Moral Theology. Charles J. Callan
person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent, confessor, or teacher.
708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.
(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on either side—that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.), whether the doubt be of law or of fact.
(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but he is uncertain of the author's standing as a theologian, and he realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his ideas solidly probable.
(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own, is probably excused from Mass. But the word "probably" makes him uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.
709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see 656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative doubt:
(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is not forbidden is lawful.
(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal, making no undue delays.
(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question, one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example: Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age; but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications that he is of that age.
710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one must decide against liberty:
(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example: Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if necessary he must secure a dispensation.
(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.
711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty. But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable, one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.
(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example: The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.
(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation change one's relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr. Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers. Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said Compline.
712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:
(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples: While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but, thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209) supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins, but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is solved by obtaining a dispensation.
(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that the Church does not require more.
713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then, though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.
714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give such rules as the following:
(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must decide for obligation.
(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use the principle that what was done is to be held as rightly done. Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly, should decide for validity.