Reglas insensatas. Freddy Escobar Rozas
generally (due to adverse effects on work incentives) and the additional cost involved in adopting less efficient legal rules.” (Kaplow y Shavell, 2002, pp. 33 y 34).
60 Las herramientas constituyen los medios que el legislador tiene para obtener los fines deseados (resolución de los desafíos funcionales). La forma en la que estas herramientas han de ser empleadas constituye los planes que el legislador diseña para obtener los fines en cuestión.
61 “Los sistemas legales operan con dos tipos de normas: reglas y estándares. Las reglas establecen ex ante qué se debe hacer o qué no se debe hacer. La norma legal que dispone que no se debe conducir en la Calle C a más de 50 kilómetros por hora contiene una regla, pues los conductores saben, desde un primer momento, que incurrirán en una situación de incumplimiento si conducen a 60 kilómetros por hora. Los estándares, por su parte, establecen ex post qué se debe hacer o qué no se debe hacer. La norma legal que dispone que en la Calle C se debe conducir a ‘velocidad prudente’ contiene un estándar, en tanto que los conductores no saben, desde un primer momento, que incurrirán en una situación de incumplimiento si conducen a 60 kilómetros por hora. La configuración de dicha situación dependerá de la interpretación que tenga el juez del concepto ‘velocidad prudente’. Esa interpretación estará sustentada en los hechos particulares del caso (p.e. ¿el conductor transitaba de día o de noche?). Por consiguiente, solo después de concluido el respectivo proceso judicial, un conductor sabrá si 60 kilómetros por hora constituye, para ese caso, ‘velocidad prudente’” (Escobar, 2020, p. 156).
62 Incluso la interpretación textual es contextual. Como indica Slocum: “[c]onsideration of context is appropriate and often necessary in determining the ordinary meaning of the textual language. To interpret acontextually is, often, to misinterpret” (Slocum, 2017, p. 29).
63 “Meta-interpretative debates cover a wide range topics, including whether to rely on parliamentary intent and legislative history, defer to administrative agencies, follow judicial precedent in constitutional and statutory interpretation, recognize evolving social mores, accept authority of treatise writers, and so on. But the principal disagreement over interpretation methodology has always been between those who favor stricter forms of interpretation versus those who prefer looser ones. Advocates of textualism insist that the plain meaning of legal text be followed. For them, the letter of the law controls. By contrast, those who favor some form of purposivism maintain that it is proper in some instances for interpreters to bypass the literal reading of an authoritative text. When the text recommends a course of action that is contrary to the purpose for which it was enacted, purposivists believe it a dereliction of duty to follow the letter of the law. Nonlawyers are often perplexed at this debate. Some think that it is obvious that legal texts ought to be construed strictly. If the law says ‘No vehicles are permitted in the park’, then no vehicles are permitted in the park – end of story (…) Others take the opposite tack. They cannot see the point of sticking to the letter of the law when doing so would be counterproductive. The function of the law, to them is to make our lives better off. What justification could there possibly be, on this view, for not letting an ambulance though a park if that is the quickest route to the hospital?” (Shapiro, 2011, p. 353).
64 “The training of lawyers is a training of logic. The process of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of a man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place” (Holmes, 1897, p. 460)
65 La organización política de las ciudades griegas requiere la participación activa de los ciudadanos en las asambleas y en las cortes. Estos últimos, por tanto, precisan desarrollar una habilidad especial: convencer a la audiencia. En este contexto florece una singular actividad profesional dirigida a transmitir la habilidad de la “persuasión”. Los primeros “retóricos” se concentran en explorar las formas de convencer a la audiencia a través de las emociones. Posteriormente, Platón y Aristóteles amplían el espectro de la retórica, al considerar la necesidad de desarrollar argumentos lógicos, a través del dominio de dos tipos de conocimiento: (i) el conocimiento formal (dialéctica), que permite realizar juicios inductivos y deductivos; y, (ii) el conocimiento sustancial (ética), que permite desarrollar ideas sobre lo justo, lo injusto, etc. En esta línea, en “Rhĕtorikĕ” Aristóteles propone tres métodos técnicos de persuasión. En orden de importancia, el primero se sustenta en la autoridad del argumento (“logos”). El segundo se sustenta en la personalidad del orador (“ethos”). El tercero se sustenta en la emoción generada en la audiencia (“pathos”). Posteriormente, los filósofos estoicos desarrollan con mayor énfasis el método de la autoridad del argumento. Así, en “De Inventione” Cicerón desarrolla diversas fórmulas conceptuales para elaborar argumentos (i) sobre cualquier materia y (ii) en favor de cualquier posición.
66 Arts. 1138, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1160, 1316, 1431, 1432, 1433.
67 El sentido común permite anticipar que bajo la FSFC tanto los costos de transacción como las rentas se incrementarán, pues los arrendadores razonablemente exigirán el pago de una “prima” a cambio de asumir el riesgo de la terminación del contrato a causa de la imposibilidad de los arrendatarios de obtener los beneficios que esperan.
68 “In drawing analogies, we say that some aspect of a current problem is similar to some aspect of a past problem, and thus we should learn -sometimes to follow sometimes to avoid- from the previous event. When, for example, it was argued at the time of the first Iraq war, in 1991, that Sadam Hussein was “like” Adolf Hitler, the point was to show that because Hitler was a dangerous dictator who invaded other countries and needed to be stopped, it followed that Sadam Hussein, also a dangerous dictator who invaded other countries, needed to stopped as well (…) The analogical argumentative structure was the same for those who argued against the second Iraq war, in 2002, by using than analogy between that war and the war in Vietnam. Then the crux of their argument was that Iraq and Vietnam were both situations in which conventional warfare was impossible and in which American military knowledge of the culture, terrain, and language was minimal. Because Vietnam turned into a long, costly and ultimately unsuccessful military venture, so the argument went, the similar situation in Iraq presented similar dangers and should therefore be avoided” (Schauer, 2009, p. 86).
69 “Implicit in this standard picture of analogy is that the person drawing the analogy has a choice of source analogs and selects one from among multiples possibilities on the basis of its being the most useful in making a decision or the most valuable for persuading someone else of the wisdom of a decision already made (…) lawyers do not select analogies that they believe will not lead someone –judge or jury- to the conclusion that they are advocating, and judges do not select