Moral Theology. Charles J. Callan
case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.
669. The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as follows:
(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really formidable.
(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number (say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who has not the same authority.
(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian, it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus, the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St. Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than a contrary argument based on one's own reasoning. Of course, this does not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known to him.
670. But one may be unable to settle one's difficulty by appeal to authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books, or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in favor of what he holds.
671. When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.
672. The Moral Systems.—There are two general systems regarding reflex moral principles:
(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change uncertainty into certainty is: "When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, he must always choose the safer," because only what is safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;
(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is true in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but untrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that of Tutiorism is: "When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain."
673. Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:
(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by deciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists, whether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave, the safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;
(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger arguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a certain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.
674. Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely. Example: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain of new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely than the opposite opinion.
675. Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258) is a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful, but that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat, doubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged to abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the danger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its performance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable to discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the opinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this may be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since he feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.
676. Tutiorism.—This system has been condemned by the Church, and with good reason, for the following motives:
(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better, it contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and precept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending what is better.
(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law against liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of men; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and known, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known to be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.
677. A modified form of Tutiorism taught: "When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless the less safe is most probable." This system has not been censured by the Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have rejected it, for the following reasons:
(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is that which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to remove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality this system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous tenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law may not be followed.
(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at times with less.
678. We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to expose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but Tutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to follow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves even to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we are obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course, that is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we must follow the safer side in the following cases:
(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the salvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids that any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example: Titus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God and of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity and the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more probable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition of salvation;
(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for ourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take chances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is excused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of