Into Action. Dan Harvey
dictated it was me and I was all too aware of the potential dangers and wondered how best to deal with them. Glancing to my left as we advanced early on I noticed, looking down a connecting side road, the Swedes advancing along on a parallel route with APCs.
As they advanced their APCs were pouring ‘anticipatory fire’ from their twin box-fed Madsen machine guns into anywhere in advance [where] they felt attackers may be lurking so I raised my Carl Gustav sub-machine gun to my shoulder and did likewise and was quickly joined by the Vickers machine gun fire from the two Ford armoured cars. By means then of this ‘active defence’, while hugely exposed on the move, was how we proceeded, hoping to seize the initiative from any would-be attackers, nullifying their advantage. That there wasn’t anyone there or those that were decided the better of taking us on, the net effect was us reaching Liege crossroads without being fired on. The Swedes on the left route, us on the right route, Point ‘E’ between us.
The Irish battalion perimeter was now extended along Kasenga and Savonniers as far as Liege. B Company had earlier cleared from the Police Camp to the beginnings of Rue De Kasenga, whereupon the Swedes continued. Lieutenant Kiely had been injured by small arms fire. If the firing along the parallel routes had not provoked a direct response from the Gendarmerie then it was because they were only waiting to do so by indirect mortar fire. The ‘danger from the sky’ was to rain down for days.
Mortar fire is deadly, its lethality derived not so much from its explosive effect, unless it was an unlikely but possible direct hit, rather from the slivers of fragmenting shrapnel subsequent to the shredding of its outer metallic case on impact; a killing radius of around 25–50 metres. The larger the calibre, the greater the killing zone. Mortar bombs are fired – more correctly launched – indirectly, that is not in a straight direct line of sight from firer to target but instead lobbed from a firing line onto a target area, up and over in an indirect flight path following an arch-like trajectory. Mortars themselves are essentially metal tubes with a fixed firing pin inside at its base, the desired direction and distance governed by the angle of elevation at which it is set thereby controlling the fall of shot. The mortar bomb, or round, is dropped down the tube, its base striking the fixed firing pin and projected skywards, the tailfin keeping its direction in flight steady and true. Individual pin-point precision is not required due to the dispersive nature of its deadly debris. Accuracy, especially over distance, can be hampered by poor use of the weapon, varying wind direction or fluctuating wind strengths, and so can cause mortar bombs to fall short, long or wide. Some fall on or near the target area but do not explode. These ‘blinds’ need careful consideration because they could yet explode by themselves or if inadvertently disturbed. There is also a potential danger that in a rapid fire situation a mortar bomb is slid down the tube and does not launch. Then the firers, thinking it has exited, drop a subsequent mortar bomb down the tube which explodes on contact with the one already in it; this is known as a ‘double-feed’.
An indirect fire support weapon’s main use is to suppress enemy movement in defence or attack, to subdue their activities, to keep their advance in check, to lay down defensive fire, or to otherwise ‘fix’ them in position while one’s own troops manoeuvre in the advance. ‘Harassing fire’ – intermittent indiscriminate firing onto a fixed position – can achieve the hoped-for demoralisation of an enemy. Underpinning all this, their main use is to kill.
Fired singularly or in pairs, more often in groups, the more mortar bombs arriving onto a position, the more ground surface is covered, and so in this sense it is an area weapon. Such a grouping of mortars causes them to be referred to collectively and conventionally as a battery, and their fire as mortar battery fire. Their use is not the sole preserve of any one side or the other, often mortar fire is used to respond to an enemy mortar firing line. Such ‘counter battery’ (CB) fire is conducted by mortars of equal calibre. These duels, however, frequently escalate in the number of mortars employed and use of higher calibre ones for more impact at longer ranges. Because they are fired indirectly, concealed from the enemy’s observation, a Mobile Fire Controller (MFC) or ‘spotter’ gives directions and adjustments of the fall of shot onto the target. For him to do so he has to have direct line of sight onto the target, to see the rounds’ impact, how near, far, or wide, and communicate with the mortar firing line to call in the adjustments. Discovering the enemy spotter’s likely position and neutralising him is a way of disrupting the process and this makes his job a hazardous one.
Significantly, the Liege crossroads was now in Irish hands and those Gendarmerie accustomed to occupying certain houses from which they opened fire on the Irish camp got a hot reception when they found the houses occupied by the Irish at last light and fled under a hail of fire. Infuriated by the loss of Liege crossroads, a very severe mortar barrage was placed on the Irish positions during the night. Irish mortars replied and approximately 105 mortar bombs fell throughout the battle area. Trooper Sheridan and Corporal Ferguson received shrapnel wounds and Corporal Gorman received a bullet wound; three more added to A Company’s casualty roll.
The following day, 11 December, Point ‘E’, the Liege crossroads, again came under heavy mortar fire. The determined barrage impacts sent dirt flying in a wealth of noise and smoke that sucked the air out of the atmosphere, the combined effect being highly disorienting causing those on the receiving end to feel highly debilitated. The danger caused a panicked scramble for cover, to get behind something – anything – but to get some object, layer or structure between you and the incoming mortar shells; every second urgent as it might be your last, shelter always seeming too far away. Is your dugout deep enough, its top-cover sufficiently protective? Shouting, curses, heart thumping madly – ‘thud, bang’ after ‘thud, bang’ after ‘thud, bang’. Then silence. An acute silence, a momentary dizzy yet very deep silence, the only disturbance your own thoughts that surely no one else could have survived that. But is it actually over? You stir tentatively. Is it only a lull, will a misfire explode belatedly? You strain to hear the telltale whistle of further incoming shells. Nothing. You peer around, your weapon close at hand. During the barrage there were six direct hits alone on Point ‘E’. Yet amid the menacing mayhem, there were lighter moments as well, as Lieutenant Sean Norton describes:
We were dug-in, defending a strategic crossroads, with our HQ 200m to the rear. An hour before sunset we were subject to a mortar-bomb attack in the form of a creeping barrage, moving from front to rear. As the bombs came nearer [to] the HQ the personnel there were ordered to their trenches.
The first man to reach the large trench at the end of the garden was the head cook. As he was about to jump in he stopped suddenly at the entrance. This caused the others behind him to form a very agitated queue. By now the bombs were ripping up the adjoining garden fences, showering them with debris. Everybody was shouting: ‘Jump in!’ to which he replied: ‘I can’t, there’s a fucking frog in it.’ Needless to say, he was dumped head first in on top of the hapless frog, with his comrades in on top of him.
The Moral? It is not always the obvious that frightens.
Inevitably, accompanying small arms fire poured in from the area of the Tunnel itself and south of Avenue Kasenga. Captain McIntyre, B Company, received a bullet wound while his platoon were assisting A Company. Irish mortars replied.
By day three at Liege crossroads, 12 December – over forty-eight hours since the bombardment commenced – attrition began to take effect. The constant wearing down of stamina, weakening of nerve, wrecking of resolve; these and more are called into question as weariness seeps into the senses. This is where self-belief, confidence and concentration are required and four times during the night Commandant Fitzpatrick, Company Commander of A Company, called for mortar support fire to break up Gendarmerie concentrations in forward positions. Inevitably, Katangese mortars replied and incredibly, unmercifully, unimaginably, Sergeant Paddy Mulcahy was wounded again for an unlikely second time, twice in five days. Tragically these were injuries he was to die from four days later. Privates Woodcock, Desmond and Confrey also took shrapnel wounds during these mortar barrages. At last light, in order to neutralise the Katangese mortar fire, Irish battalion mortars laid down a heavy barrage on Katangese positions. Notwithstanding, intermittent mortar fire fell on all Irish positions during the night. Subsequently these mortar positions were successfully located and fired on by the Irish.
The confrontations during