Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer. Edward William Sloan III
and Kittery Navy yards. In reporting about his trip to Welles, Isherwood took pride in having been able to make contracts for a building period 15 days shorter than that for similar engines previously built, and in setting a price 12 per cent less by weight or power.
Unfortunately, Isherwood usually had to give Welles less favorable news. Writing to him in February, 1862, the Engineer in Chief explained that work on the USS Roanoake, in process of conversion into an ironclad at the New York Navy Yard, had halted because he was unable to contract for a propeller shaft. All the private forges were taken up with other work, so that contractors had flatly refused to take on this necessary job.
Finally, Isherwood was able to persuade one builder to cast it in rough form, but when the unfinished shaft was taken to the government machine shop, Isherwood quickly discovered that the finished work could not be done there, since both the largest planer and lathe were inadequate for such a large piece of work and broke down when attempting it. The problem here was twofold; the Navy Department did not have sufficiently large tools to do the work, and private contractors, overwhelmed with both government and private construction, had neither room nor time to take on the work that the Navy yards were unable to handle.
Frequently, engine builders, greedy for profits or overly patriotic, took on Navy Department work they could not possibly handle. With their limited facilities they had to turn to other builders, subletting their contracts, which inevitably resulted in delays. The reputable firm of Pusey and Jones, in Wilmington, Delaware, contracted to do the machinery of the Juniata, promising to complete the work in 140 days. As they had no foundries and forges of their own, they had to sublet to another builder, resulting in a discouraging delay of 164 days more before the machinery could be delivered. Despite Isherwood’s care in negotiating, time and again he discovered these “responsible” builders solemnly engaging for work which they alone could not possibly perform. Out on the Mississippi River or off the Carolina coasts, the Union Navy would ultimately suffer from the lack of a vessel.
There was one problem over which neither the contractors nor the Navy Department had control, and which threatened to throw the entire ship- and machinery-building industry into chaos. During the war the price of gold, measured in United States dollars, fluctuated greatly, reflecting a lack of confidence in the financial stability of the Union. Gold rose in price, especially after the issue in 1862 of greenback paper currency, resulting in a greater depreciation in the value of the dollar. The natural concomitant was soaring costs, particularly for materials and labor. Builders who had made what first had appeared to be profitable contracts with the government suddenly found that they would not make their profit and might even take a serious loss if they received only the contracted price for their machinery. Desperately, they turned to the Navy Department for extensions of time for construction, hoping also to avoid the penalty payments for delay which would further cut into their vanishing profits. Justifiably, they feared new contracts. The rate of inflation became so rapid that builders could no longer depend on short-term arrangements, let alone binding agreements for machinery which might take months to build.
Isherwood’s task became more difficult as inflation cut into contractors’ earnings. Writing to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox, in August, 1862, the Engineer in Chief complained that he could get contracts for only two engines in Boston, because all the other builders objected to both the established price and the delivery date. Fearing that some of them might soon refuse to comply with contracts already signed, Isherwood explained that “prices of labor and material have risen enormously within a week.” Part of the rise in wages was because of the scarcity of labor. To this initial shortage of skilled workers came the complicating factor of the draft, which indiscriminately seized men who were far more valuable to the government by remaining in their civilian occupation. Isherwood begged Fox to obtain for such workers a draft exemption which he hoped would not only enlarge the labor force, but also lower wage costs, thus allowing builders to accept contracts and fulfill them on time. “Indeed, if it is not done,” warned the Engineer in Chief, “I am hopeless of the contracts already out being executed in any reasonable approximation to their time.”20
To get his contracts accepted, Isherwood often had to increase the government’s original price for machinery by 10 per cent and, in addition, extend completion dates for a month or two. “The most willing parties hesitate to accept,” reported the discouraged engineer in another letter to Fox, “nothing will induce them but a price under which they will be safe at the expected advance.” Because of the soaring labor costs, “common riveters for boiler work are now getting two dollars a day, and first-class workmen two and a half to three dollars. . . .”21
Throughout the nation, shipyard workers, conscious of the sudden rise in their value, demanded better pay. “At the Morgan Works the men have struck for higher wages,” Isherwood wrote to Fox, from New York city, “and at all the others the wages have been raised within the last week from 10 to 15 cents a day.” Preparing to leave for Boston, Isherwood warned the Secretary of the difficulty in obtaining any contracts for engines. He would try to persuade the builders to take as many engines as possible, but this would be a formidable task, since, “the principal objection to the price offered is the expectation that labor and materials will advance 16 per centum before the work can be completed.” Little wonder that the engine builders demanded a fat margin of profit.22
When the Navy Department planned to build a new group of larger geared engines, in 1863, Isherwood found only three builders willing to consider the job. Asking them to build the machinery in ten months, he found that the contractors refused to do the work in less than twelve. They had the facilities to do the job in ten months, they said, but lacked the raw materials and skilled labor, regardless of the price they were willing to pay to hire such labor. Isherwood had to agree to the longer time period and to the price of $700,000 for each engine, which was actually not too steep, he reflected in a letter to Welles, “when the present enormous rates for wages and materials are considered, with the great prospective increase anticipated in both.”23
Traveling constantly to inspect vessels and make contracts for new ones, Isherwood could not afford any interruptions. When he fell from a ladder while inspecting the Tacony, in Philadelphia, he refused to stop work, although he had badly sprained his ankle and possibly fractured some of the smaller bones in his foot. With his ankle too swollen to determine the extent of his injuries, Isherwood wrote Assistant Secretary Fox on July 2, 1863, “I shall be in Washington Monday morning, on a pair of crutches I regret to add, but I shall be there.,, Furious at the delays caused by this ill-timed injury, Isherwood, oblivious of his own discomfort, apologized to Fox, “Nothing can be more inopportune than this accident. The pain and personal inconvenience I do not regard, but the loss of time, now so precious, grieves me much.” Refusing to rest his ankle, Isherwood had it encased in a bandage filled with crushed ice, and hobbled into the offices of New York machinery builders, seeking contracts. His insistence on carrying on business as usual occasionally produced a ludicrous situation. When visiting the offices of Morris and Towne, New York engine builders, Isherwood was able to discuss engine contracts successfully with these men, but, as he wryly remarked, “with my back on the floor and Mr. Towne fomenting the ankle with ice water.”24
As the war continued, the Navy Department found it harder to obtain its machinery. In February, 1864, when asking for estimates on a group of thirty engines for the Sassacus class of double-enders, Isherwood received only four proposals. Setting the price and building time on the basis of these estimates, he once again trudged around the country, successfully restraining his blunt and tactless nature while applying “much personal solicitation” to get twenty-seven of the engines contracted for. As ever, the price was too low and the time required was too short. In order to make his contracts at all, Isherwood had to promise not to exact penalty payments from contractors if they ran over the allotted time, so long as they continued to act in good faith. As he told Welles, he could not have contracted for more than six engines without this promise to make the forfeiture clause a dead letter.
“Unexpected and unprecedented rise of price in material and labor . . . disorganization of labor by strikes and its withdrawal for military purposes . . . difficulty of procuring materials . . .” appeared constantly in the reports of Isherwood to his superior, and there