American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805. Группа авторов
to absolute, uncontrouled dominion; that if the English government, in its administration, has, at some seasons, been despotic, yet its genius hath at times been free; and that the liberty of the subject, founded upon established laws, was essential to every form under which it appeared.
I believe all political power to be derived originally from, and invested in the people; which power, I believe, they may dispose of, for their own use, in what hands, and under what conditions they please.
I believe a current of liberty has been gradually widening, as well as purifying, in proportion to the distance from its source, a feudal institution; that charters and laws have removed every scruple that might now arise about the reciprocal rights and privileges of the King and his subjects.
I believe the feudal system and absolute dominion, two things perfectly incompatible.
I believe the claim of the Norman Invader to the crown was not conquest but testamentary succession; that he renounced his conquest by a coronation oath; and before he commenced tyrant, confirmed the use of the Saxon laws.
I believe regal power to have no divine right, but to be of human or popular institution; and that the present reigning family’s title to the crown, is derived only from parliamentary resolutions, to which revolutional principles alone gave birth.
I believe passive obedience was not demanded even by Elizabeth or James; nor even acknowledged, by the people, as a matter of right.
I believe legal resistance and rebellion essentially different, and that they originate from quite opposite principles. By the law of nature, every man has a right to defend himself against the abuse of power, and by the singular constitution of this kingdom, when Kings and Ministers, break through the bounds prescribed by the laws, the people’s right of resistance is unquestionable.
I believe what is called the English constitution to be that system of government which was first declared by the great charter of England; and after many struggles between the crown and its subjects, was established at the glorious revolution.
I believe I am bound to maintain the Protestant succession as established by law, in the present reigning family, and also to support the Catholic Church of England, so long as it continues united with the state; and therefore I will use my utmost endeavors to oppose the designs of Papists, and every pretender to the throne, as inveterate enemies to both.
I believe a Parliament to be a legislative body, instituted by the people at large with delegated power, intended as a balance between them and the Sovereign; and elected for the sole purposes of preserving their liberties, or defending their lives and estates.
I believe it is my duty to yield an implicit obedience to the laws of my country; that these are a standard of right for both Prince and subject; and that no Englishman ought to suffer in person or property, unless by the uncontrouled judgment of his Peers.
I believe I am under an indispensable obligation to have an eye, in all my pursuits and actions, to peace, safety, and good government; I will, therefore, under God, endeavor to maintain, at all times, true loyalty to my King, and an unfeigned affection to the Magistrate; proportioned to the wisdom and integrity, with which they guard public freedom, and promote national prosperity.
I believe I ought not, on any pretence, to surrender that invaluable liberty, which has been solemnly confirmed to me, by the great transactions of former days; nor to renounce that pure religion which my ancestors sealed with their blood; I will therefore be ready, at any moment, to risque my life in their defence; and so long as I intend fairly and honestly, I trust Almighty God will bless my public and private efforts to advance his glory and my nation’s welfare.
The Alarm: or, an Address to the People ofPennsylvania on the Late Resolve of Congress
The Americans of the founding era were a highly politicized people. Even in the midst of their most serious crisis, every action was subject to debate. The Continental Congress had passed a resolution for the separate colonies to write new constitutions commensurate with their independent statehood. It had called upon the respective state legislatures to draft the constitutions, and in this essay the author argues that constitutions should not be written by legislatures but by special conventions elected for that purpose. While that has become common practice in the United States, few of the more than two dozen state constitutions adopted by 1800 were written by special conventions. The legislature tended also to adopt the new constitutions, and only twice before 1800 did a state both elect a special convention and submit the document to the people for adoption, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 being the first.
The long continued injuries and insults, which the Continent of America hath sustained from the cruel power of the British Court, and the disadvantages, which the several provinces in the mean time labour under from the want of a permanent form of government, by which they might in a proper constitutional manner of their own, afford protection to themselves, have at length risen to such an height, as to make it appear necessary to the Honourable Continental Congress to issue a Resolve, recommending it to the several Colonies to take up and establish new governments “on the authority of the people,” in lieu of those old ones which were established on the authority of the Crown.
This, Fellow Countrymen, is the situation we now stand in, and the matter for your immediate consideration, is simply this: Who are, or who are not, the proper persons to be entrusted with carrying the said Resolve into execution, in what is the most eligible mode of authorizing such persons? for unless they have the full authority of the people for the especial purpose, any government modelled by them will not stand.
Men of interested view and dangerous designs may tell you, The House of Assembly: But be not deceived by the tinkling of a name, for either such an House does not now exist, or if it does exist, it is by an unconstitutional power, for as the people have not yet, by any public act of theirs, transferred to them any new authority necessary to qualify them agreeable to the sense and expression of Congress, which says, “on the AUTHORITY of the PEOPLE,” they consequently have none other than what is either immediately derived from, or conveyed to them in consequence of, the royal charter of our enemy, and this, saith the Honourable Congress, “should be totally suppressed”. Wherefore, in compliance with this advice and recommendation of Congress, it is proposed to enter a public protest, in order to suppress it, for legislative bodies of men have no more the power of suppressing the authority they sit by, than they have of creating it, otherwise every legislative body would have the power of suppressing a constitution at will; it is an act which can only be done to them, but cannot be done by them. Were the present House of Assembly to be suffered by their own act to suppress the old authority derived from the Crown, they might afterwards suppress the new authority received from the people, and thus by continually making and unmaking themselves at pleasure, leave the people at last no right at all. The power from which the new authority is to be derived, is the only power which can properly suppress the old one. Thus, Fellow Countrymen, you are called upon by the standing law of nature and reason, and by the sense of the Honourable Congress, to assert your natural rights, by entering your protest against the authority of the present House of Assembly, in order that a new government, founded “on the authority of the people,” may be established.
Until the authority of the Crown, by which the present House of Assembly sits, be suppressed, the House is not qualified to carry the Resolve of Congress, respecting a new government, into execution, and after the House is suppressed, it will be again disqualified, for the want of new authority, for in that case it will be no House at all: Wherefore, both before and