The Story of the Great War (Vol. 1-8). Various Authors
necessary by the general strategic plan of the allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to move in an easterly and southeasterly direction with the apparent intention of falling in strength upon the Fifth French Army. In this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line of communications to an attack from the combined Sixth French Army and the British forces.
"I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth French Army.
"I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's flank with all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive them back."
As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth French Army against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven from the east bank the few villages they occupied on the west bank had to be taken, and as these were covered by heavy artillery from the farther bank, the French loss of life was very severe. Yet these several combats—of which there were as many as there were villages—were stationary. In every case the Germans were compelled to cross the river; in every case the artillery made it impossible for the French to follow them.
At dawn also every one of the French armies advanced, and within two or three hours of sunrise found themselves engaged with the German front. The spirited order to the troops issued that morning by General Joffre had left no doubt in the minds of Frenchmen on the importance of the issue. It read:
"At a moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country depends is going to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our efforts must be directed toward attacking and driving back the enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground it has won, and allow itself to be killed on the spot rather than give way. In the present circumstance no faltering can be tolerated."
Yet in spite of the powerful efforts of the French armies they were all held in check, and General Sarrail was beginning to give way.
Though the fighting in the center had been stationary on this sixth of September, 1914, it had been desperate. D'Espérey was facing the 150,000 men of Von Kluck's army, and the effect of the British attack on Von Kluck's flank had not yet been felt. He more than held his own, but at great cost. General Foch, with the Ninth Army, had a double problem, for he was wrestling with General von Bülow to hold the southern edge of the Sézanne Plateau, while General von Hausen's Saxon Army was trying to turn his right flank. A violent attack, which, for the space of over two hours seemed likely to succeed, was launched by the Duke of Württemberg against General Langle and the Fourth Army. The attack was repelled, but the French losses were proportionately great. There could be no denial that many such attacks could break through the line. General Sarrail's army, fighting a losing game, showed marvelous stubbornness and gameness, but even so, it could not resist being pushed south of Fort Troyon, itself unable to support the battering it might expect to receive when the German siege guns should be brought into place.
Battle of the Marne—End of German Retreat and the Intrenched Line on the Aisne River.
At every point but one the Germans had a right to deem the day successful. The only reversal had been a minor one before the forest of Crécy. Yet, of all the generals on that front Von Kluck alone was in a position to see the gravity of the situation. The British had caught him on the flank as he tried to pierce the left wing of General d'Espérey's army, and if he should now retreat, that army could envelop him and thus catch him between two fires.
Next morning, Monday, September 7, 1914, another glorious summer morning, saw a resumption of the battle along exactly the same lines, with the same persistent attack and defense along the eastern part of the front, and with the British making full use of the blunder made by the German right. General von Kluck had realized his plight, but, even so, he had not secured an understanding of the size of the force that was threatening his flank, and he sent as a reenforcement a single army corps which had been intrenched near Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. The British had three full army corps and were well supplied with cavalry and artillery. Yet Coulommiers was Von Kluck's headquarters and actually, when the Germans were driven back and the British troops entered the town, Prince Eitel, the second son of the kaiser; General von Kluck and his staff were compelled to run down to their motor cars and escape at top speed along the road to Rebais, leaving their half-eaten breakfast on the table, and their glasses of wine half emptied. One of the most dramatic cavalry actions of this period of the war took place shortly before noon, when one hundred and seventeen squadrons of cavalry were engaged. In this action the British were successful, but the German cavalry were tired and harassed, having been severely handled the day before.
In this engagement between the British and the German right, all the odds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely the grasping at opportunities that presented themselves. Still, by constantly striking at General von Kluck's exposed flank, his frontal attack of General d'Espérey was so weakened, that, toward evening at the close of two days of continuous and very severe fighting, the Fifth French Army was able to advance and hold the position from La Ferté-Gaucher to Esternay. The ground gained was valuable but not essential, yet it made a profound impression.
General d'Espérey's step forward was the Germans' step back. It meant that the road to Paris was barred. How fully this was realized may be seen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von Tschepe und Weidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied by the staff of the Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious French entered Vitry-le-François. The order was dated "September 7, 10:30 p. m." and it read as follows:
"The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The principal French troops have been forced to accept battle, after having been continually forced back. The great decision is undoubtedly at hand. To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well as all that of our Army Corps, are bound to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun. To save the welfare and the honor of Germany I expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last breath. Everything depends on the result of to-morrow."
Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the third day, again, it was General von Kluck's initial move that brought disaster to the German side.
Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris, as would have been expected, made a detour, having as his object not the capital but the French army? It may be said in favor of it that the decision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity with the military doctrine of Napoleon. According to this doctrine, a capital, whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory object, geographical or political. What is of importance is the strategical object. The strategical object is the essential, the geographical object is only accessory. Once the essential object is attained, the accessory object is acquired of itself. Once the French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von Kluck could return to the capital and take it easily.
Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the army of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace to his left, and in front of him the British army and the Fifth French Army; he might have been caught as in a vise between these forces while all his activity was being absorbed by his attack on the intrenchments around Paris.
It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as it seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of the Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different. It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false maneuver on his part, that determined the victory of the Marne. Von Kluck did exactly what he ought to have done; the decision taken by the German General Staff was exactly what it ought to have taken, and what was foreseen during the whole course of the war.
It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations made by the