John Brown, Soldier of Fortune: A Critique. Hill Peebles Wilson
do not then hesitate to avow before this House and the Country, and in the presence of the living God, that if by your legislation you seek to drive us from the territories of California and New Mexico, purchased by the common blood and treasure of the whole people, and to abolish slavery in this district, thereby attempting to fix a National degradation upon half of the states of this confederacy I am for disunion, and if my physical courage be equal to the maintenance of my convictions of duty, I will devote all I am, and all I have on earth to its consummation.[68]
This speech was repeatedly interrupted by storms of applause. And Stephens, too, was greeted with loud acclamations when he announced his concurrence in every word of his colleague, and declared the Union dissolved from the moment an attack upon a section became an accomplished fact.
Colcock of South Carolina then announced that he would bring in a formal motion for the dissolution of the Union, as soon as the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia should have been resolved upon, or the Wilmot Proviso passed.[69] The compromise agreement was effected by the fine patriotism, the sagacity, and the personal sacrifice of two great figures of that generation: Clay and Webster. In promoting this measure, they exhausted their political resources, and forfeited their political fortunes. Neither of them could have been reëlected to the senate.
Nothing was settled by the compromise of 1850; both sides accepting it in a tentative way. "The present Crisis may pass," wrote Mr. Stephens in 1850,[70] "the present adjustment may be made, but the great question of permanence of slavery in the Southern states will be far from being settled thereby. And, in my opinion, the crisis of that question is not far ahead."
This review, altogether too brief, is made herein to show the extreme tension of the sectional feeling which existed in the country on account of the extension of slavery; and the national significance of the struggle that was soon to develop over the question in Kansas. It also foreshadows the action the Southern States would surely take, if the Kansas decision declared against them.
By the admission of California into the Union as a Free State, the South lost the "balance of power"; but the general situation at the time was far from being hopeless. Further territorial expansion was necessary—imperatively so—but the prospect was still full of promising possibilities. There was Cuba, that Buchanan had offered a hundred millions for in 1848; out of which two, or, if necessary, three States could be made. And, looming up in the more remote horizon, were Nicaragua and the remainder of Mexico. And, last but not least, "Squatter Sovereignty," or, in more modern parlance: "Let the People Rule."
The "Pearl of the Antilles" was the prize trophy in the new crusade for territorial acquisition, and "Free Cuba" the slogan. The efforts to get control of the island, for purposes of annexation, were persistent, and the history of them is intensely interesting. First came filibustering operations. Three expeditions were sent out in 1849–1851. The command of the last of these was offered—first to Jefferson Davis, and then to Robert E. Lee.[71] It sailed August 3, 1851, under Lopez. In the first scrimmage with the Spaniards, Colonel Crittenden (son of Senator Crittenden of Kentucky) and fifty of his men were captured, taken to Havana, and shot, August 24th. The remainder of the Army of Invasion was defeated; Lopez was taken and garroted; and his followers who had been taken prisoners, were sent to Spain.
General Quitman's expedition, organized in 1853–1854, would have been more formidable than any theretofore undertaken. He had commanded a brigade in General Scott's army, in Mexico, and had been Governor of Mississippi. His demonstrations, however, may have been merely in support of Mr. Marcy's efforts, at the time, to open negotiations with Spain for purchasing the island. Meanwhile the Black Warrior incident offered the most promising opportunity of all. The provocation in that case could have been held to be sufficient to justify a declaration of war; and that surely would have been the result, had it not been for the tornado of anti-slavery sentiment which was let loose at the time by the promulgation, in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, then pending in Congress, of the new doctrine of "Squatter Sovereignty"; and by Mr. Dixon's amendment thereto, expressly repealing the restriction of the time honored Missouri Compromise. "It may be affirmed with confidence," says Mr. Rhodes,[72] "that Northern public opinion, excited by the Kansas-Nebraska act, alone prevented this unjust war." The New York Courier and Inquirer said June 1st:
Does any sane man live who believes that if Cuba was tendered to us tomorrow, with the full sanction of England and France, that this people would consent to receive and annex her? … There was a time when the North would have consented to annex Cuba, but the Nebraska wrong has forever rendered annexation impossible.
A revolution in Spain gave an opportunity for negotiations to purchase the island; but the suggestion that a few millions of money should be placed at the disposal of the Executive, during the recess of Congress, to be used in the Spanish-Cuban business, met no response;[73] while the "Ostend Manifesto" received no consideration whatever. The trouble was that the South had been moving with too much energy and too arrogantly. Her statesmen had undertaken to do everything at once. Had they been less aggressive, or more conciliatory and diplomatic, and concentrated their efforts on the acquisition of Cuba, they surely could have succeeded;[74] and would then have been in position to await the psychological moment to move the Kansas question. The Missouri Compromise was a "solemn covenant entered into by two opposing parties for the preservation of amicable relations." It was not sustained by any constitutional authority. Kansas Territory, therefore, might have been peacefully occupied by emigrants from Missouri and the Southern States, as Missouri had been, leaving, with confidence, the constitutionality of the restrictions against slavery, for future settlement by the courts.
The creation of the State of Kansas was a political proposition pure and simple. The amendment to the Nebraska bill creating Kansas Territory provided for a "complete Territorial government; including a legislature with two houses and thirty-nine members; although, at the time, there was not one white man in the Territory, except those intermarried with Indians and the few who were there under authority of Federal law. … The project fell upon Congress as suddenly and apparently as uncaused as a meteor from the political sky."[75]
The settlement of the Territory was promoted by the leaders of the pro-slavery and anti-slavery sections of the country. The South was spurred to activity by the extremity of its political and commercial necessities; while the North was impelled by a great moral sentiment, that had developed with time and changes which had occurred in public thought and in economic conditions. But the fact should not be lost sight of, that the ethical emotions which nourished this sentiment had their origin, or beginnings, in the unprofitable and unsatisfactory character of slave labor in that section. The Southern statesmen staked the entire stock of their political assets on the result in Kansas. The North already had a majority of one State, with the Territories, Minnesota and Oregon, waiting at the threshold of the Union for admission into the family of States. If the South lost Kansas, its political power and prestige would be destroyed; slavery would thereafter be dependent, in the Union, upon the mercy or charity of the aggressively hostile anti-slavery sentiment which it had too arrogantly aroused.
The plans of the Southerners for the creation of the new State, were well matured, and seemed in every way feasible. The geographical situation was ideal. The close proximity of the friendly State of Missouri, with a large percentage of its population on its western border, backed by the mutuality of every Southern State, seemed to be sufficient guaranty that the necessary voting population could, and would, be promptly furnished. They had good cause to believe that they could get their people into the Territory in sufficient numbers to control the necessary elections.
In the Senate Mr. Seward said, May 25, 1854:
The sun has set for the last time upon the guaranteed and certain liberties of all the unsettled portions of the American continent that lie within the jurisdiction of the United States. Tomorrow's sun will rise in deep eclipse over these. How long that obscuration shall last, is known only to the power that directs all human events. For myself I know this: that no human power can prevent its coming on, and that its passage off will be hastened and secured by others than those now belonging to this generation.[76]
Authorities by the score might be cited to show the gloom and despondency of the North at this time. The people had reason to believe that