The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method. Christian von Wolff
they depend upon agreement, but in their case the mere will of the one exercising them rules. These rights therefore are altogether free, and in this respect they are even called jura libertatis [rights of freedom] by Grotius. Nor is there need with him to distinguish from the rights of freedom those which are not exercised daily, but only once when it shall be convenient, as the redemption of a pledge, if there has been no agreement concerning a definite time within which it ought to be redeemed. For then you are undoubtedly free to use that right when you will, nor can you be compelled to do contrary to your desire what must be done once for all, for example to redeem your pledge, when it shall seem best to another. The act, therefore, is one of pure will.
§ 77. What sort of a right commerce between nations is
§ 76.
§ 73.
§ 76.
Since a right of pure power is that which any one may exercise or not as seems best to himself, free from all outside coercion, moreover since it depends upon the will of any nation whether or not it wishes to engage in commerce with another nation, and upon what condition it wishes so to engage; commerce between nations is of itself, or naturally, a right of pure power, consequently acts pertaining to it are acts of pure will.
Note, § 76.
In order that no doubt may arise, those points must be considered fully which we have just noted. Moreover from what follows later, it is
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plain that it is of no little importance to recognize what sort of a right commerce between nations is.
§ 78. Of the prescription of rights of pure power
§ 76.
§ 1024, part 3, Jus Nat.
The rights of pure power cannot be barred by prescription, and they are not lost, except from the time when a prohibition or order has intervened, and obedience has been given to it, with adequate evidence of consent. For you can use or not use the right of pure power, as shall seem best to you, nor can any other one compel you to use it or not use it. Therefore from the fact that you use it during a long period without any interruption, it cannot be understood that you wish always to use the same, and that you ought not to be free not to use it longer, if it shall seem best to you not to use it longer. And on the other hand, if you do not use this same right when you could, from that it cannot in the least be understood that you do not wish to use it, if it shall seem best to use it. Therefore, although by prescription a personal right may be lost by presumed consent, the rights of pure power cannot be barred by prescription or lost. Which was the first point.
§ 1024, part 3, Jus Nat.
But if another prohibits you from using a right which you were able to use and have used up to this time, or compels you to use the right which you have continuously used but do not wish to use further, and with adequate evidence of consent you obey the prohibition or order, assuredly it is understood that you agree in this, that you ought not to be free to use or not to use further, but that you wish to use constantly, or not to use the same, as the case may be, consequently you lose your right by the presumed consent. Therefore, since the loss of your right by presumed consent is prescription, the right of pure power is barred by prescription, from the time when the prohibition or order has intervened, and obedience has been given to it with adequate evidence of consent. Which was the second proposition.
For example, let us assume that you are free to use any mill-house whatsoever, but that for a long time you have used a certain definite mill-house, on that account your right to use any mill-house whatsoever, as may have been suitable, is not barred by prescription, nor does the master of the mill-house acquire by prescription the right to
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compel you to use none except his mill-house. Therefore, although you have used that mill-house through a hundred and more years, this nevertheless in no way at all prevents you from using another, if it shall have so pleased you. But let us suppose that you do use another and that the master of the mill opposes it and forbids you to use any other than his, and moreover suppose you do this, although you are driven by no compulsion so to do, and do not oppose this in any way, although you might oppose it, it is rightly presumed that you agree to this, not to use any other mill than his. And therefore you lose your right of using any mill whatsoever, and the master of the mill from that time acquires the right of compelling you to use his mill alone. Moreover it is a matter of positive law that prescription requires a certain number of years, which it declares enough for presuming consent from silence.
§ 79. Of the barring of commerce by prescription
§ 78.
§ 74.
§ 78.
§ 60.
§ 1024, part 3, Jus Nat.
Since the rights of pure power cannot be barred by prescription, since moreover commerce between nations of itself, that is, if there is no agreement added thereto, is a right of pure power; commerce between nations cannot be barred by prescription, consequently since commerce consists in the right of buying and selling again, if through a hundred years two nations have united for trade, nevertheless on this account the one nation is not bound to allow the other to sell its goods to the former, or to buy its own goods from the other, nor is freedom in buying and selling its goods lost.
§ 73.
For example, if a certain nation for however long a time has bought grain from a certain other nation, nevertheless the one cannot on this account compel the other to buy in the same way ever afterwards, if it desires not to do so. And on the other hand, if a certain nation has sold wine to a certain other nation, the latter is not bound to allow this nation ever afterwards to bring wine into its territories and sell it there. The same is understood of any other kind of merchandise whatsoever. Freedom in buying and selling always remains unimpaired to every nation.
§ 80. Of the voluntary submission of a nation
§ 32.
§ 28 h, and § 9, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 69.
§ 70.
§ 159, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
If one nation shall not be strong enough to protect itself against the wrongs done by other nations, it can submit itself to some more powerful
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nation, under definite conditions, upon which an agreement has been made, and the rights of each are to be determined in accordance with the compact of submission. For every nation has the right to those things without which it cannot preserve itself. Therefore, since it cannot preserve itself, unless it can protect itself against the wrongs done by other nations, consequently unless it is sufficiently powerful, moreover since the lack of power may be supplied by the power of another, and nations ought to strive as far as they are able to be powerful; if any nation shall not be strong enough to protect itself against the wrongs done by other nations, it can subject itself to some more powerful nation. Which was the first point.
§ 11, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 698, part 3, Jus Nat.
For since it depends upon the will of any one, upon what conditions he wishes to transfer a certain right to another, it depends upon the will of nations also, upon what conditions one nation desires to submit itself to another, or to give itself into tutelage, and upon what conditions the other nation desires to receive it under its protection, consequently they must agree on these points. If therefore any nation is not strong enough to protect itself against the wrongs done by other nations, since it can submit itself to some other more powerful nation for the sake of protecting itself, as shown above in point 1, it can submit itself to it on definite conditions, upon which they shall have agreed. Which was the second point.
§§ 788, 361, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 382, part 3, Jus Nat.
Finally, since agreements of this sort are stipulations, and since no one can acquire more