The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
change of strategic front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew, from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka, to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words, that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the army the tête de pont of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.
The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.
It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to present a double front—in the first case, to face the valley of the Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)
Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
LINES OF DEFENSE.
Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the temporary position of an army.
The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.
Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary fortifications, may be regarded as eventual lines of defense, both strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker point—in which case the advantage is evidently strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to Wurmser in Mantua.
STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle.
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions—for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class.
This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions.
The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.
In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.
In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of support on the strategic front are called pivots of operations, and are