Woman and the Republic. Helen Kendrick Johnson
it would differ merely in degree from presidential suffrage; but it never has been so secured in any State except those that give full constitutional suffrage. It is on a par with school suffrage, except that legislative enactment extends the vote to town and city matters.
The history of the school suffrage affords another proof of the incompatibility of republicanism and constitutional suffrage for woman. Dr. Jacobi recognizes the difference between constitutional and school suffrage when she says: "Women continually sign petitions for this privilege, till startled by the discovery that it also means something else. It means, however, in the State of New York, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, that woman can only enjoy this privilege thoroughly if empowered by constitutional amendment to vote for all officers as well as for school commissioners." The States that have refused to comply with the Suffragists' demand for the elective franchise, the most progressive States, have been first to grant school suffrage, under constitutional limits. The twenty-seven odd States that grant school suffrage have had different methods of dealing with the question, because their laws differ, but both the positive proof of its being granted, and the negative proof of its being withheld, tell the same story in regard to the fundamental principle involved. This is shown strikingly in the situation in Kansas. Women have full municipal suffrage, and the Supreme Court of that State decided that they could vote for school treasurer, which was a charter office, but could not vote for County Superintendent of Schools, because that office was provided for in the Constitution. The school suffrage may or may not have a property qualification attached. That makes no difference. The difference is the essential one between delegated power and sovereign power. The States differ so widely in their methods of dealing with municipal as well as school legislation, that only a study of the laws of each State will reveal the situation. In Ohio, in 1895, for instance, the Legislature passed a bill enabling women to vote on a municipal tax-levy, which the courts held was unconstitutional, while they granted votes on license and other local questions.
In answer to the question whether, in Massachusetts, a woman could be a member of a school committee, the Supreme Court returned the following decision in 1874: "The Constitution contains nothing relating to school committees; the office is created and regulated by statute; and the Constitution confers upon the General Court full power and authority to name and settle annually, or provide by fixed laws for naming and settling, all civil officers within the Commonwealth the election and constitution of whom are not in the Constitution otherwise provided for. The question is therefore answered in the affirmative." The Supreme Court of New York, in 1892, held that "School Commissioners are constitutional officers within Article II. part 1 of the Constitution, and consequently the law of 1892 giving women the right to vote for them is void." The case was that of Matilda Joslyn Gage. The office of School Commissioner was created after the adoption of the Constitution, and it was therefore urged that the Constitution did not bear upon it; but the Supreme Court further decided that the law gave the Legislature the right to appoint or to elect the Commissioner; and as they had decided that the office should be elective, the women could not vote for that office. They vote for district-school officers under various local permissions or limitations. In a case brought to decide the right of women to vote for County Superintendent of Schools the Supreme Court of Illinois, in 1893, held that, as the office was designated in the Constitution as elective, women could not vote for it. The decision further said. "The votes for State Superintendent of Instruction, and County Superintendent, are provided for by law, and the Legislature cannot change the law. It may be that it is competent for the Legislature to provide that women who are citizens of the United States and over twenty-one may vote at elections held for school directors and other school officers not mentioned in the Constitution." Later, the Supreme Court held that women were entitled to vote for school trustees, as "no officer of the school district is mentioned in the State Constitution."
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in 1894, held that the provision of the act of April 24, 1894, conferring upon women the right to vote at elections of certain school officers, is valid, such right being within the legislative power to provide for the establishment and maintenance of public schools, and not within Article V. part 1, of the Constitution, which limits the right to male citizens. Judge Shauck says: "The whole subject of the public schools is delegated to the Assembly. As the common-school organization is wholly a creation of the Legislature, it is in the power of the Legislature to determine the qualifications of an elector and office-holder in it." In upholding his ruling, he cited similar decisions from the Supreme Courts of Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Iowa.
This rapid survey suggests, it seems to me, that, instead of being "a legitimate outgrowth of the fundamental principles of our government," woman suffrage is really incompatible with true republican forms. Pre- civilized conditions, aristocratic tendencies, the forces that would destroy government—these appear to be its natural allies. We must study more closely its connection with representative government the better to comprehend this portentous truth.
CHAPTER III.
WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC.
The writers of the "History of Woman Suffrage" give the following account of the founding of their Association. In July, 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Martha O. Wright, and Ann McClintock issued an unsigned call for a convention, which was asked to consider the social, civil, and religious condition and rights of woman; and in preparation for the meeting, they wrote a "Declaration of Sentiments," which was adopted by the assembly. They say, in describing the writing of this declaration:—"The reports of Peace, Temperance, and Anti-Slavery conventions were examined, but all alike seemed too tame and pacific for the inauguration of a rebellion such as the world had never before seen. We knew women had wrongs, but how to state them was the difficulty, and this was increased from the fact that we ourselves were fortunately organized and conditioned. … After much delay, one of the circle took up the Declaration of 1776, and read it aloud with spirit and emphasis, and it was at once decided to adopt the historic document, with some slight changes. Knowing that women must have more to complain of than men under any circumstances possibly could, and seeing the Fathers had eighteen grievances, a protracted search was made through statute books, church usages, and the customs of society to find that exact number."
In such solemnly puerile fashion did they work out a travesty on one of the most august utterances ever penned. A young man who was present remarked: "Tour grievances must be grievous indeed when you are obliged to go to books in order to find them out." He might have added, "And they must be false indeed when you have to found most of your charges on dead- letter statutes and outgrown usages and customs."
The Preamble of their Declaration reads: "When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course."
The declaration is as follows: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, and to insist upon the institution of a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are suffer able, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards