U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James
was the most convenient resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of Congress on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to trust Congress with power to draw a revenue from Trade. There is no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Congress for money matters being the most important of all, if the people will trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other necessary powers. Congress indeed by the confederation have in fact the right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be applied: and this right was granted to them in the expectation that it would in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be added to Congress to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass. The people would not much interest themselves in the elections, a few designing men in the large districts would carry their points, and the people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than in Congress. He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should be unfriendly as had been suggested, to Congress. If they appoint Congress and approve of their measures, they would be rather favourable and partial to them. The disparity of the States in point of size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great and general points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of Virginia notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation without, or even proposing, any alteration. Massachusetts also ratified without any material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications is the want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the States as some had proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations, which had been formed with us, as Confederated States. He did not however suppose that the creation of two branches in the Legislature would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two branches, and a proportional representation in one of them, provided each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three or four of the large States would rule the others as they please. Each State like each individual had its peculiar habits usages and manners, which constituted its happiness. It would not therefore give to others a power over this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.
Mr. Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a proper model were not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some at least short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12 since the commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it went on even against the difficulties arising from Congress themselves. He admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same motive to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures & the General Legislature: observing that the members of the former would have views & feelings very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private Citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the General or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congress to the people at large, had always been better received & produced greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take up Mr. Lansing's proposition "to vest the powers of legislation in Congress"
Massachusetts no. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania no. Del. ay. Maryland divd. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2d Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed till tomorrow.
Adjourned.
Thursday June 21. In Convention
Mr. Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.1
Doctor Johnson.2 On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of the States. The plan from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State Governments. Mr. Wilson & the gentleman from Virginia who also were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different language. They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, tho' a subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however shewn how this could consist with, or be secured against the general sovereignty & jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the National Government. If this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N. Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He wished it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as was proposed, should retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate effectually in the General Government, without giving them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general Councils.
Mr. Wilson's respect for Doctor Johnson, added to the importance of the subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the General Government and individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each other; and how the latter could be secured against the former? Might it not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured against the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the General & particularGovernments. As the plan now stood, tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the General Government (the Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the General Government would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the General Government of defending itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the State Government. If a security be necessary on one side, it wouldseem reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the States from the General Government. In case a combination should be made by the large ones it wouldproduce a general alarm among the rest; and the project would be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wouldtake place in the National Legislature itself, that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and wouldfinally spread among the people at large. The General Government will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Governments in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from which it was apprehended.