The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent.
What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures?
In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results.
Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by experience, is—
1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger.
2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher, aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon, a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.
Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of influencing military operations—viz.: that of a council of war at the seat of government—deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also, from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of directing the army—a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the scene of operations.
FOOTNOTES:
General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in order to form an oblique line.
ARTICLE XV.
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.
The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London, situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls, the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for, whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront death in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the public miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the defense of his country.
The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare against the employment of officers of the army in other public functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than in the theaters and public clubs?
It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea that they were to die by their standards. Even the English—so jealous of their rights—contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for twenty-five years, does what is