Collected Political Writings of James Otis. Otis James
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and a thousand other accidents and circumstances, concur to vary the idea annexed to those words. The delicacy and politeness of the Russian court, would perhaps appear boorish in the present refinements at St. James’s. The British courtier at Versailles may be looked upon with as much pity and contempt, as the true plain hearted Old Briton would be by a modern politician. In the days of our fore-fathers, power put on the grim visage of open force and violence. In this more delicate age, soft words; a smiling countenance, fair promises, and other tickling blandishments, are the only sure means of obtaining those enormous degrees of power, which mankind are so fond of: Whatever delicacy and politeness may dictate, good sense and good nature require that great allowances be made for the different ages, nations, education, advantages and natural tempers of men. In one word, I am no courtier; I know not to give flattering titles to men, nor have I the least desire to offend them. If plain english and freedom of speech are too hard for the digestion of any stomacks, those who labour under this infirmity, have a right to please their own palates, and will of course seek elsewhere for entertainment.
Mr. Locke informs us, that Mr. Lowndes was “no otherwise known to him than by his civilities,” and adds, that he had “a very great esteem for him”; and so have I for his Honor, tho’ no part of my respect arises from civilities I have received, but purely from his Honor’s rank and merit. Mr. Locke in his disputes uses greater freedoms by fifty times, than I ever desired to use with his Honor, and it would be no difficult task to point out some in his controversy with his friend Lowndes. However, this might not serve me, as it may be said, that greater freedoms are excuseable between friends. The bishop of Worcester was greatly Mr. Locke’s superior in rank, tho’ I confess not so much as his Honor is mine in abilities. But it must be remembered, that no man carries the atmosphere of his commission or public character into a disputation; if there was any rule of logic in favour of that, the very name of a justice of the quorum would be as effectual to strike a poor plebeian dumb, as the ratio ultima regum3 of Lewis the XIV. Most men had rather be silent all their days, than run the risque of being thought worthy of hard names, bonds and stripes for every word that may happen to displease the delicate ears of a superior.
I return my most humble and hearty thanks to his Honor for his history of our currency, and should promise myself great entertainment, if he would gratify the public with a more general history of the province. His Honor’s
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long acquaintance with our ancient records, must have furnished him with many curious annecdotes, unknown to most others.
I entirely agree with his Honor, that our standard for silver has ever been the same with sterling. I could never see any necessity of altering the denomination, and have often wondered at such alteration taking place; and am more fully convinced since his Honor’s opinion, that it was a very ill judged thing, tending only to confusion and disorder. It is a thousand pities that so fair an opportunity as offered itself in 1749, for rectifying this error should not have been embraced.
His Honor observes, that “in democratical governments, generally, there will be a biass in the legislature, to the number rather than to the weight of the inhabitants.” It is presumed that this may be true in speculation, but it cannot well be examined in practice: because strictly speaking, there never were many democratical governments in the world. I don’t at present recollect one such government existing upon the face of the earth. The English government is by some indeed considered as democratical, others have not scrupled to call it an anarchy; but the best opinion is, that the true British constitution, as settled by the glorious revolution, is a mixed monarchy, or a composite of the three famous kinds, viz. of monarchy, supplied by the King, aristocracy, supplied by the lords, and of democracy, supplied by the commons. This when the checks and ballances are preserved, is perhaps the most perfect form of government, that in its present depraved state, human nature is capable of. It is a fundamental maxim in such a government, to keep the legislative, and executive powers, separate. When these powers are in the same hands, such a government is hastening fast to its ruin, and the mischiefs and miseries that must happen before that fatal period, will be as bad as those felt in the most absolute monarchy.
It may happen in governments formed after this model, that in consequence of art and corruption, half a dozen, or half a score men will form an oligarchy, in favour of themselves; and an aristocracy in favour of their families and friends. Instances may be found, where a man of abilities, shall monopolize a power proportionate to all those of lord chief baron of the exchequer, lord chief justice of both benches, lord high treasurer, and lord high chancellor of Great Britain, united in one single person. There is no axiom in the mathematicks clearer than that no man ought to be sole legislator of his country, and supreme judge of his fellow citizens. Should it be objected, that in making these political reflections, I have wandered; my apology is, I went out of the way, for the sake of his Honor’s company, whose observation upon the democratical byass, led me astray if I have erred. By analogy it seems probable, that in an aristocratical government, the byass will
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be in favour of the weight rather than the number of the inhabitants. But the more equitable way in all governments, is to set quantity against quality, and to keep as exact a balance between debtor and creditor, as the nature of the thing will admit. If it is possible that his Honor should intend, a distant light delicate suggestion, that I am in the least warped by either of these byasses, he is very much mistaken. I desire neither poverty nor riches, and thank God heartily that I have neither. Mediocritate mea contentus sum.4 My argument in more respects than one, runs counter to what the wise of this world call interest. This will not lie, and when a man speaks against it, there is little reason to suspect his sincerity, however lightly we may think of his understanding. Restituit Rem,5 is a pompous motto, that I never expect to be complimented with, and I certainly will never assume it, but this, Non populi fasces, non purpura Regum flexit,6 is what every man should take care to deserve, before he pretends to any degree of philosophy or patriotism.
For the sake of the unlettered reader, let it be noted, that Monarchy is the government of a single person, whether King, Emperor, or perpetual Dictator. Aristocracy is a government administred by a few Nobles or Grandees. A Democracy is that government where the supreme power is in the Hands of the people. An Oligarchy, is the government of a few, sometimes justly termed a Junto. Anarchy denotes a mobb or no government at all.
There can’t be a more severe satire upon many modern governments, than what Mons. Secondat is supposed gravely to assert, as the principle of Monarchal governments: “In Monarchies (says he) policy makes people do great things with as little virtue as she can. The state subsists independently of the love of one’s country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and which to us are known only by Story.”
The same author, speaking of the British Constitution, observes that, “the political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind, arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted, as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, (or nearly so) there can be no liberty, because (just and great) apprehensions may arise lest the same Monarch or Senate (or Junto) should enact tyrannical laws to execute them
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in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul: for the judge would be then the legislator: were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the insolence of an oppressor. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise the powers of enacting laws, of executing the public resolutions, and of judging the crimes and differences of individuals. Most kingdoms of