Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain. Jean-Claude Amiard

Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain - Jean-Claude Amiard


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that the UN’s policy of nuclear disarmament has been a failure. The traditional vision of security that seems to be shared by the actors involved in the process of arms control and nuclear disarmament limits their capacity and willingness to abolish this type of armament [LAZ 06]. Hence, France and the United States are exerting strong pressure on the French-speaking states and on Japan to not sign the treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

      Nuclear weapons operate on the balance of terror. However, the problem with balance is that the risk of falling is always great. This “balance” is undesirable to an overwhelming majority of the world, because their security is directly at stake [COL 18b].

      Five states have carried out their first atomic tests: the United States on July 16, 1945, the Soviet Union on August 29, 1949, the United Kingdom on October 3, 1952, France on February 13, 1960 and China on October 16, 1964.

      In order to prevent the number of states possessing nuclear weapons from becoming too large, the United Nations has been concerned with nuclear disarmament from the outset, and four UN structures are particularly responsible for this task: the Security Council, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the Office for Disarmament Affairs [GIL 18].

      The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is composed of 65 permanent members who hold three sessions a year in Geneva (usually January to March, May to June and August to September). It operates on the basis of consensus to ensure full support for the agreements reached. It has completed negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but has not yet entered into force [GIL 18].

      The first treaty limiting the use of weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), the Antarctic Treaty, signed in Washington, entered into force on June 23, 1961. This treaty stipulates that the Antarctic is an area exclusively reserved for peaceful purposes and prohibits all activities of a military nature, such as military maneuvers and the testing of any kind of weapon.

      The International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was developed within the UN by the Eighteen-Power Committee on Disarmament. Concrete negotiations lasted three years, from 1965 to 1968. The text was mainly drawn up by the United States and the Soviet Union. On July 1, 1968, the treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, Washington and London. It entered into force on March 5, 1970 after ratification by the three depositary Powers and 40 other signatory states [AIE 70].

      For the treaty itself, the parties had to decide on its extension 25 years after its entry into force. Despite the reluctance of some non-aligned countries (Mexico and Indonesia) and Arab countries (because of Israel’s absence from the treaty), the NPT was extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995 [IRS 19a].

      1.3.1. The functioning of the Treaty

      In the operation of the NPT, states are divided into two categories. The first category consists of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS). These are the five official nuclear powers (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China), which according to Article IX “had manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” and are entitled to possess such weapons. The second category includes all non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), which make up the rest of the NPT membership. For the purpose of control or safeguarding, this last category is divided into two sub-categories depending on whether or not the states have access to nuclear facilities (see section 4.1.1).

      For many years, this NPT has not been functioning well. This is mainly due to non-compliance with two clauses. The first clause is the non-implementation of a process to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The second clause is related to the hypocrisy of the five weapon states, who do not respect the spirit and letter of the NPT. Indeed, while no one can deny that the nuclear arsenals of these states, with the exception of China, have indeed decreased since the Cold War, it must also be noted that all of these states have undertaken processes of modernizing nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

      This treaty seems to have reached its maximum effectiveness with regard to the two pillars of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but it seems limited in effectively forcing the NWS to implement the third pillar, that of a real disarmament policy [COL 15].

      1.3.2. Revision of the NPT

      This treaty is subject to a Review Conference (RevCom) every five years: the next one was due to take place in 2020, interspersed with three so-called Preparatory Conferences (PrepCom). The RevCom is an opportunity to take stock of the progress made


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