The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
in execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.
We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in person, his most important duty will be to have the position of commander well filled—which, unfortunately, is not always done. Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services. But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it? Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his selections.
One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding a faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed so much luster upon the Russian arms.
It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cæsar, when he was ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the experience of events.
The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:—First, A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions; Secondly, A physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to assign to the command a general of long experience in service with troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon are instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to a rational conclusion:—
1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special corps.
2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will be equally fitted for the command.
3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a commander-in-chief.
Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the principles of the art of war.
The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.
Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous!
Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.
It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be expected from operations conducted by others than those who have originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his own conception?
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