The Art of War. baron de Antoine Henri Jomini
to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to form a coalition for that purpose.
These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.
ARTICLE IV.
Of Wars with or without Allies.
Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any power, however formidable.
ARTICLE V.
Wars of Intervention.
To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when it can make decisive use of its resources.
There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.
Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful. While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland, Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may reach the adjoining states.
There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign wars—viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not to be obtained otherwise.
History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the proper time."
In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807 Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg, leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder, it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.
There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different interventions:—
1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force specified by former treaties.
2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.
3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of war—which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against one.
4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or interferes before the declaration of war.
When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the case is quite different.
The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France: still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad maneuvering of their allies.
Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the military character of these expeditions.
It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a measure, an advantage to the state.
In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.
The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807, but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813. Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her favor—a double result, combining the highest advantages.
Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and at the time most opportune for her.
This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence when they know how to profit by it.
Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy, and the German empire, and had been victorious