Belgians Under the German Eagle. Jean Massart

Belgians Under the German Eagle - Jean Massart


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Yes! for the German Government, during the siege of Antwerp, made proposals of peace for the third time. This offer was secret. The terms have not been published; even the Germanic Press sought to deny that it had been made; but the avowal appeared in a Viennese newspaper, the Neue Freie Presse, and was reproduced by order of the German authorities in La Belgique (Brussels, 13th January, 1915).

      Hostilities preceding the Declaration of War.

      So the Emperor Wilhelm II did not succeed in making us his accomplices. Needless to say, we did not tremble before the two bogies which are given so large a place in his harangues: his store of dry powder and his newly-whetted sabre.

      And so the sovereign of the formidable German Empire declared war upon tiny Belgium. "He would find himself, to his keenest regret, obliged to execute, if need be by force of arms, the measures of security set forth as indispensable," as the declaration of war expressed it (1st Grey Book, No. 27). This declaration reached Brussels at 7 a.m. on the 4th of August. But, apparently unknown to the Emperor, the German troops, before the telegram had reached Belgium, had crossed the frontier during the night of the 3rd.

      

      We have just seen that the declaration of war reached Brussels on the 4th August, at seven o'clock in the morning. This, at least, is what we learn from the official documents published by Belgium. What does official Germany say upon this point? Nothing. Nowhere is any mention made of the declaration of war, and it is this intentional vagueness which allows the Germans to declare, without blushing, that the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd August. They let it be supposed that the state of war existed from the moment when Belgium, on the 3rd, refused the German ultimatum. Thus the Chronik des Deutschen Krieges (p. 33) gives the text of the ultimatum; then, in two lines, a summary of the reply. The first document which follows relating to Belgium is the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Meuse (6th Report, I).

      This is very vague as to the political relations between the two countries: are they at war, or are they not? No one could say. Of the declaration of war, which should have found a place here, not a word; there is no further question of Belgium before the telegrams of the 7th August (p. 84).

      When we say that the declaration of war is not mentioned in any German publication, we are going too far. Die Wahrheit über den Krieg ("die Wahrheit!") speaks of the declaration of war; but only to say that Belgium declared war (p. 40): Belgiën antwortete darauf mit der Kriegserklärung.[10]

      

      The same publication appends some documents; No. 41 (p. 160) is a reproduction of the ultimatum. One would naturally expect that No. 42 would be either Belgium's reply or the declaration of war. By no means; these two documents are not given. Any one who reads the text and hopes thereby to learn "die Wahrheit" concerning the war will be no better informed by the documents. Let us in passing remark that the German Government, in the White Book published for the session of the Reichstag of the 4th August, had also, by its own admission, made a selection among the documents which it submitted to the members of Parliament. This procedure is no doubt a logical consequence of Kultur.

      The Pacific Character of Belgium.

      Nearly all the nations of Europe cherish national animosities, racial hatreds handed down from century to century, the heritage of conflicts never pacified, which a mere nothing suffices to renew; or the survival of oppressions and spoliations suffered of old by men's forbears, whose abhorred memory is transmitted like a sacred trust from generation to generation. And in all these countries, moreover, there is a chauvinist, a jingo party, which urges a "war of revenge against the hereditary enemy." In Belgium, as Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Dublin, there was nothing of the kind. We had no spite against any one, and our people, laborious and peaceful, only asked to be allowed to live in friendship with its neighbours. Never had there been in Belgium any manifestation against a foreign country; never had a political party inscribed in its programme any sort of hostility towards another people. Who, then, will be persuaded that "the Belgian Government had for a long time been carefully preparing for this war,"[11] as the Emperor Wilhelm II asserted in his telegram to the President of the United States (in which he also stated that his heart was bleeding!)? No, there is no possible doubt on this point: Belgium brought into the conflict no racial enmity,[12] and if she has found herself thrown into the furnace, despite her constant love of peace, it is solely because her haughty neighbour confronted her with this dilemma: either peace with dishonour, or honour with war. The choice was not in doubt.

      

      German Espionage in Belgium.

      It is idle to insist on the accusation of premeditation, for it is unhappily too certain that Belgium was is no way ready for war. But it is also incontestable that Germany had "for a long time carefully prepared for" the invasion of Belgium. We cannot as yet reveal in detail the facts as to German espionage, with its often odious methods, for in most cases these revelations would expose those who have informed us to reprisals. We must for the present be intentionally vague, reserving preciser details for a later date.

      When the occupation comes to an end we shall report in detail the case of a German engineer, who, in returning to us with the rank of officer, presided over the systematic destruction by fire of the workshop which he had managed; and the case of another engineer, who commanded the gang ordered to set fire to the quarter adjoining the factory in which he had been employed. Thanks to his knowledge of the locality, he was able in a few seconds to set fire to the richest streets of the neighbourhood. We shall be able to mark on a map the foundations of reinforced concrete for the great German guns, constructed long in advance, in the localities most favourable to bombardment; we shall also point to the store of timber intended to serve for the construction of a bridge over the Scheldt, which was found in a factory established by Germans on the banks of the river. As for the store of Mauser rifles discovered at Liége, our newspapers spoke of that at the time.

      Here is a fact which can be related without danger. A German officer dropped from his pocket—we shall state later on in what locality—a detailed plan of the town of Soignies, in which his troops had lodged a few days earlier. This plan gives, besides the details of streets, and even houses, information concerning the occupants of certain buildings: pharmacies, breweries, tanneries, the Communal treasury, the bank, and other establishments where the army might need to make requisitions. The large buildings are coloured blue. It was there that the troops were lodged. This plan, drawn in Chinese ink and coloured, dates from fifteen years back according to the indications which it contains. But it has quite recently been revised and completed, for the latest alterations in the town have been added in pencil; improvement of the Senne, creation of a public square, etc.

      The case related by the N.R.C. of 19th August (evening) is particularly instructive. When the Germans occupied Liége and Seraing the Cockerill workshops naturally refused to work for them, since the Germans wished them to make munitions for them. The German Colonel Keppel then assumed the direction of the works, promising the workers an increased salary of 50 per cent. And this officer did not blush to sign his proclamation: "Attaché of the German Government at the Liége Exposition." He had consequently profited by his privileged situation in Belgium in order to make himself familiar with the organization of the Cockerill works. But it must be supposed that matters were too difficult for him, for Herren Koester and Noske (Kriegsfahrten, p. 21) assert that he had to abandon the position.

      The Mentality of the German Soldiers at the beginning of the Campaign.

      Until the very last moment our enemies deluded themselves as to the loyalty of the Belgians: they still hoped that the latter would only resist as a matter of form. This idea is openly expressed in the Chancellor's speech of the 2nd December; it is also implicitly contained in the proclamation of General von Emmich (see 6th Report, I). The officers and soldiers who crossed the


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