Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843. Bernard William Dallas
one or two points worth noticing, in order to complete the series of events which happened in the year 1840. Among these, one of the most important was the issuing of an Order in Council, for the establishment of courts of admiralty in China, for the adjudication of prizes, &c. It was to the effect that, "in consideration of the late injurious proceedings of certain officers of the Emperor of China towards certain of our officers and subjects, and, whereas, orders had been given that satisfaction and reparation for the same should be demanded from the Chinese government, it was necessary, for the purpose of enforcing those orders, that all vessels and goods belonging to the Emperor of China or his subjects should be detained and brought into port; and that, in the event of reparation and satisfaction being refused by the Chinese government, a court of admiralty should be formed for the purpose of adjudging and condemning them as prizes."
This order in council was not acted upon, except on a very limited scale, and for a very brief period. It was afterwards considered more equitable that the burden of the war should be made to fall as much as possible upon the government of China, and as little as possible upon the people; and this highly judicious and humane determination was carried out as much as possible, and with the best results, during all the latter part of the war, much to the credit of all concerned.
During the year 1840, very little progress was made in our endeavours to gain over the Chinese people to our interests, or to conciliate their forbearance, in any of the places in which we were brought into contact with them. At Chusan, in particular, they evinced the most hostile spirit towards us, and lost no opportunity of exhibiting their hatred of the foreigner. It was not without great difficulty even that provisions could be obtained for our men; there was evidently some secret influence which operated to prevent the people from meeting us amicably, and made them, for some time, resist even the temptation of gain, so difficult for a Chinaman to withstand. Nothing tended to exhibit their hostile spirit so much as their persevering attempts to carry off our men by stealth, whenever they could find an opportunity; and indeed the kidnapping system was followed up with many circumstances of barbarity, to the very close of the war.
This embittered our men very much against the Chinese, and we may almost wonder that their prisoners, when they fell into our hands, received such lenient treatment in return. The story is well known of Captain Anstruther's capture at Chusan, at the distance of only two or three miles from the town, his being tied up in a sack, and subsequently carried over in a boat to Ningpo on the mainland, and the curious history of his confinement in a bamboo cage, three feet long by two feet broad; and other instances of a similar kind, in which the prisoners were treated with the utmost barbarity, have been so often recounted, that a passing allusion to them will here be sufficient. Captain Anstruther, however, would seem to have been more leniently treated than many of the other prisoners: and I have heard him declare that, with respect to the better class of mandarins at Ningpo, he had little cause of complaint to urge against them, considering that he was a prisoner in an enemy's hands. His talent for drawing, however, enabled him to conciliate their good will, and to earn for himself some indulgences which others were not fortunate enough to procure. He sold his drawings and particularly his portraits, for a tolerable price. Many of the other prisoners, however, were treated with frightful barbarity, and, in some instances, they were put to death.
A much more formidable enemy to us than the Chinese was soon discovered, in the terrible sickness which broke out among our troops at Chusan, and carried off many a brave man prematurely to his grave. The low, swampy rice-grounds surrounding the town, the want of proper drainage, the exposure to the hot sun, and the use of the deleterious spirit which the Chinese call samshoo, made from rice, (of which a vast quantity was manufactured on the island for exportation,) all these causes combined sufficed to produce fever, dysentery, and various complaints, which committed great havoc among the men. The island was subsequently, however, rendered less unhealthy by better arrangements, and by enforcing greater cleanliness.
At Amoy, after the affair of the Blonde, a strict blockade was maintained by the Alligator and other vessels, which interrupted the whole trade of that important commercial city. But none of our ships astonished and alarmed the Chinese so much as the steamers; they were particularly alluded to in the official reports to the emperor, and were described as "having wheels at their sides, which, revolving, propelled them like the wind, enabling them to pass to and fro with great rapidity, acting as leaders;" and it is not surprising that the Chinese should soon have christened them the "Demon Ships."
The effect of our operations to the northward had already been to excite great alarm in the mind of the emperor and of his ministers; indeed the panic created by the first approach of a hostile force was so great, that a very small body of men might have marched almost from one end of China to the other, so little were the Chinese prepared for resistance. But gradually they recovered their energy, improved their means of defence, adopted better weapons, and cast heavier guns. As far as personal bravery could aid them, they were by no means an enemy to be despised. The spear and the bayonet frequently crossed each other; perhaps more frequently than the bayonets of Europeans do; and, in not a few instances, the long spear was more than a match for the shorter bayonet. Hand to hand encounters with the Tartar troops were not uncommon towards the close of the war; and, indeed, many of our men learnt, to their cost, that they had held the Chinese far too cheap. Instances occurred in which the powerful Tartar soldier rushed within the bayonet-guard of his opponent, and grappled with him for life or death.
We may now revert to the period of the arrival of the new Imperial Commissioner Keshen at Canton, with a view to treat with the plenipotentiaries, according to the terms agreed upon at the Pehio, as before mentioned. His predecessor, Lin, whose fall had now commenced, could not resist giving a parting warning to the people, against the continuance of their pernicious habits; and he even assured them that, if they still persisted, "they would assuredly, one and all of them, be strangled."
In the beginning of December the greater part of our naval forces had again assembled below the Bogue, although a squadron was still left to the northward. Notwithstanding that Keshen had arrived for the ostensible purpose of inquiring into and settling all matters in dispute, it was evident that the Chinese were making hostile preparations, with a view to a very different mode of settlement of the question. A feeling of uncertainty and apprehension prevailed, such as generally precedes some great movement. The Chinese, on their side, were collecting troops, and raising new works; while, on our side, every precaution was taken, in case a resumption of hostilities should be called for.
On the 13th, the Nemesis, which had been for some days at anchor with the fleet, a few miles below Chuenpee, conveyed Captain Elliot down to Macao, while the rest of the fleet moved nearer up towards the Bogue, as if with the object of supporting the "negotiations" by a firm display of power. Captain Elliot's stay at Macao was very short, and from the increased activity of our preparations at the Bogue, it became evident that the "negotiations" were not going on satisfactorily.
Numerous communications were passing between Macao and our fleet at the Bogue; Captain Elliot himself went backwards and forwards several times in the Nemesis, and the moment seemed fast approaching when some very decided blow was to be struck.
The following description of the scene of operations will therefore be found interesting. About twenty-two to twenty-five miles above the island of Lintin, before described, and consequently about the same distance above Tongkoo Bay, on the same side of the river, is a projecting headland, about a mile and a quarter wide, distinguished at a considerable distance by the high peak in which its summit terminates. On either side of it there is a fine sandy beach, off which there is a good anchorage. This is Chuenpee.
The hill, which is its principal feature, stands rather towards the northern side of the promontory, and is divided into two conical eminences, upon one of which there was a high building, resembling a watch tower, which was now fortified, and formed a conspicuous object as you ascend the river. At the bottom of the hill there were a considerable stone battery and other works. The whole of these had been very recently strengthened and extended. A line of entrenchment, with mud batteries, had also been carried round the rear. Behind the hill also, in an opening looking towards the north, or into Anson's Bay, another small battery had been erected, with an enclosed space or square for barracks, surrounded by a parapet wall.
The extent of these works was not properly