Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer. Edward William Sloan III
for their superior.
Yet Isherwood was not a martinet merely seeking to gratify his cravings for power by a ruthless rule. If he was “unsparing in criticism,” he was also “generous in approval and commendation.” His professional dedication to both engineering and naval progress had a contagious quality, capable of driving his subordinates to a degree of effort and enthusiasm they had never anticipated. The virtues of and necessity for teamwork were not lost to Isherwood, for “his assistants were always made to feel rather as associates, engaged in advancing a common cause than as subordinates, receiving and executing orders from their superior officer.” In this manner Isherwood drew “zealous co-operation” rather than “perfunctory service” from his men, and the office of the Engineer in Chief operated with an efficiency and a productivity which contributed heavily to the success of the steam Navy throughout the Civil War.8
The magnitude as well as the difficulty of Isherwood’s task was unprecedented. With only a handful of steamers, the American Navy suddenly had been called on to perform a function which required hundreds of vessels, most of which had to run by steam power. To cope with this problem, Isherwood had no traditions and no precedents in creating such a steam fleet. America had never been a big naval power; and, traditionally, had relied on a last-minute collection of whatever ships were available to meet wartime needs. In the Civil War the Navy was as unprepared as ever; but, in addition, it now had the problem of producing warships which had to utilize a relatively new and unpredictable form of propulsion. Never had a naval engineer been faced with this situation, for never before had large-scale naval operations had to rely on steam engines. Throughout the Civil War, all that Isherwood did to design, build, and maintain the motive power of the steam fleet would be unprecedented. It was inevitable that he would make mistakes; the department only hoped that he could meet the challenge.
The most pressing need of the Navy, when Isherwood became Engineer in Chief, was for small gunboats which could be used for close, inshore work and for supporting amphibious operations against Confederate strongholds, such as Port Royal, South Carolina. In March, 1861, there were none of these vessels in the Navy, but Isherwood quickly supplied an answer to the problem. He had recently been employed by the Russian government to design the machinery for two 691-ton gunboats to be used on the Amur River, under the command of the Russian Captain Davidoff. Isherwood not only designed the engines, but also superintended construction of these boats at the Novelty Iron Works, in New York city. When Welles requested the immediate construction of gunboats, Isherwood was able to present him with complete plans of the “Davidoff Gunboat.”
He recommended that Welles immediately contract with the Novelty Iron Works for four such vessels, since the drawings, specifications, and patterns were complete. In addition, the cost of such vessels was known exactly, since Davidoff had visited nearly all the principal American machine shops looking for the lowest bid. Welles showed little enthusiasm for this suggestion, wishing instead to follow the normal government contract procedure of advertising for the gunboats. Isherwood and Lenthall, however, unwilling to waste such a unique advantage, finally persuaded Welles to contract directly with the Novelty Iron Works.
As a result, the first four 9½-knot steamers were built in the phenomenally short time of 90 days, thus earning this class of vessel the name of “ninety-day gunboats.” Ultimately, 23 of these small, heavily armed, screw vessels were built, all of which had the same Isherwood engines, although the last 19 had 60 per cent greater boiler power.9 With nearly all the contracts for these gunboats let in early July, 17 of them were in active service by the end of the year, proving to be of great value to the Union Navy in its early operations.
The next class of vessels built under Isherwood’s supervision was an unusual type, called forth by the exigencies of river operations against Confederate forces. Inland waterways so sinuous that turning a vessel around would be hazardous if not impossible required speedy, shallow-draft boats which could go with equal facility in either direction. For this purpose the Navy decided on a class of side-wheel “double-enders,” of which 12 of the 1,100-ton, 11-knot vessels with rudders at both ends were built, starting in the summer and fall of 1861. These gunboats all used an orthodox, direct-acting inclined engine of Isherwood’s design, and also employed the new feature of forced draft by the use of mechanical blowers.10 In the autumn of 1862 the construction of an improved class of double-enders was under way, these Sassacus-class vessels having a designed speed of 14½ knots, with 4 more double-enders, featuring iron hulls, being able to attain 15 knots.11 These gunboats, displacing 1,173 tons, were considerably larger than the earlier class of double-enders which were about to join the fleet.
Not only were small gunboats needed in great quantity. For cruising at sea, the Navy also required fast screw sloops, able to intercept the coastal blockade-runners which infested southern waters. Fortunately, Congress had authorized the construction of 7 sloops of war in February, 1861. The department, using the plans of sloops built in 1858, constructed 4 of these 1,560-ton vessels, including the Kearsarge, destined for fame in its fateful encounter with the Confederate raider Alabama. Congress also authorized the construction of 10 additional sloops of war at this time, and these were equipped with Isherwood’s machinery.12 Larger than the 1858 models, the new screw steamers varied in size, ranging from 1,934 tons to 2,200 tons, and producing speeds between 12 and 13 knots in the open sea. Construction began early in the fall of 1861.
Near the end of 1862, as Isherwood was working busily upon his improved class of double-enders, additional contracts were let on a class of 12½-knot, small screw sloops. This group of 8 vessels, which included the Nipsic, was intended for cruising close to the shore, as the sloops were only 150 tons larger than the ninety-day gunboats, and were built mainly for speed.13
In addition to the close-in blockade of the southern coastline, the Navy also had to man the “outer line,” approximately one hundred miles offshore, where large, swift cruisers were stationed to cut off the larger blockade-runners and to challenge the formidable Confederate commerce destroyers which roamed the open seas. For this purpose, the Navy Department, in 1863, projected a group of twenty vessels, including both gun-deck frigates and sloops of war. All of these ships were to be built with two-cylinder, back-acting engines of Isherwood’s design. Eight of them, the large frigates, were to displace approximately four thousand tons and have a thirteen-knot speed. Best known of this class were the Antietam and Guerriere, both serving in the Navy for many years. The smaller sloops of war, of the Contoocook class, displaced only three thousand tons, and, consequently, were speedier, being designed for fifteen knots. Of the ten proposed, only four of this class were built.
Finally, in 1863, the Navy Department, with an eye toward possible British and French intervention on the side of the Confederacy, planned a class of supercruisers in which all other qualities were to be subordinated to speed. These vessels, wooden hulled, unarmored, and carrying enough sail power to permit extended periods of cruising without steam, were the result of lessons imperfectly learned from the War of 1812. The aura surrounding the exploits of America’s superfrigates, such as the Constitution, led American naval strategists of the 1860’s to believe that if war with a large commercial power once again came, America would repeat the terrorizing raids of its legendary frigates, and that such exploits would bring the enemy to its knees. Thus there came into being a class of vessels which never took part in the Civil War, but which nevertheless vitally affected the naval and engineering reputation of Benjamin Isherwood. The brief careers of the Wampanoag and her sister ships sounded, in the later 1860’s, a tragic note which would produce echoes in subsequent years as the Navy made its descent into the “dark ages” of American naval history.
Between 1861 and 1865, Benjamin Isherwood designed the machinery for forty-six paddle-wheel vessels and for seventy-nine screw steamers. Not only did he produce the general plans for such machinery, but he spent sixteen to twenty hours a day in his office turning out “the most minutely detailed specifications” and all the working drawings for constructors.14 The ingenious inventors of his day could also turn out engine designs quickly enough, but Isherwood had a further responsibility. His engines had to run, and they had to continue running without breaking down.
The tremendous increase of the Navy’s steam fleet during the war posed