When Culture Becomes Politics. Thomas Pedersen
Sciences: Insights, Inroads and intrusions. History and Theory; Vol. 33, no. 1. February 1994.
41 James T.W. Marks, “Theory, Pragmatism and Truth: Post-Modernism in the context of Action”. Canadian Journal of Sociology; Vol. 17, no. 2. Spring 1992.
42 See Malcolm Bradbury, “What was Post-Modernism? The Arts in and after the Cold War”. International Affairs London; Vol. 71, no. 4. Special Anniversary Issue, October 1995.
43 Robert J. Brym, “The end of sociology? A note on Post-modernism”. Canadian Journal of Sociology. Vol. 15, no. 3. Summer 1990.
44 A view shared by Marks, ibid.
45 M. Thompson, G. Grendstad & P. Selle, Cultural Theory as Political Science. London: Routledge, 1999 p. 1
46 Ibid.
47 Joseph I.H. Janssen, “Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public Support for European Integration”. British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 21/4. October 1991, p. 458.
48 See i.a. the works by Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik.
49 Janssen, op.cit. p. 465.
50 Michael Zürn, “The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization: A view from Europe”. In: Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sorensen (eds.), Whose World Order? Boulder: Westview, 1992.
51 James E. Cameron, “A three-factor Model of Social Identity”. Self and Identity, Vol. 3, 2004.
52 Bid.
53 Adrienne Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and access to information”. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 10/5. October 2003.
54 E.g. in M. Maffesoli, “La connaissance ordinaire”. Precis de Sociologie comprehensive. Paris: Librairie des Méridiens. 1985.
3. DO EUROPEANS REGARD THEMSELVES AS EUROPEAN?
Culture and democracy are closely related phenomena. As I shall argue, cultural identity has acquired a strong, personalized layer. Political culture used to be measured as a purely sociological phenomenon, each social grouping being assumed to possess certain cultural characteristica. In contemporary Europe the reality is much more messy and complex. It would be going too far to argue that cultural identity has become entirely individualized. We can all point to examples of similar responses to given social challenges across borders in Europe. Yet, it is equally true that globalization for instance has very different consequences upon different individuals. Some embrace it; others fight it. New technologies have empowered many more – though not all – citizens. As a result, socialization is becoming less important. Institutions are also losing importance as explanatory variables. Against this background, how are we to continue using rather vague and highly aggregate concepts such as organizational culture or post-modern nations. Clearly there is a need for differentiation. A need for more precise, conceptual language.
If – for better or worse – (political) culture increasingly overlaps with democracy in Western societies, this has several implications: First, it means that prediction becomes more difficult. Secondly, it means that researchers must pay more attention to the attitudes of citizens, even when studying longer term trends. As culture becomes democratized, citizens become constitutive in a new sense. Please note that my argument is not normative: It may well be that we ought to lament the blurring of the borders between elite and citizen. However, it appears to be a fact, at least in some parts of the world. Thirdly, to the extent that agency is becoming more important, context- and situation-specific logics are gaining in importance at the expense of group-logics. It may soon be more important to analyze typical situations confronting individuals than to analyze typical forms of group consciousness.
Do European citizens feel that they belong to a community called “Europe” – represented by the European Union? Obviously, “Europe” and the EU are not identical concepts and may mean different things to different people – and nations. We tend to assume that Europe has a common, political language, but is it really the case, once we move beyond generalities? In other words, the ubiquitous diversity in European culture may not only be caused by historical legacies but also by cultural democracy or, to be more precise, by a more individualist version of cultural democracy, better informed and less patient with democratically elected leaders.
To enquire about European identity begs the questions, which identity? Although Eurobarometer polls are often very useful, the questions asked are not always the most relevant, and they are based upon a number of specific, theoretical assumptions regarding the sources of identity. We still know little about European cultural identity apart from scattered evidence on European symbols and values. Eurobarometer has, however, recently broadened its repertoire of questions somewhat. In a 2006 report it thus deals with what it calls “new topics” such as common values.1 Eurobarometer has compared personal “values” with “values representing the EU”. It turns out that whereas peace and respect for human life and human rights in that order are the most important personal values for European citizens, when asked about the values that best represent the EU, respondents place human rights and democracy at the top, and peace in third place. Respect for human life is not seen to be accorded the same importance by the EU as by individual Europeans (13 % regards it as representing the EU well), and peace is not regarded as having the same importance for the EU as for individual citizens. These are of course aggregate figures covering considerable differences between member societies.
Interestingly, in view of the debate about a European economic model, a clear majority of Europeans appears to reject state interventionism, 64 % stating that “free competition is the best guarantee of economic prosperity” and that … “the state interferes too much in their lives” (62 %). However, these figures should not be read as a rejection of social justice. Eurobarometer has also examined attitudes to a number of “societal questions” and as many as 64 % of Europeans agree that … “we need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual”. However, the reliability of these figures is limited, since equality and justice are lumped together, and we do not know the relative importance of equality compared to other values. One is thus left with the impression that at the level of citizens, support for a truly social market economy is not as big as at the level of the political elite.
This impression is confirmed, if one examines speeches by European politicians. Thus ten days before the referendum on the European Constitution, the French President, the German chancellor and the Polish president Kwasniewski met in Nancy, voicing their support for the “yes”-camp in France. In this connection the then German chancellor stated i.a. that … “the European social model is a success story” and that … “a strong Europe is needed to be able to develop this model further”. Chirac for his part indicated that in his view the European social model has three elements … “social security, the right to unemployment benefit