American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805. Группа авторов
of the people in any state. And this is said to be the principle of democratical governments, and to influence every subject of it to pursue such measures as conduce to the prosperity of the whole. A man, therefore, to qualify himself for a member of such a community, must divest himself of all interested motives, and engage in no pursuits which do not ultimately redound to the benefit of society. He must not, through ambition, desire to be great, because it would destroy that equality on which the security of the government depends; nor ought he to be rich, lest he be tempted to indulge himself in those luxuries, which, though lawful, are not expedient, and might occasion envy and emulation. Should a person deserve the esteem of his fellow citizens, and become popular, he must be neglected, if not banished, lest his growing influence disturb the equilibrium. It is remarkable, that neither the justice of Aristides, or the bravery of Themistocles, could shield them from the darts of envy and jealousy; nor are modern times without examples of the same kind.
To this species of government every thing that looks like elegance and refinement is inimical, however necessary to the introduction of manufactures, and the cultivation of arts and sciences. Hence, in some ancient republics, flowed those numberless sumptuary laws, which restrained men to plainness and similarity in dress and diet, and all the mischiefs which attend Agrarian laws, and unjust attempts to maintain their idol equality by an equal division of property.
Schemes like these may be practicable in countries so steril by nature as to afford a scanty supply of the necessaries, and none of the conveniences, of life; but they can never meet with a favourable reception from people who inhabit a country to which Providence has been more bountiful. They will always claim a right of using and enjoying the fruits of their honest industry, unrestrained by any ideal principles of government, and will gather estates for themselves and children without regarding the whimsical impropriety of being richer than their neighbours. These are rights which freemen will never consent to relinquish, and after fighting for deliverance from one species of tyranny, it would be unreasonable to expect they should tamely acquiesce under another.
The truth is, that men will not be poor from choice or compulsion, and these governments can exist only in countries where the people are so from necessity. In all others they have ceased almost as soon as erected, and in many instances been succeeded by despotism, and the arbitrary sway of some usurper, who had before perhaps gained the confidence of the people by eulogiums on liberty, and possessing no property of his own, by most disinterestedly opposing depredations on that of his neighbours.
The most considerable state in which the shadow of democracy exists (for it is far from being purely so) is that of the united provinces of Holland, &c. Their territories are confined within narrow limits, and the exports of their own produce very inconsiderable. Trade is the support of that people, and, however said to be considerable, will not admit of luxury. With the greatest parsimony and industry, they, as a people, can but barely support themselves, although individuals among them may amass estates. I own they have exhibited to mankind an example of perseverance and magnanimity that appeared like a prodigy. By the profits of their trade they maintained large armies, and supported a navy equal to the first in their day of warfare; but their military strength, as well as the form of their government, have long since given way. Their navy has dwindled into a few ships of war, and their government into an aristocracy, as unhappy and despotic as the one of which we complain.
The state of Venice, once a republic, is now governed by one of the worst of despotisms. In short, I do not recollect a single instance of a nation who supported this form of government for any length of time, or with any degree of greatness; which convinces me, as it has many others, that the principle contended for is ideal and a mere creature of a warm imagination.
[Continuation in the next issue, June 15, 1776]
One of the first staples of our country, you know, is esteemed by many to be one of the greatest luxuries in the world, and I fancy it will be no easy matter to draw you into measures that would exclude its culture and deprive you of the wealth resulting from its exportation.
That I may not tire your patience, I will now proceed to delineate the method in which I would distribute the powers of government, so as to devise the best code of laws, engage their due execution, and secure the liberties of the people. It is agreed by most writers on this subject, that this power should be divided into three parts, each independent of, but having connection with each other. Let the people, in the first place, choose their usual number of Representatives, and let this right return to them every third year.
Let these Representatives when convened, elect a Governor, to continue in authority during his good behavior, of which the two houses of Council of State and Assembly should jointly be the Judges, and by majority of voices supply any vacancy in that office, which may happen by dismission, death, or resignation.
Let the Representatives also choose out of the Colony at large, twenty-four proper persons to constitute a Council of State, who should form a distinct or intermediate branch of the legislature, and hold their places for life, in order that they might possess all the weight, stability and dignity due to the importance of their office. Upon the death or resignation of any of the members let the Assembly appoint another to succeed him.
Let no member of either house, except the Treasurer, hold a post of profit in the government.
Let the Governor have a Privy Council of seven to advise with, tho’ they should not be members of either house.
Let the Judges of the Courts of Common Law and Chancery be appointed by the Governor, with the advice of his Privy Council, to hold their offices during their good behaviour, but should be excluded a seat in either house.
Let the Treasurer, Secretary, and other great officers of state be chosen by the lower house, and proper salaries assigned to them as well as to the Judges, &c. &c.
Let all military officers be appointed by the Governor, and all other inferior civil ones.
Let the different Courts appoint their own clerks. The Justices in each county should be paid for their services, and required to meet for the dispatch of business every three months. Let five of them be authorized to form a Court to hear and determine causes, and the others impowered to keep the peace, &c. &c.
These are the out lines of a government which should, I think, preserve the principle of our constitution, and secure the freedom and happiness of the people better than any other.
The Governor will have dignity to command necessary respect and authority, to enable him to execute the laws, without being deterred by the fear of giving offence, and yet be amenable to the other branches of the legislature for every violation of the rights of the people. If this great officer was exposed to the uncertain issue of frequent elections, he would be induced to relax and abate the vigorous execution of the laws whenever such conduct would increase his popularity. Should he, by discharging his duty with impartiality give offence to men of weight and influence, he would be liable to all the opposition, threats, and insults which resentment could suggest; and which few men in such a dependent state would have sufficient resolution to neglect and dispise. Hence it would follow, that the apprehensions of losing his election would frequently induce him to court the favour of the great, at the expense of the duties of his station and the public good. For these, and a variety of other reasons, this office should be held during good behaviour.
The Council of State who are to constitute the second branch of the legislature should be for life. They ought to be well informed of the policy and laws of other states, and therefore should be induced by the permanence of their appointment to devote their time to such studies as may best qualify them for that station. They will acquire firmness from their independency, and wisdom from their reflection and experience, and appropriate both to the good of the state. Upon any disagreement between the Governor and lower house, this body will mediate and adjust such difference, will investigate the propriety of laws, and often propose such as may be of public utility for the adoption of the legislature. Being secluded from offices of profit, they will not be seduced from their duty by pecuniary considerations.
The Representatives of the people will be under no temptation to swerve from the design of their institution by bribery or corruption; all lucrative posts being denied them. And should