The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
To defend the threatened independence of the state;
To avenge insulted honor; or,
From a mania for conquest.
It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war, as—
1. A state may simply make war against another state.
2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each other.
3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.
4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.
5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.
6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.
7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous.
8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy.
9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.
War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.
For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.
To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.
ARTICLE I.
Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.
When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before action.
The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate legatee.
Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be justified.
In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper guarantees to other states.
ARTICLE II.
Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of View.
A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of awaiting the attack on the frontiers.
There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.
These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war; but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.
For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and possess no steadiness under misfortunes.
ARTICLE III.
Wars of Expediency.
The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish Succession, were wars of expediency.
There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful