminal has in any way offended, for fear that his judgment be affected, or corrupted by anger. In short, they can judge him only upon the testimony of witnesses, and according to the other forms prescribed to them; in consequence of which they can conscientiously pronounce upon him only according to law, or judge worthy of death only those whom the law condemns.”
After having thus expounded the innumerable precautions which society has taken, out of respect for human life, touching the persons of criminals, Pascal continues as follows:
“Behold in what way, in the order of justice, the life of man is disposed of; let us see now how you dispose of it.[16] In your new laws there is but one judge, and this judge is the offended party. He is at the same time judge, accuser, and executioner. He seeks himself the death of his enemy; he commands it, he executes him on the spot; and, without respect for either the body or soul of his brother, he kills and damns him for whom Christ died; and all this to avenge an affront, or slander, or an insulting word, or other similar offences for which a judge, although clothed with legal authority, would be considered a criminal if he should condemn to death those who had committed them, because the laws themselves are very far from condemning them.”
Finally, gathering into one word all the evils which homicide comprises, Pascal ends by saying “homicide is the only crime which at the same time destroys the State, the Church, nature, and piety.”
25. The right of self-defense.—None of the foregoing principles would present the shadow of a difficulty to any except those who are nearer the brute than man, if it were not for an apparent exception to the rule, which is the case of legitimate self-defense. To understand properly the solution of this question, it is necessary to examine carefully the nature of the relations which bind men to each other.
Every man is a moral person; that is to say, a free being, and for that very reason inviolable in his dignity and in his rights. He is, as Kant says, an end to himself, and should not be treated as a means. The things of nature are to us but means to satisfy our wants; we may therefore mutilate and destroy them, not as our whims may dictate, but as our wants require. Thus can we cut the finest trees of a forest to make fire of, or for furniture. We even claim a similar right over animals, although it may, perhaps, not be so evident. But we have no such right over man. We can neither mutilate nor destroy him for our use.
And, in fact, to destroy or mutilate through sheer force a member of humanity, is to apply to him the law of compulsion, which is the law of physical nature, and which without reserve governs all physical phenomena: it is to make of man a thing of nature, to see in him the body only, and ignore the soul.
The consequence of such conduct is evident: it is that whosoever employs against another the law of compulsion means thereby that he does not recognize between himself and other men any other law but that. Treating them as if they were purely physical agents, he gives us thereby to understand that he recognizes himself, and expects to be treated, as such; he means to take advantage of his strength as long as he is the strongest, but gives us to understand thereby that he is satisfied to submit to strength if he is the weaker.
It is here that the right of self-defense comes in. He who is violently attacked, has the right to oppose to violence just as much strength as there is employed against him. Otherwise, in allowing himself to be knocked down by strength, he would consent to the abasement, to the suppression of his own personality; he would in some respect be the accomplice of the violence he is made to suffer. Some Christian sects, straining this point, go so far as to condemn absolutely the right of self-defense; they do not see that this would infallibly bring with it the triumph of brute force, and the suppression of all justice. Such sects may, to a certain extent, manage to exist in civilized societies; but the principle is self-destructive, since not to resist violence is in some respect to be its accomplice.
Yet, whilst admitting the right of self-defense, it is necessary to recognize its limits. “This agent,” says M. Renouvier, “whom the right of self-defense treats as a brute, this being is a man, nevertheless, or has been one, or may become such. Hence the doctrine of conscience is to admit this right only when necessary, and not beyond what is necessary.” (Moral Science, Ch. LVI.) This is, to begin with, a natural consequence of the duties towards one’s self, since it is already a surrender of one’s dignity to be obliged to act in the capacity of