Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain. Jean-Claude Amiard
[ABB 18]. The Pakistani people were overcome with fever dreams for the future and were very proud after the first atomic tests. However, in India, the population was more reserved about the Indian tests and regretted the practice of secrecy in this field [ABR 09].
The third failure of the NPT is that of North Korea, which after signing the treaty withdrew from it. In October 2006, North Korea announced that it had detonated its first nuclear bomb. Other tests were carried out in 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017. The best estimate of the stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the Yongbyon nuclear complex at the end of 2015 were between 75 and 320 kg [BRA 18].
In order to stop this North Korean nuclear program, in the early 1990s, successive American presidents tried to negotiate with the North Korean government. American decision-makers were left asking themselves about the usefulness of such a negotiation, the timeframe and the objectives of these diplomatic talks with Pyongyang.
The United States began four major rounds of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea. These were the bilateral framework (1994–2002), bilateral missile negotiations (1996–2000), multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003–2009) and bilateral Leap Day Deal negotiations (2012). In general, North Korea agreed, ostensibly, to end, or even deactivate its nuclear and/or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives. But despite some progress in some negotiations, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile programs [NIK 17].
In April 2018, Pyongyang announced the end of its nuclear tests, and in June 2018, an official meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un took place in Singapore. On June 30, 2019, another historic meeting between the US and North Korean presidents took place on the border between North Korea and South Korea. However, no specific agreement has been reached.
1.3.5. Future nuclear-weapon states
Alongside these four states that have acquired nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation has been observed in several countries. This is developed in section 4.1.3.
The fact that Israel is the only state in the Middle East that possesses nuclear weapons, and that this state enjoys privileges at the UN and the IAEA, since no control is exercised over its production of fissile material, nor over these nuclear weapons, inevitably leads to strong tension in this region. Also, there are many candidates to acquire nuclear weapons. The first candidate is Iran, which has begun to enrich uranium and has a missile program. Among the other postulants is Saudi Arabia, which is anxious to thwart Iran’s influence in the Near East. This state is supported by the United States in this desire. This is obvious and by issuing authorizations for the transfer of American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, without any guarantee of non-proliferation, the American president at the time (Donald Trump) was provoking Iran [TIS 19].
1.4. Other nuclear non-proliferation treaties
Three international treaties and several regional treaties restrict the use of nuclear weapons.
1.4.1. The CTBT Treaty
In January 1946, the first General Assembly resolution specifically called for the elimination of all nuclear and other similar weapons “capable of being used for purposes of mass destruction”, including biological and chemical weapons.
Among the solutions available to the UN, a nuclear test ban can be a very effective way to prevent horizontal proliferation (to states) and vertical proliferation (improvement of nuclear weapons). This solution is not a panacea but could help to limit the number of nuclear weapons.
According to Duarte, a test ban has three advantages. First, it makes it possible to prevent certain forms of “vertical proliferation”, in particular, the development of new generations of nuclear weapons or the modernization of existing arsenals. Second, it helps to begin the process of dismantling the complex institutional infrastructures that have been put in place to develop and maintain these arsenals. Third, a ban also contributes to the process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons themselves, in the eyes of the world, and thus makes it more difficult for policy makers to support the need for nuclear deterrence [DUA 19].
Prior to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), five other anti-nuclear test treaties had been signed. The first Partial Test-Ban Treaty, signed on August 5, 1963, prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under the seas and in outer space. Its main purpose was to stop radioactive substances from contaminating the environment. The second treaty signed on January 27, 1967 prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space. It entered into force on October 10, 1967. The third treaty, signed on February 11, 1971, prohibited the introduction and placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil. It entered into force on May 18, 1972. The fourth treaty concerned the limitation of underground testing, and was signed on July 3, 1974. The fifth treaty, signed on May 28, 1976, prohibited underground explosions for peaceful purposes. Finally, on September 24, 1996, the CTBT Treaty was signed [COL 19b, IRS 19b].
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), along with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is now one of the pillars of the global nuclear non-proliferation structure.
Negotiations took place between 1994 and 1996 and the treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of May 1, 2019, only 184 states have signed the CTBT and it has only been ratified by 168 of them. In order for the treaty to enter into force, the negotiators defined, among other things, a list of nuclear-capable countries whose ratification was indispensable (regardless of the number of states that had ratified the treaty elsewhere). These were the 44 so-called Annex 2 states. As of May 1, 2019, eight Annex 2 states had not yet ratified the treaty: Iran, the United States, China, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan and North Korea, the last three of which were also expected to sign [RÉP 19].
1.4.2. The TPNW
Faced with the non-compliance of one of the pillars of the NPT, effective nuclear disarmament, the non-nuclear weapon states decided to start drafting a new treaty at the level of the UN General Assembly. This made it possible to bypass the undertakings of the five nuclear powers that were hindering this disarmament.
The International Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was the first multilateral treaty on nuclear disarmament, open for signature in 1996, and is supported by a very large majority of UN member states. It was written by diplomats whose ambition was to both respect the mosaic of treaties that codify nuclear weapons (NPT, CTBT and the future FMCT), in accordance with the safeguarding system currently being formulated by the IAEA, and to move the international community towards a world without nuclear weapons [COL 18a].
In the last decade or so, nuclear weapons have been reclassified, thanks to the humanitarian initiative, as weapons with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. This has led to a change in consciousness. The illegality of nuclear weapons, as well as the illegality of the policy of threatening to use them, appears shocking to the states that possess them because they have not yet made their “moral revolution”. The rest of the world is now aware that the presence of these weapons is no longer acceptable and that they are generating growing insecurity, particularly because of their potential humanitarian, environmental and climatic impact at the global level [COL 18a].
On July 7, 2017, an International Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty was adopted at the UN. Approved by 122 states and ratified by 50 nations on October 24, 2020, it entered into force on January 22, 2021. Historically, this text will prohibit signatory countries from manufacturing, stockpiling or using nuclear weapons. Will the threat to use these weapons, i.e. the policy of deterrence, also become prohibited [SOR 18]?
It should be noted that many states are revising their policy on nuclear weapons. This is the case for the Vatican, for example. For many years, this state accepted nuclear deterrence as a “tragic illusion” (Paul VI, June 7, 1978), as “a step on the road to progressive disarmament, can still be considered morally acceptable” (John Paul II, June