The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918. F. W. Bewsher
a prelude to an attack. It in consequence opened rapid fire. This fire was taken up by posts on its right and left. Subsequently the alarm travelled for several miles, and rapid fire was opened all along the line. The fight, often occasioned by Private X., just out from home, mistaking a pollarded willow for a German, involved an enormous expenditure of ammunition, in which the shooting was not always under complete control.
It will be easily understood that, without the red lamp, CD might have made things very unpleasant for AB in these circumstances.
This sector presented many difficulties. The defences that had been constructed were so limited that the troops in the line were far too congested. They were therefore liable to suffer undue casualties in the event of bombardment. Moreover, the supporting posts being isolated sections of trenches clearly visible, particularly in air photographs, were in consequence liable to attract a considerable volume of artillery fire. Further, communicating trenches, as usual, were quite inadequate to meet the requirements of the garrison.
General Bannatine-Allason therefore at once decided that the whole scheme of defence must be recast and largely augmented. Accordingly work was begun on a continuous support line, and on increasing the number of communication trenches. In fact, a considerable effort was demanded from the ranks to render the sector reasonably defensible.
When the Division was relieved in July much progress had been made, General Willcocks expressing himself to the Divisional commander as very satisfied with the great improvements that had been effected in the defences.
In this period the Division learnt many lessons in trench craft.
On taking over the line enemy sniping was continuous. The hostile snipers were masters of the situation, and inflicted serious casualties. However, every effort was made to check the enemy’s activities in this respect, with excellent results. Towards the end of the Division’s tour in this sector, the Highlanders were at least on equal terms, if not superior to the enemy as snipers. In some cases telescopic rifles were bought by private enterprise. The men who were entrusted with these rifles were carefully selected from amongst the gamekeepers and stalkers in the infantry, and on several days they were able to register good bags.
On 1st July the Division saw the first British mine exploded. At 3 A.M. two rounds were fired by the artillery as a signal; a moment later the mine exploded. The artillery and machine-guns then opened on the enemy’s trenches for fifteen minutes. The German retaliation was slight. When day broke it was reported that about fifty yards of the German parapet was blown in. Later the Germans were seen with stretchers on and about the crater. The blow, therefore, appeared to have been successful. After daybreak, however, the enemy snipers killed several of our men who exposed themselves in trying to see the results of the explosion.
As in the last sector, work in the defences was considerably hampered by the enemy’s artillery and trench-mortars, which were constantly levelling the British trenches. As usual, appeals for artillery retaliation could seldom be met, owing to the paucity of ammunition. It became most discouraging to the men to see their breastworks being damaged and destroyed in this manner, their labours of the previous night often being undone in a few minutes, without it being possible to fire a round in retaliation. In this sector life in the trenches was made more uncertain than ever by the introduction of the rifle grenade by the Germans.
In the early part of July, Colonel Ian Stewart, D.S.O., Scottish Rifles, who had joined the Division as G.S.O. 1 in June, formulated a scheme of training every man in the use of the bomb. Bombing, before this innovation, had been regarded as the duty of specialists. The new scheme was that every man should be trained to be able to light and throw a bomb in the case of an emergency. At the same time the brigade grenadier companies were put through a longer and more thorough course of instruction than had been the case in the past. The introduction of this scheme marked a big advance in the practice of bombing.
On 20th July orders were received that the Division was to join the Xth Corps under the command of General Morland, in the area of the newly-formed Third Army. The Xth Corps was then to consist of the 5th Regular Division, the 51st Territorial Division, and the 18th Service Division. Accordingly during the nights 22–23rd and 23–24th July the Division was relieved in the line by the Lahore and 8th Divisions.
On the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th of July the Division proceeded by train to the Neuilly area east of Amiens.
CHAPTER III.
THE PERIOD OF APPRENTICESHIP.
It was some ten weeks since the Division had heard its first shot fired. Up to the present it had, indeed, experienced war. It had, however, been employed throughout either in actual battle or in consolidating a battle front in particularly trying circumstances. It had, therefore, had little time or opportunity to collect its thoughts and profit by its experiences.
During the next few months it was given the opportunity it required, and it will be seen that these months were profitably employed by all ranks.
This period may be called the Division’s apprenticeship to war.
In this connection it must not be forgotten that, in spite of its late successes, there was a time when the Highland Division was what can best be described as “green.” That this was the case is no reflection on the spirit which animated the men or the manner in which the troops had been trained by their commanders. Under the conditions of modern warfare it could not have been otherwise.
Lord French writes of the newly-arrived Territorial Divisions: “At first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at.”
The manner in which the Division “trained on” and developed from apprentices into skilled tradesmen was most creditable, both to the men and to those responsible for their education in the ways of war.
One difficulty that must always exist with inexperienced troops, particularly non-regular troops, is the question of discipline. To maintain discipline in the circumstances of peace does not present a tithe of the difficulties which are encountered in times of war. The ill effects of the lack of discipline in peace conditions are evident to all. War, on the other hand, produces fresh and unexpected circumstances, in which experience alone can teach how efficiency is dependent on rigorous adherence to discipline, often in apparently trivial matters. This was felt by the Highland Division, in common with many others, in numerous ways.
In a Division in which the officers and men of the various companies and battalions are recruited from the same villages or towns, and are known to one another intimately in civil life, the enforcement of the rigid discipline demanded by war will always be a difficult matter, until experience has shown the necessity for it.
Officers and N.C.O.’s have first to appreciate the degree to which they must exercise command over their men, if the military machine is to stand the test. They must also learn that the efficiency of the troops under their command is dependent on the manner in which they supervise the daily life and actions of their men, and on the amount of forethought they exercise on their behalf.
Owing to inexperience, delay in reliefs, entailing much fatigue to the men, the miscarrying of working parties, entailing the loss of valuable time, were in the early stages frequent. Further, in spite of continual warnings, men light-heartedly ignored the enemy, and were constantly being killed by enemy snipers through wilful exposure. There were cases of men asphyxiating themselves in their dug-outs with the fumes of their own coke fires through want of the necessary precautions.
The diaries of senior officers contain frequent references to instances in which they found the enemy working in daylight in full view, unmolested, through want of initiative on the part of local commanders. Occasions were not unknown when troops in the line evinced what has since become known as “wind.”
However, the Division recognised from the first that it had much to