Belgians Under the German Eagle. Jean Massart
in Belgium, had succeeded in finally lulling our suspicions.
In the currents of thought which were then clashing in Belgium, it was confidence that carried the day. Many of us who were present on the 1st of August at a session of the Royal Academy of Belgium, were speaking, before the session was opened, of the serious events which were approaching, the war already declared between Austria and Serbia, and the conflict which appeared imminent between Germany, France, Russia, and England. Yet no one imagined that Belgium could be drawn into the conflagration. That very morning, it was related, France had officially renewed, through her Minister in Brussels, the assurance that she would faithfully abstain from violating the neutrality of Belgium (1st Grey Book, No. 15); and there was no reason to doubt his words. A few days earlier the German Minister in Brussels had affirmed that his country had too much respect for international conventions to permit herself to transgress them; and we believed him too! Oh, simplicity! We still believed him, on the following day, when he repeated the same declaration (1st Grey Book, No. 19; Belg. All., p. 7). And on the evening of that Sunday, the 2nd of August, he presented to our Government the ultimatum of Germany (1st Grey Book, No. 20).
The Ultimatum.
The telegram of the 2nd of August, by which Herr von Jagow sent the ultimatum to the German Minister in Brussels, declared: "Please forward this Note to the Belgian Government, in a strictly official communication, at eight o'clock this evening, and demand therefrom a definite reply in the course of twelve hours, that is, at eight o'clock to-morrow morning" (Lüttich, p. 4). Never, since Belgium's birth, had a problem so breathless been placed before her Government. And Germany left her twelve hours to solve it: twelve hours of the night! She was not willing that our Government should have time to reflect at leisure; she hoped that in a crisis of distraction Belgium, taken at a disadvantage and forgetful of her dignity, would accept the inacceptable.
However, the German Minister in Brussels continued to offer us explanations which were as perfidious as they were confused and obscure, and to assure us up to the last of the friendly intentions of his Government. The Germany fashioned by Bismarck has assuredly nothing about it to remind us of the Germany of Goethe and Fichte. We might have guessed as much, for that matter, when we saw the Germans glorifying the man who boasted of having falsified the famous Ems telegram in order to make the war of 1870 inevitable, and who succeeded in making his countrymen accept, as a guiding principle, that "might comes before right."
The Speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag.
However, we may suppose that some slight scruples lingered in the recesses of the German conscience, since on the very day when the Chancellor of the Empire told the British Ambassador in Berlin that an international convention is merely "a scrap of paper,"[6] and that neutrality is only a word, he recognized, in his speech to the Reichstag, that the invasion of Belgium constituted an injustice; but he immediately excused this violation of the law of nations by strategic necessities.
B.—Justification of the Entry into Belgium.
"Strategic necessities!" said the German Chancellor. These necessities are expounded in the ultimatum, and may be summed up thus: "Germany knows that France is preparing to attack her through Belgium."
The first question which occurs to us is: Was France really preparing to cross our territory, and had she massed troops near our frontier? There is assuredly no one outside Germany who would admit this. Indeed, if important bodies of troops had been massed in the north of France they could effectually have opposed the advance of the Germans through Belgium. Now in all the battles which the French fought in our country their numbers were much too small to resist the Germans. Let us also remark that these attempts on the part of the French were made on the 15th August at Dinant, the 19th August at Perwez, and the 23rd August at Semois. How then can any one believe that the French were massed close to our frontier as early as 3rd August? Moreover, the map published in the N.R.C. of the 16th December, 1914, confirms the untruthfulness of the German allegations.
This "strategic reason" was again invoked by the Chancellor of the Empire on the 4th August. But owing to the irrefutable manner in which the tardiness of the French movements disproved this assertion the latter is no longer uttered, save in an evasive manner. The German no longer says: "France was ready to cross into Belgium," but "France would not have failed to enter Belgium, and we simply outstripped her." It is thus that Count Bernstoff, the German ambassador to Washington, expressed himself in the interview published by L'Indépendant in September 1914, while the same assertion is found in the manifesto of the ninety-three German "Intellectuals" and the letter addressed by Herr Max Bewer to M. Maeterlinck (in the D.G.A. of October 1914 and the Soldatenpost of the 14th October, 1914).
Let us now ask if Germany had such suspicions of France as amounted to a semi-certitude? In other words, was she sincere in declaring that she knew that France was on the point of invading Belgium? We do not hesitate to assert that she was lying: for if she had really believed that France was ready to violate our neutrality it would have been enormously to her advantage to wait until the violation was committed. For Belgium has always asserted that in case of war between France and Germany she would resist by arms the first invader and immediately join herself to the other Power. Now Germany, however profound her political perversity may be, had no reason to suspect the sincerity of Belgium; she knew then—and this time she did know—that by allowing the French to enter our country she would assure herself of the assistance of our army against her enemy. And scanty as was her esteem for the Belgian soldiers—perhaps she has since had occasion to change her mind!—it was none the less obviously to her interest to avoid having them as her adversaries.
For the rest, we may boldly assert that the very terms of the German ultimatum prove, without possible doubt, that she did not believe in the danger of a French irruption into Belgium. For if she had entertained this conviction she would have said to Belgium: "I warn you that if you do not take the necessary measures to resist the entrance of the French I shall be fully authorized to invade your territory in my turn, in order to defend myself." In acting thus she would have had the right on her side ... and the German diplomatists of the day are certainly capable of distinguishing justice from injustice in cases where the distinction is so easy.
We say, therefore, that the imminence of a French attack upon Belgium was only a pretext and a bugbear; a pretext to justify the violation of Belgium in the eyes of other nations; a bugbear to catch votes of credit in the Reichstag without previous discussion. "We were not able to wait for this session before commencing hostilities and invading Luxemburg, perhaps even Belgium," declared the Chancellor. Observe how clumsy is this "perhaps"; the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August (1st Grey Book, No. 35), and on the afternoon of the 4th, at the session of the Reichstag, the Chancellor had no knowledge of it! We thought the official telegraph service worked better than that in Germany!
What, then, were the real reasons for invading our country? They were strategic reasons, it is true, but not those which the Chancellor indicated in his speech! They had been known for a long time; the German staff had always regarded a sudden attack upon France as an unavoidable necessity, and for that it was necessary at all costs to cross Belgium. Moreover, on the very day when the Chancellor was still invoking the French preparations in the Reichstag, the Secretary of State, von Jagow, openly avowed the true motive for violating Belgium. The pamphlet of propaganda, Die Wahrheit über den Krieg, after invoking, without insisting on, the danger of a French attack, described at length the German plan of campaign; a sudden attack upon France, delivered by passing through Belgium; then, immediately after victory, a change of front, and the crushing of the Russian Army. The same idea is expounded in an infinity of articles and pamphlets.
There can, therefore, be no remaining doubt as to the determining motives of Germany: