Sociology. Anthony Giddens
(in the plural), who are always in networks or relations of interdependence. Elias calls these interdependent networks figurations, and the approach he pioneered is known as figurational studies or, sometimes, process sociology (Mennell 1998). This theoretical move is deceptively simple. But, if we start from social figurations, then radical conclusions follow. The individual person is not an autonomous, ‘closed’ being entombed within a physical body, coming into contact with others only during interactions, a little like snooker balls colliding. Elias argues that human beings are ‘open people’, whose individual identities and ‘selves’ are socially produced in networks of social relations – they are social selves (Burkitt 2008).
On the other hand, the ‘thing’ that is routinely called ‘society’ is not a thing at all but is, in reality, a long-term social process of ever-changing figurations (Van Krieken 1998: 5–6). A long-term perspective is necessary because it is only by tracing the development of social life in the past that we can arrive at a realistic understanding of the present and of ourselves. Elias insists that a figurational perspective, which focuses attention on this continual social process, is a clear advance over theories which discuss ‘society’ as a static thing-like entity.
For example, in The Civilizing Process (2000 [1939]), Elias traces the development of ‘civilized’ codes of manners, such as etiquette at the dinner table, from the European Middle Ages onwards. These codes first developed in the royal courts, where people were expected to control their behaviour and emotions, but subsequently spread to other social classes through a process of status competition. Hence, the rather strange habits and customs of people in previous times are not just historical curiosities unrelated to modern life. In fact, we can never understand why the standards we accept as ‘natural’ exist unless we appreciate how they developed over very long periods of time.
See ‘Classic studies’ 21.1 in chapter 21, ‘Nations, War and Terrorism’, for a discussion of Elias’s ‘civilizing process’ theory, which shows how he handles social structures and individual actions.
Elias’s figurational perspective does not try to ‘bridge’ the structure–agency dilemma in sociology. Rather, it effectively dissolves the ‘problem’ altogether. There is no need for sociologists to focus exclusively on the micro level of small-scale interactions or the macro level of social structures and institutions. Understanding the shifting figurations formed by interdependent people means we have to be concerned with every aspect of human life, from individual personalities to the large figurations represented by the concepts of nation-state or the city.
One often-repeated criticism is that Elias tends to see ‘society’ as largely the unintended outcome of many intentional actions. Yet this may not give enough weight to the influence of very powerful actors such as states, social movements or multinational corporations in shaping society in their interests (Van Krieken 1998). Nevertheless, figurational sociology has developed into a thriving research tradition which has produced some fascinating studies.
Anthony Giddens and structuration theory
An alternative way of tackling this dilemma was developed by Anthony Giddens. Unlike Elias, Giddens (1984: vii) does not reject philosophy, arguing that sociology must be ‘alive’ to philosophical problems: ‘The social sciences are lost if they are not directly related to philosophical problems by those who practise them.’ Debates in philosophy can contribute to our understanding of social life and should not be ignored. However, Giddens also adopts a central focus on the structuring activity of individual actions, which bears some similarity to Elias’s interest in social processes.
Giddens’s approach begins from the recognition that people actively make and remake social structure during the course of their everyday activities. For instance, the fact that I use the monetary system contributes in a minor, yet essential way to the very existence of that system. If everyone, or even a majority of people, at some point decided not to use money, the ‘thing-like’ monetary system would collapse. A useful concept for analysing such processes is structuration (Giddens 1984). Structuration theory holds that ‘structure’ and ‘action’ are necessarily related to each other and are not opposites. Societies, communities and groups have ‘structure’ only insofar as people behave in regular and fairly predictable ways. On the other hand, ‘action’ is only possible because each individual possesses an enormous amount of socially structured knowledge which pre-exists them as individuals.
Take the example of language. To exist at all, language must be structured – that is, it must have properties which every speaker must observe. What someone says in any given context would not make sense unless it followed certain grammatical rules. Yet the structural qualities of language exist only insofar as individual language users actually follow those rules in practice. We can say that language, as with other social institutions, is constantly in the process of structuration.
Interactionists are quite right to suggest that human agents are highly knowledgeable actors. Social life demands that we follow complex sets of conventions, such as the rituals strangers observe when passing by or meeting in the street. On the other hand, as we apply that knowledge to our own actions, we give force and content to those rules and conventions on which we draw. Structuration always presumes this ‘duality of structure’ in which all social action presumes the existence of structure. But, at the same time, structure presumes action because it depends on regularities of human behaviour.
This resolution to the structure–agency problem has its critics. One issue is the relative weight afforded to structure and agency in particular settings. Despite the laudable attempt to bridge the divide, Giddens’s structuration theory does seem to put heavy emphasis on the structuring power of actors in shaping social life. Even though social structures are seen as effective, structuration theory still views human agency as capable of changing and reshaping them, however powerful or long established they may be. But the extent to which this is true cannot be decided in advance of empirical research into concrete cases.
Margaret Archer (1995, 2003) is sympathetic to structuration theory but sees Giddens’s theoretical discussion as overly descriptive. It is not enough simply to note that structure and agency are co-constitutive (that one implies the other). Sociological explanations need to establish whether structure or agency is the cause of social phenomena in particular cases. The continuous interplay of structure and agency that Giddens rightly identifies has a definite chronological sequence: existing social structure → individual actions → modified social structure, and so on. In tracing this continuous sequence in specific studies, it should be possible to discover whether structure or agency is more effective.
It seems unlikely that the structure–agency problem will ever be resolved to the satisfaction of all sociologists, especially as various perspectives and theories lie closer to one side or the other of the dilemma. Individual sociologists also lean towards structure or agency perspectives depending on their own social backgrounds and life experiences. Nonetheless, the two approaches discussed above are evidence of a desire to take some of the heat out of this longstanding problem.
THINKING CRITICALLY
Does Elias’s figurational sociology really bypass the need to bridge the divide between structure and agency? According to Giddens’s structuration theory, what exactly are social structures?
The second enduring dilemma is that of consensus versus conflict. For all functionalist thinkers, society is treated as an integrated whole, composed of structures or institutions which mesh closely with one another. This is very much in accord with Durkheim’s focus on the constraining, ‘external’ character of ‘social facts’. However,