Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer. Edward William Sloan III
which was finding personnel capable of handling the machinery in steam vessels. As patriotic young men flocked to the Navy Department to offer their engineering talents, zeal soon outdistanced skill as the major contribution of engineering recruits. As much as the Engineer in Chief labored to screen the applicants and train these new men, it was not enough. There was no naval engineering school to teach them their trade; they had to learn by experience, and often while under fire. The best way to deal with this problem was not to spend precious weeks and months training the engineers, for there was not time for that. Instead, as Isherwood soon realized, he would have to design and build his engines to be so simple and reliable that any novice could operate them without causing an immediate engine breakdown.
With durability and reliability as his guiding principles, Isherwood designed engines which could withstand the manhandling of the clumsiest of mechanics. His engines were immensely strong, and, consequently, immensely heavy. Fuel economy and power, though desirable qualities, took second place to simple mechanical dependability. In a period of rudimentary steam technology, when low steam pressures were necessary, Isherwood refused to employ more advanced theories which utilized high pressures and great degrees of steam expansion. The success of engines built on more sophisticated principles was too questionable, considering the low caliber of most engineers and the tremendous demands placed continuously on naval steam engines. His engine designs, therefore, became an easy target for those who criticized Navy steamers for lack of power or economy and for the excessive weight of their machinery.
Isherwood’s requirements for engines clearly demonstrated his absorption with practicality in machinery design. Insisting on “fairness of parts” in his engines, he stressed simplicity of combination and an arrangement which would feature easy access and constant observation. All surfaces in moving contact with other metal parts were to be large in order to withstand the great strains and continuous abrasion in a working engine. Anticipating the inevitable mechanical problems caused by bad materials and bad workmanship in construction, as well as from mismanagement and abnormal strains through continuous operation, he insisted on extraordinary strength of components.15
At times, Isherwood’s best efforts to forestall engine breakdowns failed. Finding competent engineers when so many were needed was not always possible, as he soon discovered. In July, 1863, Admiral Farragut, in the midst of directing naval operations at the mouth of the Mississippi River, wrote testily to Welles about the poor condition of the new vessels being sent out to him, ascribing the difficulties to the rapid increase in the Engineer Corps. “The majority of them know very little of their duties,” the Admiral said, “and their engines are cut up and ruined by neglect and want of proper care.”16 Welles turned the problem promptly over to Isherwood, remarking that the difficulties apparently stemmed from “employment of incompetent and neglectful persons in the engineer department.” He urged Isherwood to attempt to improve the caliber of the Engineer Corps, especially of the temporary branch comprised of noncareer marine engineers being utilized only for the duration of the war. To safeguard against the employment and appointment of incompetents, Welles informed Isherwood that the department would send a circular letter to all Navy Yard commandants, encouraging a more rigid screening of applicants.17 Isherwood, perhaps more realistic in his view of the situation, continued to design more rugged and fool-proof engines.
Bad workmanship in engine construction was a problem scarcely less serious than that of mishandling by inexperienced engineers. Private contractors were unprepared for the deluge of orders suddenly thrust upon them during the war, and inevitably the quality of their product deteriorated as they struggled to complete their work against rising material and wage costs which threatened to wipe out the handsome profits they had at first envisaged. The likelihood of hidden defects in the hastily made forgings produced by such contractors forced Isherwood, in designing his engines, to use an enormous factor of safety to forestall wholesale engine failures caused by breaking parts.18 This practice, along with the need to protect the engines from the engineers, forced Isherwood into a vulnerable position, and he did not have to wait long for the onslaught of criticism. Yet his engines worked and worked reliably, and that was all that really mattered. Despite occasional complaints from commanding officers, his machinery did all that could reasonably be asked of it; and, considering the circumstances, even a bit more.
Isherwood’s work as Engineer in Chief included more than the design of engines and the supervision of the men operating them. The Navy was unable to build enough ships to meet the sudden demands for blockade and river operations and, consequently, had to embark on a large purchasing program which actually obtained, by the end of the war, more than twice the number of vessels built by the government. The purchase of over 400 steamers, ranging from ferryboats to private yachts, was achieved largely through the remarkable efforts of George D. Morgan, brother-in-law of the Secretary of the Navy. Although accusations of nepotism and of excessive commissions plagued Morgan’s attempts to procure this large fleet for the Navy, there now is little question that he performed invaluable service in obtaining so many vessels at unusually reasonable prices for the government. Isherwood, as the naval engineering expert in the department, was consulted frequently on prospective purchases, as the mechanical reliability of these vessels was paramount.
Perhaps the most time-consuming task for Isherwood was arranging for the building of the engines he had designed for government service. With only a rudimentary bureaucratic organization and a small staff, the executive officers in the Navy Department enjoyed a variety of duties, of which a most significant one was dealing with private contractors. Isherwood, in charge of steam machinery for the Navy, became responsible for making all the contracts for the construction of this machinery, as well as for procuring the necessary supplies, tools, and spare parts. Navy Yards were able to build some of the machinery, but the larger work had to be let out to private marine engine builders, most of whom were located in New York, Boston, or Philadelphia. In order to deal directly and effectively with these private builders, Isherwood spent much of his time traveling up and down the Atlantic Coast, negotiating for the Navy’s machinery.
In contracting for machinery, Isherwood rarely relied on public advertisements for eliciting bids from contractors. Instead, he would announce that the government needed machinery of given specifications and would invite builders to state their quoted price for such equipment. Isherwood would, subsequently, send circular letters to engine builders throughout the country, asking them to contract for a pair of engines at a price based on the lowest estimate he had received. Since he would negotiate with any competent and reputable engine manufacturer, he often asked for contracts with builders who had declined to give him an initial estimate. That there were too few private companies to do all the work meant that Isherwood had to travel around the country trying to persuade engine manufacturers to take on extra business.
If his refusal to contract through open competitive bidding indicated favoritism, it was, nevertheless, a necessary practice. Machinery building was too important and too complicated to be trusted simply to the lowest bidder. To insure the best possible work, Isherwood had to limit his contracts to responsible builders and set a price where they could make a fair profit. Only by this procedure could he protect the quality of his machinery and discourage the horde of opportunists who plagued the government throughout the war with their impassioned and impractical offers to supply its needs.
The normal procedure after contracting with a private builder was for the government to make progress payments as the machinery moved towards completion. Since there was no contractual guarantee by the builder to achieve certain standards of performance, the government was not able to recover funds on machinery which later proved inadequate. Consequently, the only way the government could protect itself was to control the original specifications so rigorously that the contractor, in meeting them, would assure the reliability of the machinery. Isherwood thus prepared extremely elaborate and detailed specifications and drawings for builders, so that, as he expressed it, “there [was] not a bolt, a nut, or a screw left out.” In this way no misunderstanding could occur, and no builder could find a loophole.19
Typical of Isherwood’s negotiation procedure was a trip he took in August, 1861, to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, in which he made arrangements with five of the largest and most experienced marine engine builders for the construction of 5 inclined steam engines. These engines were to be placed in