Moral Theology. Charles J. Callan
it. Titus is responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not responsible. Caius' inattention is involuntary, if due to mental concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not try to be more attentive to his duties.
34. Consent Requisite for a Human Act.—To be human, an act must proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against one's will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence, natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking one's beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.
35. Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary, according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary, since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from God.
(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.
(c) An act is said to be simply—that is, absolutely—voluntary, when it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence, an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect, inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.
(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly, when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples: Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him; hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally, although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.
36. An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly (physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b) permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples: Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes. Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will misunderstand it and take scandal.
37. Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only permitted.
38. The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a) Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance, because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.
39. The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example: Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.
40. Obstacles to Consent.—The obstacles to consent are all those factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.
41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future danger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a) it lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or suspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of choice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself agreeable.
42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a) involuntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of one's mind. Example: Titus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a wild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every direction; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking with calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a stern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate, Caius gives what he knows is a "bluffing" answer.
43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.
(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.
(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell.
44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.
(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: