The Story of the Great War (Vol. 1-8). Various Authors
for one thing, because of his plan—or his orders—to strike a southeasterly blow; he was outmaneuvered by the presence of a vastly larger British force than he had any reason to expect, and he was outnumbered almost two to one.
Through the apple and pear orchards of La Trétoire the battle was sanguinary; the British (reenforced on September 7, 1914, by some French divisions) swept through the terrain in widely extended lines, for close formation was not to be thought of with artillery and machine guns in front. It was bitter fighting, and the German right contested every inch of ground stubbornly. Once, indeed, it seemed that General von Kluck would turn the tables. He rapidly collected his retreating troops, and with unparalleled suddenness hurled them back upon the advancing First Corps under Sir Douglas Haig. Aeroplane scouts decided the issue. Had the British been compelled to await the onset, or had they been forced to depend on cavalry patrols, there would have been no opportunity to resist that revengeful onslaught. But no sooner had the Germans begun to re-form than Sir Douglas Haig moved his machine guns to the front and fell back a few hundred yards to a better position. This happened on September 8, 1914, and may be regarded as the last offensive move made by General von Kluck's army in the west. On that same day Coulommiers was invested and Prince Eitel compelled to flee, and the battle of Coulommiers was won.
CHAPTER XVII
CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
The third part of the battle of the Marne, called by some the Battle of Montmirail, was not marked by special incident. General d'Espérey's part was to hold firm, and this he did. Not only by reason of the British assistance on the left, but also because the strong army of General Foch to the right was a new army, of greater strength than was known to General von Moltke and the German General Staff. The battle of Montmirail was won by the steady resistance of the Fifth Army to the hammer blows of the German right, and to the quick advantage seized by General d'Espérey when the British weakened the flank of the force opposing him. On September 8, 1914, General d'Espérey had not only held his ground, but had driven General von Kluck back across the Grand Morin River at La Ferté-Gaucher, and also across the Petit Morin at Montmirail. Since the British had butted the Germans back from the Petit Morin at La Trétoire, these three days of fighting in the battles of Coulommiers and Montmirail had won the Allies advanced positions across two rivers, and had so weakened the German right that it was compelled to fall back on the main army and forego its important strategic advantage on the east bank of the Ourcq River.
These three battles, Ourcq, Coulommiers, and Montmirail, constitute the recoil from Paris, and at the same time they constitute the defeat of what was hereinbefore shown to be one of the four fundamentals of the great German campaign plan. With the situation thus cleared, so to speak, one may now pass to the details of the second part of the German plan, which was to engage the powerful Ninth and Fourth Armies, under the command of Generals Foch and Langle, respectively, to break through them, if possible, but at all hazards to keep them sufficiently menaced to disable General Joffre from sending reenforcements therefrom to the army of General Sarrail, on which the whole force of the army of the crown prince was to be hurled.
The next section of the Allied armies, then, was General Foch's Ninth Army, which encountered the German drive at Fère Champenoise, and which resulted in the severe handling of General von Bülow's forces. With characteristic perception of the difference between a greater and a lesser encounter, General Foch called his share of the battles of the Marne, the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond." This did not culminate until Wednesday, September 9, 1914, so that the German retreat there was one day later than the final retreat of General von Kluck.
The clash between the armies of General von Bülow and of General Foch began, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn of that fateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known writer on strategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well supplied with the famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in the center of his line. His extreme right and left were mobile and thrown partly forward to feel the attack of the invading army. But, in spite of all preparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to hold his own on September 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued incessantly, by night as well as by day, for the artillerists had found each other's range. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand fighting at this point, General Foch only once being successful in luring the Germans to within close firing range. The results were withering, and General von Bülow did not attempt it a second time. There seems reason to believe that General von Bülow had counted upon acting as a reserve force to General von Kluck during the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the situation to westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fère Champenoise on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.
It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail on the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Bülow's army had been exposed by the advance of General d'Espérey and the retreat of General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch, and despite the danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile left like a great tongue. That night the weather turned stormy, facilitating this move. At one o'clock in the morning, the statement has been made, word reached General Foch indirectly that air patrols had observed a gap in the alignment of the German armies between General von Bülow's left and General von Hausen's right.
During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked two complete surprises on General von Bülow. He had enveloped the German commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there with General d'Espérey's army behind him, since the latter had by now advanced to Montmirail. At the same time he had thrust a wedge between Von Bülow and General von Hausen, threatening General von Bülow's left flank as well. The first was a seizure of an opportunity, executed with military promptness, the second was a bold coup, and its risk might well have appalled a less experienced general.
Considering the westernmost of these movements first, it will be seen at once how the enveloping action brought about the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond." General von Bülow's army was stretched in an arc around the marshes, which, it will be remembered, have been described as a pocket of clay, low-lying lands mainly reclaimed, but which become miry during heavy rains. It was General von Bülow's misfortune, that, on the very night that his flank was exposed, there should come a torrential downpour. These same marshes had figured more than once before in France's military history, and General Foch, as a master strategist, was determined that they should serve again. When the rain came, he thanked his lucky stars and acted on the instant.
When the morning of September 9, 1914, dawned, the left wing of General Foch's army was not only covering the exposed flank of General von Bülow's forces, but parts of it were two miles to the rear. Under the driving rain, morning broke slowly, and almost before a sodden and rain-soaked world could awake to the fact that day had come, General Foch had nipped the rear of the flank of the opposing army, and was bending the arc in upon itself. Under normal circumstances, such an action would tend but to strengthen the army thus attacked, since it brings all parts of the army into closer communication. But General Foch knew that the disadvantages of the ground would more than compensate for this, since the two horns of General von Bülow's army could not combine without crossing those marshes, now boggy enough, and growing boggier every second. The task was harder than General Foch anticipated, for the same rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were also a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers. But, in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the flank broke and gave way, and two entire corps from General von Bülow's right were precipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were taken—to that time the largest capture of artillery made by the Allies—and a number of prisoners. Hundreds perished miserably, but General Foch held back his artillery from an indiscriminate slaughter of men made helpless in the slimy mud. Thus ended the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond," which broke still further the German right wing.
Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Bülow had troubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day of torrential rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that runs from