U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James
supposed that there were good regulations in both. Let us therefore contrast the one with the other, and consolidate such parts of them as the committee approve." — Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 140.
King, in his notes, gives a résumé of his speech. It illustrates the accuracy of Madison's reporting:
"Answer (R. King) The States under the confed. are not sovereign States they can do no act but such as are of a subordinate nature or such as terminate in themselves — and even these are restrained — coinage, P. office &c. they are wholly incompetent to the exercise of any of the gt. & distinguishing acts of sovereignty — They can neither make nor receive (embassies) to or from any other sovereign — they have not the powers of injuring another or of defending themselves from an Injury offered from one another — they are deaf, dumb and impotent — these Faculties are yielded up and the U. S. in C. Assd. hold and possess them, and they alone can exercise them — they are so far out of the controul of the separate States yt. if every State in the Union was to instruct yr. Deleg., and those Delegates within ye powers of the Arts. of Union shd. do an act in violation of their Instructions it wd. nevertheless be valid. If they declared a war, any giving aid or comfort to the enemy wd. be Treason; if peace, any capture on the high seas wd. be piracy. This remark proves yt. the States are now subordinate corporations or societies and not sovereigns — these imperfect States are the confederates and they are the electors of the magistrates who exercise the national sovereignty. The Articles of Confedr. and perpetual Union, are partly federal & partly of the nature of a constitution or form of Govt. arising from and applying to the Citizens of the U. S. & not from the individual States.
"The only criterion of determining what is federal & what is national is this, those acts which are for the government of the States only are purely federal, those which are for the government of the Citizens of the individual States are national and not federal.
"If then the articles of Confedr. & perpetual union have this twofold capacity, and if they provide for an alteration in a certain mode, why may not they be so altered as that the federal article may be changed to a national one, and the national to a federal? I see no argument that can be objected to the authority. The 5th article regulates the influence of the several States and makes them equal — does not the confed. authorize this alteration, that instead of this Equality, one state may have double the Influence of another — I conceive it does — and so of every Article except that wh. destroys the Idea of a confedy. I think it may be proved that every article may be totally altered provided you have one guarantying to each State the right of regulating its private & internal affairs in the manner of a subordinate corporation.
"But admitting that the Arts, of Confed. & perpet. Union, or the powers of the Legis. did not extend to the proposed Reform; yet the public Deputations & the public Danger require it — the system proposed to be adopted is no scheme of a day, calculated to postpone the hour of Danger, & thus leave it to fall with double ruin on our successors — It is no crude and undigested plan; the child of narrow and unextensive views, brought forward under the Auspices of Cowardice & Irresolution — It is a measure of Decision, it is the foundation of Freedom & of national Glory. It will draw on itself and be able to support the severest scrutiny & Examination. It is no idle experiment, no romantic speculation — the measure forces itself upon wise men, and if they have not firmness to look it in the face and protect it — Farewell to the Freedom of our Government — our military glory will be tarnished and our boasts of Freedom will be the scorn of the Enemies of Liberty." — Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 602, n.
4 "Mr. Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney general for the State of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses a good deal of information, but he has a very bad delivery, and so extremely prolix, that he never speaks without tiring the patience of all who hear him. He is about 34 years of age." — Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
Wednesday June 20. 1897. In Convention
Mr. William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1st propos: of the Report of Committee of the whole, before the House.
Mr. Elseworth seconded by Mr. Gorham, moves to alter it so as to run "that the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would drop the word national, and retain the proper title "the United States." He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting. He wished also the plan of the Convention to go forth as an amendment of the articles of the Confederation, since under this idea the authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did not like these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions.
Mr. Randolph. did not object to the change of expression, but apprised the gentleman who wished for it that he did not admit it for the reasons assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people for ratification. The motion of Mr. Ellsworth was acquiesced in nem: con:
The 2d Resol: "that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches" taken up, the word "national" struck out as of course.
Mr. Lansing. observed that the true question here was, whether the Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2d Resolution, "that the powers of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress." He had already assigned two reasons against such an innovation as was proposed: 1. the want of competent powers in the Convention. — 2. the state of the public mind. It had been observed by (Mr. Madison) in discussing the first point, that in two States the Delegates to Congress were chosen by the people. Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the Delegates however chosen, did not represent the people merely as so many individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State. (Mr. Randolph) put it, he said, on its true footing namely that the public safety superseded the scruple arising from the review of our powers. But in order to feel the force of this consideration, the same impression must be had of the public danger. He had not himself the same impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. (Mr. Wilson) contended that as the Convention were only to recommend, they might recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever of so respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there was no certain criterion of the Public mind on the subject. He therefore recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition in the States to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those possessing Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to make some observations on the plan itself and the arguments urged in support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from their comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been said that Congress represent the State Prejudices: will not any other body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague (Col. Hamilton) that there was no coincidence of interests among the large States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States, there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is proposed that the General Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of the States. Is