The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first rank among them.
The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
Those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a country are also decisive geographic points. For instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would not be a decisive point unless well fortified or possessing an extended camp with têtes de pont. Leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country—if a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government.
In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in 1800.
The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.
When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason of the march of Mélas upon Nice.
It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.
If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed separately.
The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by—
1. The features of the ground.
2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.
OBJECTIVE POINTS.
There are two classes of objective points—objective points of maneuver, and geographical objective points. A geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. Objective points of maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical objectives, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses.
In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle—which might be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
As to the objective points of maneuvers—that is, those which relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces—their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army—since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces—such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very best.
When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states.
The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are almost