The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method. Christian von Wolff
other wished to transfer to him, if any less powerful nation submits itself to a more powerful one for the sake of protecting itself, the rights of each are to be determined in accordance with the compact of submission. Which was the third point.
§ 55, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 135, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 156, part 1, Jus Nat.
Every nation is free by nature. But in regard to this right it can determine to its liking, just as shall have seemed best to it, therefore can diminish its freedom for the sake of its own advantage; this is what happens, if a nation subjects itself to another upon certain definite conditions, or grants some right to another over itself, whatever indeed that may be. But whether a nation is not powerful enough to protect itself against the wrongs done by other nations, and whether it cannot provide for itself by some other agreement than by subjecting itself or giving itself into tutelage to another more powerful nation,
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must be left to the decision of the nation itself in accordance with the principle of natural freedom. Therefore agreements entered into must be kept and there is no question as to whether the nation has acted wisely, which has subjected itself to another for the sake of its own protection, although it could have provided for itself in some other manner, but there must be acquiescence in that as to which agreement has been made.
§ 81. Whether by this act there is a derogation from the sovereign power
§ 80.
Since any nation for the purpose of self-protection can submit itself to another nation under those conditions upon which they have agreed, and the rights of each are to be determined in accordance with the compact of submission; if a certain nation puts itself under the tutelage of another, this can be done either with or without diminution of its sovereign power.
§ 60, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 44, part 8, Jus Nat.
So this happens without diminution of the sovereign power, if a definite tribute is to be paid annually; for then the nation which owes protection has no other right than that of demanding the tribute as due. And the obligation to pay to another nation annually a certain sum of money, which arises from a contract to pay for an act, does not affect the civil power itself, much less does it derogate from its sovereignty. But if indeed to the nation which owes the protection, is allowed the right of imposing new tributes, as shall seem best to it, or certain things pertaining to the exercise of civil power cannot be done without its consent, or the suzerain power itself can do such things on its own initiative; the submission has certainly been made with derogation from the sovereign power, because the exercise of power as to certain acts depends upon the will of the nation owing protection.
§ 82. Of protection not furnished
§ 827, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 80.
If the more powerful nation does not furnish the protection promised, it is allowable for the less powerful nation to put itself under the control of another, or to submit itself to such for the sake of self-protection. For if the nation which owes the protection does not
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furnish it, it fails in its agreement, as is self-evident. But if one of the contracting parties fails in his agreement, the other also may withdraw from it. Therefore the less powerful is not bound to stand by its agreement, if the more powerful does not furnish the promised protection, consequently since it is now free from its obligation, by which it was bound under the agreement, nothing prevents it from putting itself under the protection of some other nation or submitting to it for the sake of self-protection.
There is no reason for objecting that the right exists to compel due protection to be furnished. For the less powerful nation lacks strength to coerce the more powerful; if it had possessed the strength, it could have done this. With strength it could of itself have resisted one wronging it, so that it would not have needed another’s protection, if it had possessed sufficient strength to compel the more powerful nation to furnish the protection due to it. The situation is quite different, if the nation to whom protection is owed does not pay the annual tribute owed for it.
§ 83. Of a nation which owes protection infringing upon the rights of the less powerful
§ 239, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 859, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 920, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 914, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 727, Ontol.
If a nation which owes protection assumes for itself a greater right against one less powerful, than it has by the agreement, it is allowable to resist it by force and to seek aid from another. For if a nation which owes protection assumes for itself a greater right against one less powerful than it has by the agreement, this is contrary to the right of the less powerful, consequently the one does a wrong to the other, and therefore injures it. Therefore, since the right belongs to every one of demanding from any one whomsoever, that he should not injure him, and of compelling him not to do so when he attempts to injure him, if the nation which owes the protection assumes for itself a greater right against one less powerful than it has by the agreement, it is allowable to resist by force. Which was the first point.
§ 990, part 1, Jus Nat.
Moreover, since the less powerful cannot of itself resist the more powerful, as is self-evident, and since the right belongs to every one by nature to defend another, nay more, it is bound to defend the other so far as lies
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in its power, if of itself it is not capable of self-defence; it is allowable even to seek aid from another. Which was the second point.
It would undoubtedly be better that a supplementary clause be added to the stipulation of submission that the stipulation should be void, if the nation which owes the protection assumes a greater right for itself than that which has been expressly agreed upon, for thus the right of resisting by aid of another rests on the credit of the stipulations and all objections are barred. This is perfectly in accord with the customs of the ancient Germans, who, since nothing was more time-honoured with them than the pledged word, desired that almost all their rights should rest upon agreements, and nothing was considered more disgraceful among them than to betray a pledge when given.
§ 84. Of prescription in favour of a nation owing protection against a less powerful nation
§§ 1058, 1054, part 12, Jus Nat.
§ 1025, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 216, part 2, Jus Nat.
If the nation which owes protection assumes for itself a greater right against a less powerful nation than it has by the agreement and the weaker nation does not oppose it, the more powerful by the long acquiescence of the weaker at length acquires the right which it asserts, nay more, the weaker can utterly lose its supreme power and become subject to the more powerful. For if the nation which owes the protection assumes a greater right for itself against the less powerful than it has by the agreement, and the weaker does not oppose this, but allows the right to be assumed for a long time, from the long-continued silence it is presumed to relinquish its right and consent to the usurpation of it. Therefore, since he who gives up the property tacitly consents to the change of ownership, which includes incorporeal benefits, the nation which owes protection acquires at length, by long-continued acquiescence of the weaker nation, the right which it assumes for itself. Which was the first point.
But since the same thing is true in the same way of any right belonging to the supreme power, the less powerful nation can in the same way utterly lose its sovereignty and become subject to the more powerful, which formerly owed it protection. Which was the second point.
§ 1015, part 3, Jus Nat.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. 2, c. 4, § 12.
There will be no difficulty or obscurity in these matters, provided only there shall have been sufficient examination of those points which