Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain. Jean-Claude Amiard
weapons.
As a result of the 1996–2002 joint project of the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA, called the “Trilateral Initiative”, the partners proposed an innovative method for IAEA verification of fissile material in support of nuclear disarmament to the IAEA [SHE 15].
In early 2007, representatives from the UK Ministry of Defence, the Atomic Weapons Establishment, several Norwegian laboratories and the non-governmental organization VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) began work on the best techniques for the verification and control of the effective disarmament of nuclear weapons. This was the first time that a nuclear-weapon state, a non-nuclear weapon state and an independent NGO collaborated in this area of research. This work was presented at the 2009 NPT PrepCom [UKN 10b].
The results of three years of collaboration between experts from Norway and the United Kingdom, to study the technical and procedural problems associated with a possible nuclear disarmament verification regime, were presented in a report. The report encourages the international community as a whole to contribute to the ultimate goal of an effective verification regime for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons [UKN 10a].
In 2010 and 2011, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook a warhead monitored dismantlement (WMD) exercise to investigate the methods for two nuclear-weapon states to verify compliance with an arms reduction treaty. The two fictitious countries negotiated the use of NDA (non-destructive analysis) and CoC (chain-of-custody) measuring equipment [HAU 16].
1.5.2.3. Practical implementation of NPT safeguards
By having early detection of the theft of nuclear materials or the misuse of nuclear technology, the IAEA can alert the world to a proliferation risk [AMA 16]. Through safeguards, the IAEA provides credible assurance that states only use nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with their international obligations.
In 2015, the IAEA conducted 2,118 field inspections, collected 967 environmental and nuclear material samples, observed 1,416 surveillance cameras and 407 satellite images through a network of 20 certified laboratories and 883 staff. This enabled it to provide safeguards at 1,286 nuclear facilities.
The implementation of the safeguards is carried out in four steps. The first stage is the collection and evaluation of information about a state. The second step is the development of a monitoring methodology specific to that state. The third step is the planning of safeguards to be carried out in both the field and the Agency’s headquarters. The final step is the establishment of a safeguards conclusion for each state [AIE 16a].
A safeguards inspector must perform three types of verification at each nuclear facility. These are to verify the integrity of the reactor seals, to control the correct storage of new and spent fuel and the correct operation of surveillance cameras [HEN 16].
Technicians mainly have five handheld instruments at their disposal to carry out their inspection. An HM-5 (detector of multiple alpha, beta, gamma and neutron radiation) can detect the presence of radioactive materials and the enrichment of uranium. The second is a force sensor that operates in two ranges (up to 5,000 kg and up to 20,000 kg). The third instrument is an electrically cooled germanium gamma radiation detection system; the fourth is an ultrasonic thickness gauge. Finally, there is an attribute tester (gamma ray detector) of irradiated elements for underwater fuel, or a digital device for the observation of the Chernenkov effect, which remains dry and protected from water, associated with a camera that detects ultraviolet radiation emitted by spent fuel assemblies.
In the case of additional protocols, inspections require a special toolkit. The toolkit contains all kinds of instruments to collect information and verify reports: a camera, laser meter, GPS, voice recorder, flashlight, universal radiation meter, such as the HM-5 and an environmental sampling kit [FOU 16a].
The IAEA monitors more than one million sets of encrypted data that are collected by more than 1,400 surveillance cameras and 400 radiation sensors around the world. The containment of materials and equipment is ensured by more than 23,000 seals installed at nuclear facilities.
The IAEA’s Next-Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) uses cameras that are protected by casings designed to reveal any attempt at tampering, and are equipped with long-life batteries that ensure their autonomy in the event of an absence of an external power supply for extended periods of time. Approximately 160 systems, with a total of 700 detectors and sensors, are installed in more than 40 countries.
Different types of automatic systems are used, depending on whether it is an enrichment facility, a reactor, a spent fuel storage site or a reprocessing plant.
The IAEA seals are the best known and most widely used safeguarding equipment. Despite their simplicity, these anti-fraud devices are highly effective in preventing unauthorized access to IAEA safeguarding materials and equipment. The IAEA uses several types of seals depending on the case. Some are designed to be installed underwater, others can withstand extreme conditions. The most common seals are metal seals, as well as Cobra seals, which incorporate a multi-core fiber optic cable whose ends are protected by the seal. There are also electro-optical seal systems and laser systems for containment verification [FOU 16b].
The IAEA’s scientific safeguards depend on the laboratories located in Seibersdorf, Austria. These laboratories include two modern facilities. The Nuclear Materials Laboratory (NML) handles the sampling of nuclear materials and the Environmental Samples Laboratory receives and analyzes all environmental smear samples for traces of nuclear materials [JAW 16].
The analysis of environmental samples taken by smear tests allows the determination of all elements present in a facility, which have been used in the past or recently. This technique was first used in Iraq in 1990 in a nuclear facility, the Osirak or Tammouz reactor, which had been bombed on June 7, 1981.
Once collected, the samples are anonymously labeled and analyzed at the IAEA laboratories near Vienna, as well as in the IAEA’s network of 19 accredited laboratories in many IAEA Member States (Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). The shipment of samples is also accompanied by “blind samples” for quality control purposes [DIX 16].
Satellite images are used to establish site maps. These provide valuable and accurate information about buildings and structures. For example, satellite imagery helps the IAEA monitor developments in the nuclear program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), since the IAEA is not in a position to conduct physical verification activities in that country. In particular, the IAEA is monitoring activities at the Yongbyon site [QUE 16].
1.5.2.4. Minor concealments under the NPT
Some states voluntarily conceal a number of activities in the nuclear field that could lead to military applications. This was first observed in Iraq in 1981. This NPT signatory country was developing a nuclear program with a military vocation. It was demonstrated that a country bound to the IAEA by a comprehensive safeguard agreement could carry out activities contrary to the treaty without the IAEA’s knowledge.
By declaring its renunciation of weapons of mass destruction in December 2003, Libya revealed the existence of a nuclear program for military purposes, unsuspected by the IAEA. While taking advantage, officially, of its adherence to the NPT and of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Libya had been able to import certain nuclear materials, carry out conversion activities, set up a centrifuge park intended to enrich uranium and obtain documentation relating to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons [CHE 10]. This action was the work of A.Q. Khan, who sold the plans for a bomb and first-generation centrifuges to the Libyan President Gaddafi.
Finally, very serious doubts were expressed about Syria’s nuclear activities. The American intelligence services transmitted information to the IAEA, that the installation destroyed by the Israeli air force in September 2007 at the Dair Alzour site, was a North Korean-designed nuclear reactor in the process