U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James
the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every precaution the General Government would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Governments.
Mr. Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment from the General Government than from the State Governments 2. that the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. — But it will be said that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the General Government will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Governments of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the General Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations dependent on the General Legislature; Why should it follow that the General Government wouldtake from the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Government to State Governments is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments of the State Governments on the General Government than of the latter on the former. The great objection made against an abolition of the State Governments was that the General Government could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not against the probable abuse of the general power, but against the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the General Government itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the General Government to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Governments the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the General Government to absorb the State Governments no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Governments towards an independence on the General Government and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of two Branches"
Mass. ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland divd. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The third resolution of the Report taken into consideration.
General Pinkney moved "that the 1st branch, instead of being elected by the people, should be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct." He urged 1. that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the conveniency & opinions of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant parts of the Republic.
Mr. L. Martin seconded the Motion.3
Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded against. All too must admit the possibility, in case the General Government should maintain itself, that the State Governments might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore should not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people. Whatever inconveniency may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the Government. It is the only security for the rights of the people.
Mr. Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is content with the plan as it stands.
Mr. Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The Delegates to Congress he thought had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large.
Mr. Wilson considered the election of the 1st branch by the people not only as the Corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense. The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the General Government and perhaps to that of the people themselves.
Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures wouldconstantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that would be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those of the General Government: and mentioned particularly a competition between the National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.
General Pinkney was for making the State Governments a part of the General System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina & other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Government.
On the question for General Pinkney motion to substitute election of the 1st branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being elected by the people"
Massachusetts no. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania no. Del. ay. Maryland divd. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
General Pinkney then moved that the 1st branch be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waived it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan.
On the question for the election of the 1st branch by the people"
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland divd. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Election of the 1st branch "for the term of three years," considered.
Mr. Randolph moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two years" — he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks against the popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire. The people were attached to frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States except that of S. Carolina, had established annual elections.
Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the antient Usage of England, a country much less extensive