The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918. F. W. Bewsher
of the “invaders.” Shortly before leaving, the G.O.C. sent the usual short letter of thanks to the Town Council, through the Mayor, for the assistance, general kindness, and consideration accorded during the Division’s stay in the town. The following letter was received in reply:—
Bushmead, The Embankment,
Bedford, 29th April 1915.
Major-General Allason.
Dear Sir—Please accept on behalf of the Town and myself our many and sincere thanks for your kind letter of yesterday.
The people of this Borough will never forget the visit of the Highland Division, and the desire of all concerned to cause as little inconvenience as possible, leaving alone the material benefits that have accrued to the inhabitants generally through your visit.
I need hardly say how much we shall miss you. The friendships formed during the last nine months will last for many years to come.
We shall watch for news of the Division as if they were our own people.
I will have your letter read at the next Council meeting.
May God grant you all a safe return to the friends you leave behind.—Yours very truly,
(Signed) Harry Browning.
CHAPTER II.
ARRIVAL IN FRANCE—FESTUBERT.
On 13th April 1915 telephone instructions were received from the War Office that the 1/1 Highland Division was at once to be prepared for service overseas. The following day information was received that the battalions which had already been sent overseas would be replaced by the 6th and 7th Black Watch, and by four Lancashire battalions—the ¼ Battalion King’s Own Royal Lancashire Regiment,⅛ Battalion the King’s Liverpool Regiment,¼ the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the ⅖ Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers.
By 18th April these battalions had all joined the Division. On 29th April orders were received that the Division would entrain to Southampton and Folkestone for Havre and Boulogne during the next few days.
By 5th May the journey had been completed without any unusual incidents, and the Division was concentrated in billets in the area Busnes, Robecq, and Lillers, and formed part of the Indian Corps (Sir James Willcocks) of the First Army (Sir Douglas Haig).
As soon as the Division had completed its concentration in the First Army area, General Sir Douglas Haig paid it his first of many visits. The assistance which the Division received from Sir Douglas Haig and the First Army Headquarters Staff while finding its legs during its first days in France was invaluable.
At this period the general situation on the Western Front was as follows: The second battle of Ypres, prepared by the first discharge of asphyxiating gases, had begun on 22nd April, and was to continue with great intensity for over a month.
During the early part of this period the French were preparing an attack to be launched on 9th May between Arras and the right of the British lines. The First British Army, having been ordered to support this operation by an attack, had issued instructions directing the IVth Corps against the German position in the neighbourhood of Richebourg (south-west of Fromelles), and the Ist and Indian Corps against the German trenches between Givenchy and Neuve-Chapelle. These attacks as planned were accordingly delivered on 8th, 9th, and 10th May 1915. They, however, met with little success. It was therefore decided that the First Army should concentrate on the southern point of attack, and renew the operations on 12th May. This attack was subsequently postponed until the 15th owing to low visibility.
In the attack on the 15th the Indian Corps, owing to the strength of the enemy’s defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg-l’Avoué, again failed to make progress. The 2nd Division of the Ist Corps, however, captured the enemy’s first and support lines. On the following day, the 7th Division on the right of the 2nd Division successfully captured several second lines of enemy trenches, and these two Divisions continued the advance on the day after as far as the La Quinque Rue-Rue de Béthune road.
On 19th May the 2nd Division was relieved on this front by the 51st Division.[1]
On the 25th, the object of these operations having been attained, orders were given for Divisions in the line to act defensively and consolidate the ground won.
These operations were attended by serious casualties, but, to quote Sir John French’s despatch, they assisted in securing the brilliant successes attained by the French forces on the right, not only by holding the enemy on this front, but by drawing off a part of the German reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces east of Arras. In this battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a strongly-fortified position, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards.
From the above summary it will be seen that the 51st Division was initiated to the ways of war in the midst of a great battle. On 9th May it remained in reserve to the Indian Corps, and was held in readiness to move at short notice until 11th May. By this date it had become clear that the progress of the Indian Corps had not been such as to render the employment of its reserve at all probable.
On 14th May the 51st Division, less two brigades R.F.A. temporarily attached to the Lahore and 49th Division, moved to the area Caestre, Borre, Merris, Meteren, and came into G.H.Q. reserve.[2]
On 18th May the Division moved into the area La Gorgue-Vieille Chapelle. On the night 19–20th May the 152nd Infantry Battalion began the relief of the 2nd Division (General Horne), south of Neuve Chapelle, and on 20–21st the 153rd Infantry Brigade relieved a Canadian brigade in the Richebourg sector.
The Highland Division during its first tour of duty in the line was thus employed in the particularly trying operation of consolidating a newly-won position. Few operations call for more resource and more tactical skill on the part of junior officers and N.C.O.’s, or for more detailed planning and arrangement on the part of commanders and staffs. Order has immediately to be evolved from chaos. Covered approaches are non-existent, and must be constructed before movement during daylight becomes possible; sniping with rifles and, in some cases, field-guns is constant; the protection afforded by barbed-wire entanglements is wanting; arrangements for sanitation and cooking have not been planned. In fact, the amount of work required to make the position defensible and habitable appears overwhelming.
To make confusion worse confounded, officers, runners, reliefs, ration parties, &c., as long as movement is restricted to the hours of darkness, find the greatest difficulty in acquiring a working knowledge of the geography of the defences.
Moreover the Germans, in those days of short advances, were quick at recovering from the confusion in their artillery arrangements created by a successful attack. They were therefore always liable to bombard a newly-captured position heavily before the men had time to construct sufficient field-works to protect themselves from shell splinters.
In the case of the front taken over by the Division on this occasion, the normal difficulties were accentuated by the fact that digging-in was only possible to a depth of from two to three feet. Everywhere in the Flanders mud, below that level water is encountered. It is therefore necessary to erect above ground double rows of traversed breastworks, between which the men must live and have their being.
The difficulty of consolidation in this mud country requires to have been experienced to be fully appreciated.
The work of maintaining breastworks, when completed, in a state of repair is considerable, as they cannot withstand a bombardment by artillery or trench-mortars. In consequence sections of the trenches are frequently levelled to the ground, and have to be reconstructed. The labour of maintaining them when once erected is, however, a small problem when compared with the difficulty of erecting them de novo during active operations.
In the first place, owing to the flatness and absence of cover from view, which is characteristic