Sociology. Anthony Giddens
means to “decolonize” or to “postcolonialize” sociology is far from crystal clear.’ Similarly, postcolonial theory entails a critique or rejection of the central sociological concept of ‘modernity’, which aims to characterize the experience of most Western societies but also presents the associated process of modernization as spreading outwards to ‘the rest’ of the world. The perceived Eurocentrism of this position has led many sociologists to abandon the concept altogether. Yet, as Fourie (2012: 53) argues, ‘switch on a television, open a newspaper or stroll through any city and one is likely to encounter the term or its variants; clearly “modernity is in the streets more than ever” (Kaya 2004: 47), and so continues to shape our understanding of the world around us.’
The ongoing debate around modernity, modernization and alternatives such as postcolonialism shows that even sociology’s foundational concepts can still be questioned and opened up again for investigation. Yet, some key issues about how sociology can and should be practised seem to endure amid all of the critiques and change, and we look at just two of these next.
THINKING CRITICALLY
Anthropologists conventionally study societies outside of the industrialized world. Should sociologists then simply accept that, given its origins, sociology is best suited to the study of modern societies? Does globalization effectively eliminate this academic division of labour?
From its inception, sociology has faced some theoretical dilemmas – matters of recurring controversy and dispute. These concern general approaches that pose questions about how we can or should ‘do’ sociology, and two have proved remarkably persistent: the problem of structure and agency and the issue of consensus versus conflict.
The first dilemma concerns the relative weight we should afford to social structure and human agency. How far are individuals creative actors capable of controlling the conditions of their lives? Is most of what we do the product of social forces outside individual control? This is considered a ‘problem’ because sociologists are divided on where the focus should be. Actionoriented approaches stress the active, creative side of human behaviour, while functionalism and some variants of Marxism emphasize the constraining nature of social structures.
The second dilemma concerns consensus and conflict. Some theories see the inherent order and harmony of human societies as their most enduring aspect. On this view, continuity and consensus are the most striking characteristics of societies, however much those societies change over time. Others see the pervasiveness of conflict as part of the basic fabric of social life rather than as an unusual or transitory aspect. Societies, they argue, are riven with social divisions, tensions and struggles, and it is wishful thinking to believe that people live amicably most of the time. We will take these two dilemmas in turn.
Social structure and human agency
Durkheim argued that society has primacy over the individual person as it is more than the sum of individual acts; it has a ‘firmness’ or ‘solidity’ comparable to structures in the material environment. Think of a person in a room with several doors. The structure of the room constrains the range of possible activities. The siting of the walls and the doors defines the routes of exit and entry. Social structure sets similar limits to what we can do, and in this sense it is ‘external’ to the individual. Durkheim (1982 [1895]: 50) expresses the point this way:
When I perform my duties as a brother, a husband or a citizen and carry out the commitments I have entered into, I fulfil obligations which are defined in law and custom and which are external to myself and my actions…. Similarly, the believer has discovered from birth, ready fashioned, the beliefs and practices of his religious life; if they existed before he did, it follows that they exist outside him. The systems of signs that I employ to express my thoughts, the monetary system I use to pay my debts, the credit instruments I utilize in my commercial relationships, the practices I follow in my profession, etc. – all function independently of the use I make of them.
Although this structural perspective has many adherents, it has also met with sharp criticism. What is ‘society’ if it is not the composite of many individual actions? If we study a social group we do not see a collective entity or ‘thing’, just many individuals interacting with one another in various ways. In the same way, what we call ‘society’ is only an aggregate of individuals behaving in regular ways in relation to one another. According to interactionists, human beings have reasons for what they do, and they inhabit a social world constructed by meanings. Social phenomena are not like ‘things’ but depend on the symbolic meanings we invest in them, which means we are not at the mercy of an external ‘society’ but are instead its creators.
Yet the differences between structure and agency perspectives can be exaggerated, and we can easily see connections between them. Social structures do precede and constrain the individual. For example, I did not invent the monetary system I use, nor do I have a choice about whether I want to use it if I wish to have the goods and services money can buy. On the other hand, it is mistaken to suppose that society is ‘external’ in the same way as the physical world. The physical world would still exist if no human beings were alive, but the monetary system would not. Moreover, ‘social facts’ do not entirely determine our actions. I could choose to live without using money, even if it proved very difficult to eke out an existence. As human beings, we can make choices and do not simply respond passively to events.
An antiques and vintage market demonstrates structure and agency in economic exchanges. Buyers are constrained to pay using an established currency (structure), but final prices are not fixed and can be bartered (agency).
Beyond structure and agency?
The divide between structural and agency perspectives is seen as unproductive by many sociologists, and several attempts have been made to bring them together in one theoretical perspective. Here we look briefly at just two of the more successful attempts, in the contrasting approaches of Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens. Pierre Bourdieu’s equally influential ideas are covered in detail in chapter 16, ‘Education’.
Norbert Elias and figurational sociology
The German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990) saw the structure–agency dilemma as a hangover from earlier philosophical ways of thinking and an obstacle to be overcome. Sociology inherited this ‘problem’ from philosophy, which left a series of other dualisms, such as mind–body, individual–society and micro–macro. Sociological theorists tended to defer to the expertise of philosophers in matters of logic and assessing the validity of knowledge claims. But, for Elias, sociology is a distinct theoretical-empirical science that produces a more empirically adequate knowledge, and therefore sociologists do not need philosophers to adjudicate for them (Kilminster 2007).
The structure–agency dilemma is unhelpful and inaccurate (as are all other such dualisms). For example, the distinction between individual and society implies that each has a ‘thing-like’ existence and that the individual is distinct from society. But discussing social life using these terms is misleading because ‘they encourage the impression that society is made up of structures external to oneself, the individual, and the individual is at one and the same time surrounded by society yet cut off from it by some invisible